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Failure to enter default within one year allows vacatur of default under a Woodson theory
Defaults

Failure to enter default within one year allows vacatur of default under a Woodson theory

By Jason Tenenbaum 2 min read

Why Trust This Analysis

This article is part of our ongoing defaults coverage, with 90 published articles analyzing defaults issues across New York State. Attorney Jason Tenenbaum brings 24+ years of hands-on experience to this analysis, drawing from his work on more than 1,000 appeals, over 100,000 no-fault cases, and recovery of over $100 million for clients throughout Nassau County, Suffolk County, Queens, Brooklyn, Manhattan, and the Bronx. For personalized legal advice about how these principles apply to your specific situation, contact our Long Island office at (516) 750-0595 for a free consultation.

Default judgments in New York no-fault insurance litigation come with strict procedural requirements and time limitations. While CPLR 3215(c) requires plaintiffs to move for default judgment within one year of a defendant’s default, courts retain inherent discretionary power to remedy situations where rigid application of procedural rules would create unfair outcomes. This case demonstrates how appellate courts can exercise the “Woodson theory” — using inherent judicial power to vacate judgments in circumstances not specifically addressed by CPLR 5015(a).

The case also illustrates the delicate balance between protecting defendants’ due process rights and enforcing procedural compliance by plaintiffs. When a plaintiff delays too long in seeking a default judgment, even if ultimately successful, the judgment remains vulnerable to challenge on procedural grounds.

Jason Tenenbaum’s Analysis:

DJS Med. Supplies, Inc. v Infinity Ins. Co., 2013 NY Slip Op 52073(U)(App. Term 2d Dept. 2013)

‘Plaintiff commenced this action in April 2006 to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits. Defendant defaulted. More than a year later, plaintiff moved for leave to enter a default judgment. By order dated July 13, 2007, the Civil Court granted plaintiff’s motion on defendant’s default.’

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“s plaintiff failed to offer any excuse for its delay in moving for leave to enter a default judgment, the dismissal of the complaint was required pursuant to CPLR 3215 (c), and it was improper for the court to have granted plaintiff’s motion.”

THE BEST PART OF THE OPINION

While defendant failed to demonstrate that the default judgment should have been vacated pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (3), under the circumstances presented, we exercise our inherent discretionary power to vacate judgments in situations that warrant vacatur but were not specifically codified in CPLR 5015 (a).

So Plaintiff was able to enter a default, on notice, after the one year time period through Defendant defaulting to oppose. Defendant wakes up, opposes entry of the default judgment, and the court vacates the default under a Woodson catch-all theory.

Key Takeaway

This decision highlights courts’ inherent power to vacate judgments even when statutory grounds under CPLR 5015(a) aren’t met. The Woodson theory provides a safety valve allowing judges to remedy procedural unfairness, particularly when plaintiffs fail to comply with the one-year requirement for seeking default judgments. However, defendants cannot rely solely on plaintiff’s procedural delays — they must still demonstrate why vacatur is warranted.


Legal Update (February 2026): Since this 2013 post, New York courts have continued to develop jurisprudence around default judgment procedures and the Woodson theory, with potential amendments to CPLR provisions and evolving appellate interpretations of inherent judicial power to vacate defaults. Practitioners should verify current procedural requirements under CPLR 3215 and 5015, as well as recent appellate decisions that may have refined the standards for applying discretionary relief in delayed default judgment scenarios.

Legal Context

Why This Matters for Your Case

New York law is among the most complex and nuanced in the country, with distinct procedural rules, substantive doctrines, and court systems that differ significantly from other jurisdictions. The Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) governs every stage of civil litigation, from service of process through trial and appeal. The Appellate Division, Appellate Term, and Court of Appeals create a rich and ever-evolving body of case law that practitioners must follow.

Attorney Jason Tenenbaum has practiced across these areas for over 24 years, writing more than 1,000 appellate briefs and publishing over 2,353 legal articles that attorneys and clients rely on for guidance. The analysis in this article reflects real courtroom experience — from motion practice in Civil Court and Supreme Court to oral arguments before the Appellate Division — and a deep understanding of how New York courts actually apply the law in practice.

About This Topic

Default Judgments in New York Practice

Default judgments arise when a party fails to answer, appear, or respond within required time limits. Vacating a default under CPLR 5015 requires showing a reasonable excuse for the failure and a meritorious defense or cause of action. In no-fault practice, defaults occur frequently in arbitration and court proceedings, and the standards for granting and vacating defaults have generated substantial case law. These articles analyze default practice, restoration motions, and the circumstances under which courts excuse procedural failures.

90 published articles in Defaults

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Disclaimer: This article is published by the Law Office of Jason Tenenbaum, P.C. for informational and educational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and no attorney-client relationship is formed by reading this content. The legal principles discussed may not apply to your specific situation, and the law may have changed since this article was last updated.

New York law varies by jurisdiction — court decisions in one Appellate Division department may not be followed in another, and local court rules in Nassau County Supreme Court differ from those in Suffolk County Supreme Court, Kings County Civil Court, or Queens County Supreme Court. The Appellate Division, Second Department (which covers Long Island, Brooklyn, Queens, and Staten Island) and the Appellate Term (which hears appeals from lower courts) each have distinct procedural requirements and precedents that affect litigation strategy.

If you need legal help with a defaults matter, contact our office at (516) 750-0595 for a free consultation. We serve clients throughout Long Island (Huntington, Babylon, Islip, Brookhaven, Smithtown, Riverhead, Southampton, East Hampton), Nassau County (Hempstead, Garden City, Mineola, Great Neck, Manhasset, Freeport, Long Beach, Rockville Centre, Valley Stream, Westbury, Hicksville, Massapequa), Suffolk County (Hauppauge, Deer Park, Bay Shore, Central Islip, Patchogue, Brentwood), Queens, Brooklyn, Manhattan, the Bronx, Staten Island, and Westchester County. Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Filed under: Defaults
Jason Tenenbaum, Personal Injury Attorney serving Long Island, Nassau County and Suffolk County

Reviewed & Verified By

Jason Tenenbaum, Esq.

Jason Tenenbaum is a personal injury attorney serving Long Island, Nassau & Suffolk Counties, and New York City. Admitted to practice in NY, NJ, FL, TX, GA, MI, and Federal courts, Jason is one of the few attorneys who writes his own appeals and tries his own cases. Since 2002, he has authored over 2,353 articles on no-fault insurance law, personal injury, and employment law — a resource other attorneys rely on to stay current on New York appellate decisions.

Education
Syracuse University College of Law
Experience
24+ Years
Articles
2,353+ Published
Licensed In
7 States + Federal

Discussion

Comments (1)

Archived from the original blog discussion.

JT
Jason Tenenbaum Author
This holding is incorrect under the Appellate Division, Second Department’s decision in Fuentes v. Virgil, 88 A.D.3d 643, which held that a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3215(c) is untimely when made after the default judgment has already been entered.

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