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The 120-day verification rule in New York no-fault after Chapa v MVAIC
Additional Verification

The 120-Day Verification Rule in New York No-Fault: Chapa v MVAIC and How the Rule Developed

By Jason Tenenbaum 39 min read

Key Takeaway

Chapa v MVAIC (2d Dept 2026): 11 NYCRR 65-3.8(b)(3) permits a denial after 120 days and sets no 150-day limit. How the rule developed, decision by decision.

This article is part of our ongoing additional verification coverage, with 92 published articles analyzing additional verification issues across New York State. Attorney Jason Tenenbaum brings 24+ years of hands-on experience to this analysis, drawing from his work on more than 1,000 appeals, over 100,000 no-fault cases, and recovery of over $100 million for clients throughout Nassau County, Suffolk County, Queens, Brooklyn, Manhattan, and the Bronx. For personalized legal advice about how these principles apply to your specific situation, contact our Long Island office at (516) 750-0595 for a free consultation.

This page was published February 25, 2026. Corrected September 22, 2026: the earlier version's title, summary and search snippet said that when a provider fails to respond to a verification request within 120 days, no denial is required. The opinion does not hold that. In Chapa Prods., Corp. v MVAIC, 245 AD3d 880 (2d Dept, January 28, 2026), MVAIC had denied the claim; the Appellate Term had held the denial untimely because it was mailed more than 150 days after the initial verification request; the Second Department reversed because 11 NYCRR 65-3.8(b)(3) permits a denial once more than 120 calendar days have passed and sets no time limit for issuing it. The holding concerns when a denial may issue, not whether one is needed. This page is the hub for no-fault verification in the Legal Encyclopedia, and its directory of the firm's decision notes is kept below in full; the statements of the rule have been rewritten from the regulation and the opinions.

The short version

An applicant who receives a verification request must, within 120 calendar days of the initial request, supply every item under its control or possession, or written proof providing reasonable justification for not supplying it (11 NYCRR 65-3.5(o)). If neither arrives in that time, and the request warned of the consequence, the insurer "may issue a denial" (11 NYCRR 65-3.8(b)(3)). In Chapa Prods., Corp. v MVAIC, 245 AD3d 880 (2d Dept, January 28, 2026), the Second Department held that the regulation "unambiguously" permits that denial and sets no time frame for issuing it, and reversed the Appellate Term's 150-day cutoff. MVAIC had issued a denial. Nothing in the opinion says a denial is unnecessary.

Why this page exists

This page is the hub for no-fault verification in the Legal Encyclopedia. The firm’s notes on the verification decisions of the Appellate Term and the Appellate Division from 2008 to 2023 are collected in the directory at the end of this page. The February 2026 version of this page read the 2026 Chapa opinion as dispensing with the denial. It does not, and the note above says so. The rule statements below were rewritten from the text of 11 NYCRR 65-3.5(o) and 65-3.8(b)(3) and from the opinions listed under Sources, each read for this revision.

Use the directory this way. The entries are grouped by the question each decision answers, newest first within each group, each with the month it was published and the note’s own one-line summary. An entry is marked as reversed only where an opinion read for this revision says so; there is one, the November 2019 Chapa note.

The current rule

Section 65-3.5(o) of the regulation puts the obligation on the applicant: “An applicant from whom verification is requested shall, within 120 calendar days from the date of the initial request for verification, submit all such verification under the applicant’s control or possession or written proof providing reasonable justification for the failure to comply.” The same subdivision requires the request to advise the applicant that the insurer may deny the claim if neither arrives within the 120 days.

Section 65-3.8(b)(3) supplies the consequence. Its first sentence is the older rule: an insurer “shall not issue a denial of claim form (NYS form NF-10) prior to its receipt of verification of all of the relevant information requested.” Its second sentence is the 2013 addition: “However, an insurer may issue a denial if, more than 120 calendar days after the initial request for verification, the applicant has not submitted all such verification under the applicant’s control or possession or written proof providing reasonable justification for the failure to comply, provided that the verification request so advised the applicant as required in section 65-3.5(o) of this Subpart.”

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Both subdivisions exclude a prescribed NF form, a medical examination request and an examination under oath request, and both apply to medical services rendered on or after April 1, 2013 (for lost earnings and other expenses, to accidents on or after that date). A request outside those lines is governed by the first sentence alone and by the toll in section 65-3.8(a)(1): benefits are not overdue until 30 calendar days after the insurer receives proof of claim, “which shall include verification of all of the relevant information requested.”

The appellate position is Chapa. The Second Department read the second sentence of section 65-3.8(b)(3) as one that “unambiguously states” that the insurer “may issue a denial” after the 120 days, and found that “[t]he regulations do not specify a time frame under which the insurer must issue a denial following the 120-day period.” Consequently, a denial on the 120-day ground is not untimely because of the number of days between the initial request and the denial. That is the whole of the holding. The court did not decide what “reasonable justification” means, did not decide whether a partial response ever satisfies the subdivision, and did not say that an insurer may treat a claim as closed without issuing a denial.

An insurer that never denies is where it has always been: the claim is not overdue until the verification arrives (11 NYCRR 65-3.8(a)(1)), and an action on it is premature. The 2019 Chapa decision, 66 Misc 3d 16 (App Term, 2d Dept, November 1, 2019), said as much (“merely provides that an insurer ‘may’ issue a denial”), and the 2026 reversal did not touch that passage.

The clocks that surround the rule, in order:

The clocks

Every verification deadline in 11 NYCRR part 65, from the bill forward

  1. 15business days Insurer requests additional verification11 NYCRR 65-3.5(b): "within 15 business days of receipt of the prescribed verification forms." A late request does not forfeit the verification; it shortens the 30 days to pay or deny by the delay (11 NYCRR 65-3.8(l); Nyack Hosp. v General Motors Acceptance Corp., 8 NY3d 294 (2007)).
  2. 30+10calendar days Insurer follows up11 NYCRR 65-3.6(b): if the verification "has not been supplied to the insurer 30 calendar days after the original request, the insurer shall, within 10 calendar days, follow up," by documented telephone call or by mail, and tell the applicant and the applicant's attorney in writing what is missing and from whom it was requested.
  3. 120calendar days Applicant answers, or explains in writing11 NYCRR 65-3.5(o): counted "from the date of the initial request," not from receipt and not from the follow-up. Everything under the applicant's control or possession, or "written proof providing reasonable justification for the failure to comply." The request must have warned of a possible denial.
  4. 121+no cutoff Insurer may deny on the 120-day ground11 NYCRR 65-3.8(b)(3): the insurer "may issue a denial." Chapa Prods., Corp. v MVAIC, 245 AD3d 880 (2d Dept, January 28, 2026): the regulations "do not specify a time frame" for that denial; the Appellate Term's 150-day cutoff (66 Misc 3d 16, November 1, 2019) was reversed.
  5. 30calendar days Pay or deny once the verification is in11 NYCRR 65-3.8(a)(1) and (c): benefits are overdue 30 calendar days after the insurer receives proof of claim, "which shall include verification of all of the relevant information requested." An EUO or medical examination counts as received on the day it is held.
  6. Outof the rule What 65-3.5(o) and 65-3.8(b)(3) do not reachA prescribed NF form, a medical examination request and an examination under oath request. Medical services before April 1, 2013; for wage and expense claims, accidents before that date.

How the rule developed in New York

The rule has three ages: eleven years in which an unanswered request simply kept a claim open, the amendment that let the insurer close it, and thirteen years of decisions about what closing it requires. The timeline lists each step with its date, court and holding. The prose after it says what each step did not decide.

The timeline

How the 120-day verification rule developed in New York, 2002 to 2026

  1. 2002April 4 Revised Regulation 68 takes effect11 NYCRR part 65 repealed and replaced. Additional verification requested within 15 business days (65-3.5(b)); follow-up within 10 days after 30 (65-3.6(b)); no denial before all requested verification is received (65-3.8(b)(3)); benefits overdue 30 days after proof of claim including that verification (65-3.8(a)(1)). No deadline for the applicant to answer. Upheld in Matter of Medical Socy. of State of N.Y. v Serio, 100 NY2d 854 (October 21, 2003).
  2. 2007March 22 and November 20 The Court of Appeals states the verification tollNyack Hosp. v General Motors Acceptance Corp., 8 NY3d 294: an insurer "is not obligated to pay any claim until it has been so verified," and a request one business day late shortens the 30 days by one day. Hospital for Joint Diseases v Travelers Prop. Cas. Ins. Co., 9 NY3d 312: the 30-day window "is tolled until it receives the relevant information requested," and a carrier that fails to deny within the 30 days "is generally precluded from asserting a defense."
  3. 2009November 17 Silence leaves the claim open with no way to close itInfinity Health Prods., Ltd. v Eveready Ins. Co., 67 AD3d 862 (2d Dept): the provider ignored the initial and the follow-up request; the 30-day period "did not commence to run"; the action was premature and dismissed "without prejudice to commencement of a new action." A follow-up mailed three days early did not cost the insurer the toll.
  4. 2013April 1 The 120-day rule arrivesSubdivision (o) added to 11 NYCRR 65-3.5 (120 calendar days; the warning in the request) and a second sentence added to 65-3.8(b)(3) ("an insurer may issue a denial"). Subdivision (p) added: an insurer's technical defect or missed time frame "shall not negate an applicant's obligation to comply." Applies to medical services rendered on or after April 1, 2013.
  5. 2017September 22 First appellate application: a receipt disputeTAM Med. Supply Corp. v Tri State Consumers Ins. Co., 57 Misc 3d 133(A) (App Term, 2d Dept): the insurer showed prima facie that it had not received the verification within 120 days; the provider's mailing affidavit raised a presumption of mailing and receipt; triable issue. When the denial had to issue was not decided.
  6. 2018June 8 Fourth Department: a timely objection must be decidedMatter of Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. (Elite Med. Supply of N.Y., LLC), 162 AD3d 1471: a master arbitrator did not exceed his power in holding that a claimant who answers within the 120 days with a "reasonable justification" is entitled to have that objection decided and, if it is overruled, to produce the information before the claim is denied.
  7. 2018September 17 and November 16 Both Appellate Terms: no answer, no case; a mailing affidavit, a trialVillage Med. Supply, Inc. v Travelers Prop. Cas. Ins. Co., 61 Misc 3d 126(A) (App Term, 1st Dept): a provider that "failed to respond to timely requests" has a premature claim, and an objection that the insurer had no "good reason" under 65-3.2(c) raises no issue. Solution Bridge, Inc. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 61 Misc 3d 143(A) (App Term, 2d Dept): the insurer's proof of requests, non-receipt and a timely denial was met by a mailing affidavit; triable issue.
  8. 2019April 12 "Not needed" is not a reasonable justificationCPM Med Supply, Inc. v State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 63 Misc 3d 140(A) (App Term, 2d Dept): a written answer that requested invoices were "not needed" was neither a sufficient response nor a "reasonable justification for the failure to comply"; on post-April 2013 services the insurer "was entitled to dismissal of plaintiff's complaint with prejudice."
  9. 2019November 1 Appellate Term, Second Department, adds a 150-day denial deadline (2 to 1)Chapa Prods. Corp. v MVAIC, 66 Misc 3d 16: the denial must issue within 150 days of the initial request, "30 days after the insurer is permitted to conclude" that the applicant did not comply; a later denial "is a nullity with respect to that defense." The action was still dismissed, without prejudice, because the response was "not in compliance with the request." Justice Weston dissented: the text sets no time frame, and "may" is permissive.
  10. 2019December 13 The 120-day denial as a complete defenseCrystal Acupuncture, P.C. v Travelers Ins., 66 Misc 3d 130(A) (App Term, 2d Dept): on claims "denied on the ground that plaintiff had failed to provide requested verification within 120 days," the insurer's prima facie proof of non-receipt went unrebutted and the complaint was dismissed.
  11. 2022July 1, and February 24, 2023 A qualified affidavit proves nothingBurke Physical Therapy, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 75 Misc 3d 143(A), and New York Manual, P.T., P.C. v Nationwide Affinity Ins. Co. of Am., 78 Misc 3d 128(A) (App Term, 2d Dept): an owner who swore he mailed verification "to the extent such response was proper and in [his] possession" showed neither production nor a reasonable justification.
  12. 2026January 28 Second Department reverses the 150-day deadlineChapa Prods., Corp. v MVAIC, 245 AD3d 880: 11 NYCRR 65-3.8(b)(3) "unambiguously states" that the insurer "may issue a denial" after 120 days; "[t]he regulations do not specify a time frame"; had the Department of Financial Services intended a 150-day limit "it would have included such language." The Civil Court's dismissal of the complaint was restored.

2002 to 2012: a toll with no end date

Revised Regulation 68 has been in effect since April 4, 2002. The Court of Appeals upheld it in Matter of Medical Socy. of State of N.Y. v Serio, 100 NY2d 854 (October 21, 2003), which concerned the shortened notice and proof-of-claim periods and says nothing about an applicant’s time to answer a verification request, because the revised regulation set none. Section 65-3.8(b)(3) then consisted of what is now its first sentence: no denial “prior to its receipt of verification of all of the relevant information requested.”

The Court of Appeals described the structure twice in 2007. Nyack Hosp. v General Motors Acceptance Corp., 8 NY3d 294 (March 22, 2007): an insurer “must pay or deny only a verified claim … within 30 calendar days of receipt; and, conversely, is not obligated to pay any claim until it has been so verified.” Hospital for Joint Diseases v Travelers Prop. Cas. Ins. Co., 9 NY3d 312 (November 20, 2007): the 30-day window “is tolled until it receives the relevant information requested,” and a carrier that fails to deny within the 30 days “is generally precluded from asserting a defense against payment of the claim,” citing Presbyterian Hosp. in City of N.Y. v Maryland Cas. Co., 90 NY2d 274 (1997).

Infinity Health Prods., Ltd. v Eveready Ins. Co., 67 AD3d 862 (2d Dept, November 17, 2009), shows the toll at its limit. The provider ignored the initial request and the follow-up. The Second Department held that the 30-day period “did not commence to run,” that the action was premature, and that the complaint should be dismissed “without prejudice to commencement of a new action”; a follow-up mailed three days early did not forfeit the toll. The archive’s notes from August 2009, November 2009 and January 2010 follow that appeal.

The problem the toll left was this. An unanswered request kept the claim open indefinitely. The insurer could not deny, because the first sentence of section 65-3.8(b)(3) forbade it; the provider could not win, because the claim was never overdue; and the provider could sue again the day after answering. That is the gap the 2013 amendment closed.

April 1, 2013: the amendment

The amendment added subdivision (o) to section 65-3.5 and the second sentence to section 65-3.8(b)(3), both quoted above, and added subdivision (p), under which an insurer’s technical defect or missed time frame “shall not negate an applicant’s obligation to comply with the request or notice.” Each applies to medical services rendered on or after April 1, 2013. The archive’s February 2013 note reproduces the adopted text and the reaction at the time; subdivision (p) has its own thread, beginning with the August 2019 note on Lida’s Medical Supply, a decision not re-read for this revision.

The drafting choice that mattered was the verb. The applicant “shall” respond within 120 days. The insurer “may” deny afterward. The regulation says when the applicant’s obligation ends and nothing about when the insurer’s permission ends. Every decision from 2017 to 2026 turns on one of those two words.

2017 to 2019: the Appellate Terms apply the rule

TAM Med. Supply Corp. v Tri State Consumers Ins. Co., 57 Misc 3d 133(A) (App Term, 2d Dept, September 22, 2017), was the first appellate application of subdivision (o): the insurer showed prima facie non-receipt, the provider’s affidavit raised “a presumption that the requested verification had been mailed to, and received by, defendant,” and the result was a trial. The Civil Court’s premise that the denial had been “timely and properly” issued was recited, not reviewed; the archive’s October 2017 note asked when a 120-day denial is timely. Solution Bridge, Inc. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 61 Misc 3d 143(A) (App Term, 2d Dept, November 16, 2018), reached the same result and again recited a “timely” denial without defining it (November 2018 note).

The Fourth Department took the response side in Matter of Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. (Elite Med. Supply of N.Y., LLC), 162 AD3d 1471 (June 8, 2018). A supplier had refused pricing information within the 120 days as a trade secret, and the master arbitrator vacated fourteen awards on the reasoning that “a claimant who responds within the requisite 120-day period with a ‘reasonable justification’ is permitted to have that objection decided by the arbitrator and, if overruled by the arbitrator, is to be afforded the opportunity to produce the requested information.” The Fourth Department held that this corrected an alleged error of law, within the master arbitrator’s power; whether the objection was itself a reasonable justification was not decided. The June 2018 note carried a headline that overstated the decision and now says so.

The First Department’s Appellate Term decided Village Med. Supply, Inc. v Travelers Prop. Cas. Ins. Co., 61 Misc 3d 126(A) (September 17, 2018), on the older ground: the provider “failed to respond to timely requests for verification,” the claims were premature, and a “no good reason” objection under section 65-3.2(c) raised no issue. Subdivision (o) is not cited (September 2018 note).

CPM Med Supply, Inc. v State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 63 Misc 3d 140(A) (App Term, 2d Dept, April 12, 2019), drew the line between the two ages. The provider “was required to respond.” A written answer that the requested invoices were “not needed” “is not a ‘reasonable justification for the failure to comply’ with a verification request (11 NYCRR 65-3.8 [b] [3]), or a sufficient response.” The court went further: the services were rendered after April 1, 2013 and the insurer “properly denied the claims at issue on the ground that plaintiff had failed to provide the requested verification within 120 days”; therefore, the insurer “was entitled to dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice,” and the dismissal stood as one without prejudice only because the insurer had not cross-appealed. Before 2013, silence produced a premature action. After 2013, on a warned request and a denial, silence produces a dismissal with prejudice.

November 1, 2019: Chapa at the Appellate Term

MVAIC had mailed its denials 208 days after its initial verification requests. The provider raised the timing argument for the first time on appeal; the majority (Pesce, P.J., and Siegal, J.) reviewed it because it “has thus far evaded review.” The majority held that “the deadline to issue a denial based upon the ground that an applicant failed to provide complete verification … is 150 days after the initial request for verification,” that is, “30 days after the insurer is permitted to conclude that there was a failure to fully comply,” by analogy to the Second Department’s EUO and medical-examination no-show rule (Westchester Med. Ctr. v Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co., 60 AD3d 1045 [2009]). A denial after the 150th day “is a nullity with respect to that defense.”

The provider still lost. The documents it had sent were “not in compliance with the request,” so the pre-2013 rule applied: “the action should be dismissed as premature, i.e., without prejudice, which is the same position the parties would have been in before 11 NYCRR 65-3.8 (b) (3) was amended.” The difference between with and without prejudice was the whole appeal.

Justice Weston dissented in part: “by providing that an insurer ‘may’ issue a denial in these circumstances, the regulation clearly intends for the denial to be permissive, not mandatory,” and, in the sentence the Appellate Division would echo six years later, “Had the Department of Financial Services intended to impose a 150-day time limit on when an insurer must deny a claim for failure to provide the requested verification, it would have included such language in the regulations” (citing Patrolmen’s Benevolent Assn. of City of N.Y. v City of New York, 41 NY2d 205 [1976]). Leave to appeal was granted May 1, 2020. The archive’s November 2019 note was written on the majority’s rule and now carries the reversal.

2019 to 2023: the response cases while the appeal was pending

The 150-day rule did not slow the with-prejudice cases. Six weeks later, in Crystal Acupuncture, P.C. v Travelers Ins., 66 Misc 3d 130(A) (App Term, 2d Dept, December 13, 2019), the same court dismissed claims denied on the 120-day ground because the insurer’s prima facie proof of non-receipt “of all of the requested verification” went unrebutted (February 2020 note).

Two decisions then fixed what a provider’s affidavit must say. In Burke Physical Therapy, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 75 Misc 3d 143(A) (App Term, 2d Dept, July 1, 2022), a panel led by Justice Weston held that an owner who “merely stated that he had mailed the requested verification ‘to the extent such response was proper and in [his] possession’” had “failed to demonstrate that it had provided the requested verification or had set forth a reasonable justification for the failure to comply.” New York Manual, P.T., P.C. v Nationwide Affinity Ins. Co. of Am., 78 Misc 3d 128(A) (App Term, 2d Dept, February 24, 2023), applied the same sentence to the same language (July 2022 and June 2023 notes).

January 28, 2026: the Second Department

The Appellate Division reversed the 2019 order “insofar as appealed from, on the law,” and affirmed the Civil Court’s grant of MVAIC’s cross motion, in one paragraph. Section 65-3.8(b)(3) “unambiguously states” that an insurer “may issue a denial” after 120 days; “[t]he regulations do not specify a time frame under which the insurer must issue a denial following the 120-day period”; had the Department of Financial Services intended a 150-day limit “it would have included such language in the regulations,” citing the same Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association decision the dissent had cited; therefore, “the Appellate Term improperly determined that the defendant’s denial of the plaintiff’s claim was untimely.”

The court did not reach the preservation point, so an insurer defending a late denial should not assume the argument will be treated as unpreserved; and the court did not say what a provider must show to defeat the defense, so CPM, Burke and New York Manual remain the answer: production, or a written reason given within the 120 days.

Where the courts stand

In the Second Department, the Appellate Division has spoken: a 120-day denial has no outer time limit, and the Appellate Term’s own decisions from CPM through New York Manual govern what a response must contain. In the First Department, the Appellate Term has treated an unanswered request as a prematurity problem (Village Med. Supply, 2018); no First Department decision on the timing of a 120-day denial is in the firm’s archive or was found for this revision. The Fourth Department’s only word is Elite: in arbitration, a timely written objection must be decided before the claim is denied for non-production, reviewed under CPLR article 75. No Third Department decision on subdivision (o) is in the archive. The Court of Appeals has not construed subdivision (o) or the second sentence of section 65-3.8(b)(3) in any decision read for this revision.

Three questions remain open: what written proof amounts to “reasonable justification” (the decided cases are negative examples, “not needed” in CPM and the qualified affidavit in Burke and New York Manual, plus the arbitration procedure in Elite); what happens when the applicant gives a timely written reason and the insurer denies anyway (no Second Department court decision read for this revision has faced that record); and whether the First Department’s Appellate Term will apply Chapa when a denial-timing argument reaches it.

What this means in practice

For the provider or the billing office

Calendar day 120 runs from the date on the initial request, not from the day it arrived and not from the follow-up. Answer every item. For each item you will not or cannot supply, write down why, in the response, within the 120 days. “Not needed” is not a reason (CPM). In my experience the response that survives a motion lists each requested item and states, item by item, produced, not in our possession, or objected to for a stated reason.

Keep the mailing record that describes the office practice; that is what raised the presumption in TAM and Solution Bridge. An affidavit written after suit that hedges (“to the extent such response was proper and in [his] possession”) lost in Burke and New York Manual. Do not treat a denial as void because it came late; after Chapa, the date of a 120-day denial is not a defense. If the request itself is the problem, object within the 120 days and say why; in arbitration, Elite means the objection is decided before the claim is denied for non-production, and in court a bare “no good reason” objection lost in Village Med. Supply.

For the injured person

For lost earnings and other expenses, subdivision (o) applies to accidents on or after April 1, 2013, and the request must warn you that the claim may be denied. Answer in writing and keep a copy. If an employer or another third party holds the information, say so in the response and say what you did to get it. Section 65-3.5(m) bars a denial “based upon late submission of proof of claim” where a third party withheld wage information; it does not address the 120-day response.

For the insurer or the claims office

The second sentence of section 65-3.8(b)(3) applies only “provided that the verification request so advised the applicant as required in section 65-3.5(o).” A request without the warning leaves the first sentence and the toll. Follow up within 10 calendar days after the 30th day (11 NYCRR 65-3.6(b)); Infinity forgave a three-days-early follow-up on its facts, and the archive’s January 2018 note records a late one that was not forgiven. Be able to prove the mailing of the request; in Healing Health Prods., Inc. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 44 Misc 3d 59 (App Term, 2d Dept, May 22, 2014), the question was “not whether the requests were received by plaintiff, but whether defendant mailed them.” Chapa removes the 150-day cutoff. It does not remove the need for a denial that states the ground, or for proof of non-receipt of “all of the requested verification” (Crystal, New York Manual).

The three responses a court sees most often, and what each has produced:

No response

Before 2013, premature; after 2013, with prejudice

  • Infinity v Eveready (2d Dept 2009): 30 days never began; dismissed without prejudice.
  • Village Med. Supply (App Term, 1st Dept 2018): premature; "no good reason" objection raised no issue.
  • CPM (App Term, 2d Dept 2019): post-April 2013 service plus a 120-day denial entitled the insurer to dismissal with prejudice.
  • Crystal Acupuncture (App Term, 2d Dept 2019): unrebutted proof of non-receipt; complaint dismissed.

A written reason within 120 days

Decided on its merits, if it is a reason

  • Elite (4th Dept 2018): in arbitration, a timely "reasonable justification" must be ruled on and, if overruled, the applicant may then produce.
  • CPM (App Term, 2d Dept 2019): "not needed," based on the provider's own view of the rate, is not a reasonable justification.
  • Chapa (2d Dept 2026): the insurer's denial after that reason is not untimely by reason of its date.

An affidavit that it was mailed

A trial if it is unqualified; nothing if it hedges

  • TAM (2017) and Solution Bridge (2018), App Term, 2d Dept: an affidavit describing the mailing raised a presumption of mailing and receipt; triable issue.
  • Burke (2022) and New York Manual (2023), App Term, 2d Dept: "to the extent such response was proper and in [his] possession" showed neither production nor justification.
  • Healing Health (App Term, 2d Dept 2014): the insurer's side of the same coin; the question is whether the request was mailed.

Bring these to the first call, whichever side of the file you are on: the initial request with its warning paragraph; each follow-up, with its date; the response, its attachments and the mailing record; the denial of claim form (NF-10), with its date and stated ground; and the dates of service, because a service before April 1, 2013 is outside subdivision (o).

Decisions in the archive, newest first

Each entry below is one of the firm’s notes on a verification decision, grouped by the question the decision answers and listed newest first within each group. The one-line description is the note’s own summary. Only the decisions listed under Sources were re-read for this revision; the notes name the rest as the archive names them. One entry is marked as reversed, on the strength of the 2026 Chapa opinion.

120-day responses, denial timing and regulatory changes

  • No-Fault Verification Requirements: When Partial Compliance Isn’t Enough (June 2023): New York Manual’s 2023 partial-verification ruling: what the affidavit failed to explain, the reasonable-justification rule, and related historical decisions.
  • Justification for a lt (July 2022): Burke Physical Therapy v State Farm: why a qualified mailing statement failed to prove verification compliance or a reasonable justification.
  • 120-day rule and Fee Schedule (February 2020): Crystal Acupuncture v Travelers: claims denied for failure to provide verification within 120 days were dismissed on unrebutted proof of non-receipt, and the fee schedule branches were upheld.
  • The 120-day rule (November 2019): The 2019 Chapa 150-day verification deadline was reversed in 2026. Compare the two decisions, the 120-day response rule and premature no-fault suits. (Reversed insofar as appealed from by Chapa Prods., Corp. v MVAIC, 245 AD3d 880, January 28, 2026.)
  • The first citing of 65-3.5(p): somewhat ominous (August 2019): Lida’s Medical Supply and 11 NYCRR 65-3.5(p): an unpreserved timing argument, denied cross-motions, and the distinction between compliance and proof.
  • Understanding Verification Requirements in No-Fault Insurance Claims: When the Denial Can Wait (July 2019): Parisien held an EUO denial timely after written verification was received. Read the event sequence and why the case does not permit indefinite delay.
  • 120-day rule rebutted (November 2018): Solution Bridge v State Farm left a factual dispute over mailed verification. It did not abolish the 120-day rule or require postal receipts in every case.
  • 120-day rule crumbles (June 2018): Elite Medical Supply addressed timely objections to verification in master arbitration. The 120-day rule survived; read the holding and its EUO limits.
  • First sighting of 120-day rule (October 2017): TAM Medical raised a receipt dispute, not a new universal denial deadline. Follow the 2017 note through the 2026 Chapa rejection of a 150-day cutoff.
  • The amendments to the regulations and what they mean to you. (February 2013): The 2013 Regulation 68-C amendment, its effective-date limits, verification and denial provisions, and what Chapa clarified about the 120-day rule in 2026.

Mailing, follow-up requests and claim-processing time

Proof of compliance, non-receipt and partial responses

Forms, requested materials and medical-billing issues

Objections, EUO requests and procedural context

Sources

Regulations, from the Legal Information Institute’s current text of 11 NYCRR part 65:

Opinions, from the New York State Law Reporting Bureau unless noted:

If a verification file of yours is in dispute, whether you issued the denial or received it, request a case review or call (516) 750-0595. Bring the initial request, the response and the denial; the dates on those three documents decide most of these cases.

Attorney Jason Tenenbaum has recovered more than $100 million for clients across personal injury, employment, and no-fault matters since 2002. We work on contingency: no fee unless we win.

Legal Context

Why This Matters for Your Case

New York law is among the most complex and nuanced in the country, with distinct procedural rules, substantive doctrines, and court systems that differ significantly from other jurisdictions. The Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) governs every stage of civil litigation, from service of process through trial and appeal. The Appellate Division, Appellate Term, and Court of Appeals create a rich and ever-evolving body of case law that practitioners must follow.

Attorney Jason Tenenbaum has practiced across these areas for over 24 years, writing more than 1,000 appellate briefs and publishing over 2,600 legal articles that attorneys and clients rely on for guidance. The analysis in this article reflects real courtroom experience — from motion practice in Civil Court and Supreme Court to oral arguments before the Appellate Division — and a deep understanding of how New York courts actually apply the law in practice.

About This Topic

Additional Verification in No-Fault Claims

Under New York's no-fault regulations, insurers may request additional verification of a claim within specified time limits. The timeliness, scope, and reasonableness of verification requests — and the consequences of a claimant's failure to respond — are among the most litigated issues in no-fault practice. These articles examine the regulatory framework for verification requests, court decisions on compliance, and the interplay between verification delays and claim determination deadlines.

92 published articles in Additional Verification

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More Additional Verification Analysis

Additional Verification

120-day rule and Fee Schedule

New York court ruling demonstrates how healthcare providers can lose no-fault claims due to verification failures and fee schedule violations in insurance disputes.

Feb 1, 2020
Additional Verification

Verification and Fee Schedule Defenses in No-Fault Litigation: Blackman v Nationwide

Blackman v Nationwide: a generic mailing affidavit raised an issue of fact on verification, and the 2015-service fee schedule defense needed no preservation.

Feb 1, 2020
Additional Verification

Defense of unbundling requires coding expert affidavit

First Aid's unbundling defense lacked qualified affidavit support, while its verification branches succeeded. Read the split 2010 result and later proof rules.

Feb 6, 2010
Additional Verification

Non responded to verification fatal to plaintiff’s case

City Care Acupuncture v Allstate: the providers’ own responses left verification unanswered, supporting dismissal as premature on that 2017 record.

Dec 26, 2017
Additional Verification

EUO no-show and verification non-receipt

Court ruling on no-fault insurance verification requests and EUO scheduling - insurer's timely mailing vs plaintiff's non-receipt and no-show defenses.

Oct 6, 2015
Additional Verification

Again – a mere denial will not rebut proof that a verification demand was mailed

Court ruling clarifies that mere denial of receiving verification requests cannot overcome legal presumption of proper mailing in no-fault insurance cases.

Feb 24, 2013
View all Additional Verification articles

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Disclaimer: This article is published by the Law Office of Jason Tenenbaum, P.C. for informational and educational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and no attorney-client relationship is formed by reading this content. The legal principles discussed may not apply to your specific situation, and the law may have changed since this article was last updated.

New York law varies by jurisdiction — court decisions in one Appellate Division department may not be followed in another, and local court rules in Nassau County Supreme Court differ from those in Suffolk County Supreme Court, Kings County Civil Court, or Queens County Supreme Court. The Appellate Division, Second Department (which covers Long Island, Brooklyn, Queens, and Staten Island) and the Appellate Term (which hears appeals from lower courts) each have distinct procedural requirements and precedents that affect litigation strategy.

If you need legal help with a additional verification matter, contact our office at (516) 750-0595 for a free consultation. We serve clients throughout Long Island (Huntington, Babylon, Islip, Brookhaven, Smithtown, Riverhead, Southampton, East Hampton), Nassau County (Hempstead, Garden City, Mineola, Great Neck, Manhasset, Freeport, Long Beach, Rockville Centre, Valley Stream, Westbury, Hicksville, Massapequa), Suffolk County (Hauppauge, Deer Park, Bay Shore, Central Islip, Patchogue, Brentwood), Queens, Brooklyn, Manhattan, the Bronx, Staten Island, and Westchester County. Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Part of the Verification Requests archive in the No-Fault Insurance Law section of the New York Legal Encyclopedia.

Jason Tenenbaum, Personal Injury Attorney serving Long Island, Nassau County and Suffolk County

Written By

Jason Tenenbaum, Esq.

Jason Tenenbaum is a personal injury attorney serving Long Island, Nassau & Suffolk Counties, and New York City. Admitted to practice in NY, NJ, FL, TX, GA, MI, and Federal courts, Jason is one of the few attorneys who writes his own appeals and tries his own cases. Since 2008, he has authored more than 2,600 articles on no-fault insurance law, personal injury, and employment law — a resource other attorneys rely on to stay current on New York appellate decisions.

Education
Syracuse University College of Law
Experience
24+ Years
Articles
2,600+ Published
Licensed In
6 States + Federal

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