Failure to comply with 3215(f) is not jurisdictional

Last reviewed: September 2026

Key Takeaways

• CPLR 3215 is New York’s default-judgment statute. Sum-certain claims go to the clerk under 3215(a), within one year of the default; everything else goes to the court under 3215(b), which fixes damages by inquest or reference.
• 3215(c) is a hard clock: take proceedings for entry of judgment within one year of the default or the complaint is dismissed as abandoned “unless sufficient cause is shown.”
• 3215(f) is the proof gate: proof of service, proof of the facts constituting the claim by a party’s affidavit or party-verified complaint, the default, and the amount due. The standard is Woodson’s “some firsthand confirmation of the facts.”
• 3215(g) adds notice: five days’ notice to any defendant who has appeared, plus 20-day additional mailings to natural persons in contract-debt cases ((g)(3)) and to corporations served through the Secretary of State ((g)(4)).
• A 3215(f) defect is an error, not a jurisdictional nullity (Manhattan Telecom. Corp. v H & A Locksmith, Inc., 2013 NY Slip Op 03867); the remedy is a CPLR 5015 motion. Missing 3215(g)(1) notice to an appearing defendant, by contrast, is jurisdictional in the Second Department.
• Vacatur runs on two tracks: CPLR 5015(a)(1) (reasonable excuse plus potentially meritorious defense) and CPLR 317 (no excuse needed where service was not by personal delivery and the defendant did not receive notice in time to defend).

Every default judgment in New York runs through CPLR § 3215: where to apply, what proof to file, who gets notice, and how long you have before the claim is deemed abandoned. This post began in 2013 as a note on the Court of Appeals’ holding that a 3215(f) defect is not jurisdictional. That analysis is preserved below, now surrounded by the rest of the statute and the case law this office has tracked on it.

What CPLR § 3215 Covers

A default judgment may be sought “when a defendant has failed to appear, plead or proceed to trial of an action reached and called for trial, or when the court orders a dismissal for any other neglect to proceed.” The everyday default is a missed answer under CPLR 320(a): 20 days after personal delivery of the summons within the state, or 30 days after service is complete by any other method — and service under CPLR 308(2) or (4) is complete only 10 days after proof of service is filed. Compute the default date precisely; every other deadline in the statute runs from it.

The subdivisions practitioners actually litigate are (a) the two routes to judgment, (b) procedure before the court, (c) the one-year abandonment rule, (f) the required proof, and (g) additional notice. Two principles frame all of them. A defaulting defendant “admits all traversable allegations in the complaint, including the basic allegation of liability, but does not admit the plaintiff’s conclusion as to damages” (Rokina Opt. Co. v Camera King, 63 NY2d 728, 730 [1984]). And because a default judgment is built entirely from the plaintiff’s own papers, courts scrutinize the application and appellate courts will reverse one granted on insufficient proof even though nobody opposed it.

3215(a) vs. 3215(b): Clerk’s Judgment on a Sum Certain or Application to the Court

The clerk’s route — 3215(a). If the claim “is for a sum certain or for a sum which can by computation be made certain,” the plaintiff may apply to the clerk within one year after the default, and the clerk, “upon submission of the requisite proof, shall enter judgment for the amount demanded in the complaint or stated in the notice served pursuant to subdivision (b) of rule 305, plus costs and interest.” No judge, no motion, no inquest. “Sum certain” is narrow: claims where, once liability is established, “there can be no dispute as to the amount due” — notes, negotiable instruments, actions on a money judgment, liquidated contract balances (Reynolds Sec. v Underwriters Bank & Trust Co., 44 NY2d 568, 572 [1978]). Unliquidated damages, personal injury above all, never qualify. After one year the clerk cannot act and the plaintiff must apply to the court, where the 3215(c) problem is waiting. Local practice varies as well — New York City Civil Court runs clerk’s inquests, while many District Courts outside the City insist on a motion; see Defaults 3215(f) – what does it mean?.

The court’s route — 3215(b). Where the clerk cannot enter judgment, “the plaintiff shall apply to the court for judgment.” The court “may make an assessment or take an account or proof, or may direct a reference” — in a personal injury case, an inquest on damages, at which the defaulting defendant may still appear and contest the amount (Rokina). The judgment “shall not exceed in amount or differ in type from that demanded in the complaint” or the CPLR 305(b) notice, and, except in matrimonial actions, no written findings of fact are required. Courts also grant these motions conditionally — on submission of proper proof of the amount due, for example — as in Default judgment conditionally granted.

3215(c): The One-Year Abandonment Rule

“If the plaintiff fails to take proceedings for the entry of judgment within one year after the default, the court shall not enter judgment but shall dismiss the complaint as abandoned, without costs, upon its own initiative or on motion, unless sufficient cause is shown why the complaint should not be dismissed. A motion by the defendant under this subdivision does not constitute an appearance in the action.”

Four working rules. “Take proceedings” means initiate, not finish: moving for leave to enter judgment or filing the clerk’s application within the year suffices; the judgment need not be entered within the year. “Sufficient cause” has two parts: a reasonable excuse for the delay and a potentially meritorious cause of action, and the Second Department rejects unsubstantiated law-office failure — see CPLR 3215(c) and 5015(a) and A new caveat on the one-year period to enter a judgment, where a no-fault plaintiff’s failure to enter judgment within a year of a calendar default was held to be abandonment. Dismissal is mandatory when the elements are met (“shall dismiss”), and the defendant’s motion does not constitute an appearance, so it can be made without submitting to jurisdiction. The defense can be waived by a defendant who answers or otherwise participates without raising it — while a plaintiff’s failure to enter judgment within the year has been turned against the plaintiff to vacate a later judgment under the court’s inherent power; see Failure to enter default within one year allows vacatur under a Woodson theory.

3215(f): Proof Requirements and the Woodson Prima Facie Standard

On any default application, to the clerk or the court, CPLR 3215(f) requires: (1) proof of service of the summons and complaint (or summons with notice under CPLR 305(b)); (2) proof of the facts constituting the claim, the default, and the amount due, “by affidavit made by the party” — or, where a verified complaint was served, the complaint may stand as the affidavit of the facts and amount due, with a separate affidavit of default from the party or the attorney; and (3) proof of any 3215(g) mailing.

Two recurring failures. The proof must come from personal knowledge: an attorney’s affirmation reciting the claim does not qualify, and neither does a complaint verified by counsel rather than the party. And the proof must establish a viable cause of action against the particular defendant — an affidavit showing a corporation owes the money does not show that its principal is personally liable, which is exactly what went wrong in Manhattan Telecom, below.

How much proof is enough? Woodson v Mendon Leasing Corp., 100 NY2d 62 (2003), answers. Because the defaulter is deemed to admit all traversable allegations and the reasonable inferences from them, “some proof of liability is also required to satisfy the court as to the prima facie validity of the uncontested cause of action,” but “[t]he standard of proof is not stringent, amounting only to some firsthand confirmation of the facts” (100 NY2d at 70–71). The court is confirming a real claim, not deciding summary judgment. The plaintiff’s own affidavit or a party-verified complaint pleading the elements ordinarily suffices; hearsay from an investigator or a lawyer does not — see Default judgment pitfalls: non-hearsay evidence in declaratory judgment actions and Default judgment vacated, where an unverified complaint and an attorney’s affirmation were held insufficient. Woodson is also the source of the court’s “inherent discretionary power” to vacate its own judgment “for sufficient reason and in the interests of substantial justice” (100 NY2d at 68).

3215(g): Additional Notice — Appearing Defendants, Consumer Debts, and Secretary of State Service

3215(g)(1) — appearing defendants. “Any defendant who has appeared is entitled to at least five days’ notice of the time and place of the application,” and a non-appearing defendant gets the same notice once more than a year has passed since the default, unless the court orders otherwise. A defendant appears by answering, moving, or informally — a conference, a negotiated extension — and the entitlement survives a later default in pleading. In Paulus v Christopher Vacirca, Inc. (2d Dept 2015), the Second Department held that omitting this notice is a jurisdictional defect requiring vacatur without regard to the 5015(a)(1) factors, expressly distinguishing Manhattan Telecom’s treatment of 3215(f). See Defaults – the right to notice.

3215(g)(3) — the consumer-debt mailing. Where a default judgment based on non-appearance is sought against a natural person “in an action based upon nonpayment of a contractual obligation,” the plaintiff must file an affidavit that an additional copy of the summons was mailed first-class to the defendant’s residence at least 20 days before entry of judgment, in an envelope marked “personal and confidential” that does not disclose that it comes from an attorney or concerns a debt. If it comes back undeliverable, or the residence is unknown, the mailing goes to the place of employment; if neither is known, to the last known residence.

3215(g)(4) — corporations served through the Secretary of State. Where a default judgment based on non-appearance is sought against a domestic or authorized foreign corporation served under Business Corporation Law § 306(b), the plaintiff must file an affidavit that an additional copy of the summons was mailed first-class to the corporation’s last known address at least 20 days before entry, with a notice that service was made under § 306(b). The rule exists because Secretary of State service so often never reaches a corporation whose filed address is stale; omitting the mailing is a ground to deny the application, and appellate courts have reversed default judgments for the omission without reaching the 5015(a) factors.

The Original Point: 3215(f) Non-Compliance Is Not Jurisdictional

The Appellate Division had treated a default judgment against an individual — entered without proof that he was personally liable for a corporate debt — as a nullity. The Court of Appeals reversed, and the holding still governs.

Manhattan Telecom. Corp. v H & A Locksmith, Inc., 2013 NY Slip Op 03867 (2013)

“On November 5, 2009, Vanunu moved to vacate the judgment, asserting that his default was excusable and that he had meritorious defenses to the action. Supreme Court denied the motion, finding that Vanunu’s delay in defending himself was not excusable. The Appellate Division reversed without reaching the issue of excusable default, holding that because “plaintiff failed to provide … evidence that was personally liable for the stated claims … . the default judgment was a nullity” (Manhattan Telecom. Corp. v H & A Locksmith, Inc., 82 AD3d 674 ). The Appellate Division granted leave to appeal, certifying the question of whether its order was properly made. We answer the question in the negative, and reverse.”

…

“The defect in the default judgment before us is not jurisdictional in this sense. A failure to submit the proof required by CPLR 3215(f) should lead a court to deny an application for a default judgment, but a court that does not comply with this rule has merely committed an error — it has not usurped a power it does not have. The error can be corrected by the means provided by law — i.e., by an application for relief from the judgment pursuant to CPLR 5015. It does not justify treating the judgment as a nullity.”

Jason Tenenbaum’s Analysis (2013): This will be interesting to watch play out. Does the failure to comply with CPLR 3215(f) implicate the meritorious defense branch of CPLR 5015(a)(1), provided that a reasonable excuse is established? This will insulate clerk’s judgments that do not comply with 3215(f) where a reasonable excuse is not found on the subsequent 5015(a)(1) motion.

What the years since have shown. The distinction has held. A defendant attacking an entered judgment for thin 3215(f) proof must still come in under 5015(a)(1) or 5015(a)(4); the deficiency alone is not a ticket to vacatur. The Second Department drew the line in Paulus: no notice under 3215(g)(1) is jurisdictional, no proof under 3215(f) is not. Orders granting default judgments on inadequate proof are still reversed on direct appeal — the point of Manhattan Telecom is only that a judgment already entered is not void.

Vacating a Default: CPLR 5015(a)(1) and CPLR 317

CPLR 5015(a)(1) — excusable default. On motion “made within one year after service of a copy of the judgment or order with written notice of its entry,” the movant must show a reasonable excuse for the default and a potentially meritorious defense (Eugene Di Lorenzo, Inc. v A.C. Dutton Lbr. Co., 67 NY2d 138, 141 [1986]). Law office failure can qualify under CPLR 2005 only when it is specific and documented; conclusory calendaring excuses are routinely rejected — see Reasonable excuse and law office failure and our guide to CPLR 5015(a)(1) in personal injury cases. The merits prong needs an affidavit from someone with knowledge setting out facts that would constitute a defense, not a trial.

CPLR 5015(a)(4) — lack of jurisdiction. If service was defective, the judgment is a nullity and is vacated without regard to excuse or merit. Courts reach this ground first; a sworn, specific denial of service ordinarily earns a traverse hearing at which the plaintiff bears the burden. Our CPLR 308 service guide covers what survives that hearing.

CPLR 317 — no excuse required. A defendant “served with a summons other than by personal delivery” who “did not personally receive notice of the summons in time to defend and has a meritorious defense” may be allowed to defend on motion within one year after learning of the judgment, but not more than five years after entry. There is no reasonable-excuse requirement (Eugene Di Lorenzo, 67 NY2d at 141–142). It is the natural vehicle for a corporation served through the Secretary of State and for individuals served under CPLR 308(2) or (4). Courts may deny relief where non-receipt was a deliberate attempt to avoid service, and a corporation’s stale address on file with the Secretary of State is a recurring battleground. The Second Department has granted 317 relief even where the defendant moved only under 5015 — see It is not 5015 but 317.

Before judgment. If no judgment has been entered, the defendant moves to compel acceptance of a late answer under CPLR 3012(d) or simply opposes the 3215 motion; the standards are more forgiving pre-judgment in some Departments — see Meritorious defense not needed — and the plaintiff’s own 3215(c) delay can be raised in opposition.

Practitioner Checklist

Moving for the default (plaintiff):

1. Compute the default date from CPLR 320(a) and calendar the 3215(c) year from it.
2. Sum certain → clerk under 3215(a) within one year; anything else → motion to the court under 3215(b).
3. Assemble the 3215(f) package: affidavit of service; party affidavit of merit (or party-verified complaint plus attorney affidavit of default); the amount due; damages proof for the inquest.
4. Run 3215(g): five days’ notice to any appearing defendant; (g)(3) mailing for a natural person in a contract-debt action; (g)(4) mailing with § 306(b) notice for a corporation served through the Secretary of State — each 20 days before entry, each with proof of mailing filed.
5. Keep the judgment within the complaint’s demand, then serve it with notice of entry to start the 5015(a)(1) clock.

Attacking the default (defendant):

1. Test service first — a defect is a 5015(a)(4) ground needing neither excuse nor merit.
2. Check the calendar — more than a year from the default with no proceedings is a 3215(c) motion that does not constitute an appearance.
3. Audit 3215(g) — missing (g)(1) notice is jurisdictional in the Second Department; a missing (g)(4) mailing is a ground for denial or reversal.
4. Consider CPLR 317 before 5015(a)(1); if 5015(a)(1) is the route, move within one year of notice of entry with a specific excuse and an affidavit of merit.
5. Appear at the inquest to contest damages even where liability is lost.

Frequently Asked Questions

What does CPLR 3215 mean?

CPLR 3215 is the New York statute governing default judgments — the judgment a plaintiff obtains when the defendant fails to appear, answer, or proceed to trial. It fixes who enters the judgment (the clerk for sum-certain claims, otherwise the court), what proof the plaintiff must file (3215(f)), who must receive notice (3215(g)), and how long the plaintiff has before the claim is deemed abandoned (3215(c)).

How long do you have to enter a default judgment in New York?

One year from the default. Under CPLR 3215(c), a plaintiff who fails to take proceedings for entry of judgment within one year faces dismissal of the complaint as abandoned unless sufficient cause — a reasonable excuse and a potentially meritorious claim — is shown. Starting the process within the year is enough; the judgment need not be entered within it. The clerk’s sum-certain route under 3215(a) is separately limited to one year.

What is CPLR 3215(f)?

CPLR 3215(f) lists the proof required on every default application: proof of service, and proof of the facts constituting the claim, the default, and the amount due by a party’s affidavit or a party-verified complaint, plus proof of any 3215(g) mailing. Under Woodson v Mendon Leasing Corp., 100 NY2d 62 (2003), the standard is “not stringent” — some firsthand confirmation of the facts — but an attorney’s affirmation or an attorney-verified complaint will not do. Under Manhattan Telecom (2013), a judgment entered on deficient 3215(f) proof is an error correctable under CPLR 5015, not a jurisdictional nullity.

What happens if the plaintiff waits more than one year after the default?

The complaint is subject to dismissal as abandoned under CPLR 3215(c), on the defendant’s motion or the court’s own initiative, unless the plaintiff shows a reasonable excuse for the delay and a potentially meritorious cause of action. The defendant’s motion does not count as an appearance. If a judgment was entered anyway, courts have used their inherent power to vacate it; a defendant who answers or litigates without raising the point may waive it.

How do you vacate a default judgment in New York?

Three routes. CPLR 5015(a)(4): if service was defective, the judgment is a nullity and is vacated without any showing of excuse or merit. CPLR 5015(a)(1): within one year after service of the judgment with notice of entry, show a reasonable excuse and a potentially meritorious defense. CPLR 317: if you were served other than by personal delivery and did not actually receive notice in time to defend, you may be allowed to defend without any excuse, on motion within one year after learning of the judgment and within five years of entry. If no judgment has been entered yet, move to compel acceptance of a late answer under CPLR 3012(d).

Counsel-to-Counsel: Referrals and Co-Counsel

If you are litigating a CPLR § 3215 issue — a contested default motion, a 3215(c) abandonment fight, a 5015 or 317 vacatur motion, or an appeal from any of them — and want a second set of eyes, or want to hand the motion or appeal to someone who briefs these issues every week, the Law Office of Jason Tenenbaum, P.C. works with referring attorneys across New York: per-diem motion practice, appellate briefing and argument (1,000+ appeals), and co-counsel arrangements on no-fault, personal injury, and insurance coverage litigation. Referring counsel stay involved to the degree they want. Call (516) 750-0595 or use the contact form — attorney inquiries answered same day.

Related Reading

• CPLR 3215(c) and 5015(a)
• Defaults – the right to notice (CPLR 3215(g)(1))
• Defaults 3215(f) – what does it mean?
• CPLR 5015(a)(1) in New York Personal Injury Cases: Setting Aside Default Judgments
• It is not 5015 but 317
• Meritorious defense not needed
• Default judgment conditionally granted under CPLR 3215(f)
• CPLR § 308 Service of Process: The New York Practitioner’s Guide
• Complex default judgment issues in no-fault arbitration cases
• Law office failure requirements for opening default judgments
• No-Fault Insurance Defense
• Legal Encyclopedia: Civil Procedure