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Foreclosure Defense

FAPA: Can a Bank Letter Restart the Foreclosure Clock?

By Jason Tenenbaum 16 min read

Key Takeaway

U.S. Bank v Ahmed (2026): a de-acceleration letter cannot reset the six years.

This article is part of our ongoing foreclosure defense coverage, with 1 published articles analyzing foreclosure defense issues across New York State. Attorney Jason Tenenbaum brings 24+ years of hands-on experience to this analysis, drawing from his work on more than 1,000 appeals, over 100,000 no-fault cases, and recovery of over $100 million for clients throughout Nassau County, Suffolk County, Queens, Brooklyn, Manhattan, and the Bronx. For personalized legal advice about how these principles apply to your specific situation, contact our Long Island office at (516) 750-0595 for a free consultation.

Take a homeowner in Brentwood. She was served with a foreclosure complaint that demanded the entire balance. The case died on the calendar. Years later a servicer’s letter arrived announcing that the acceleration had been revoked, and a new foreclosure followed with, the lender said, a fresh six-year clock. That sequence was familiar to anyone who defends foreclosures on Long Island. The Foreclosure Abuse Prevention Act (L 2022, ch 821) took effect on December 30, 2022, and ended it.

On August 5, 2026, the Appellate Division, Second Department, applied the Act in U.S. Bank N.A. v Ahmed, 2026 NY Slip Op 04889, and affirmed the dismissal of a foreclosure commenced in January 2021 as time-barred. The lender’s de-acceleration letter, dated July 24, 2019, did not move a clock that had started in May 2014. If a letter like that one is on your kitchen table, this post is about what it can and cannot do to your dates.

The short version

A foreclosure complaint that demands the entire balance accelerates the debt, and the six-year period under CPLR 213(4) runs from that day. CPLR 203(h) now provides that once that cause of action has accrued, "no party may, in form or effect, unilaterally waive, postpone, cancel, toll, revive, or reset the accrual thereof." A lender's de-acceleration letter is a unilateral act. In U.S. Bank N.A. v Ahmed (2d Dept, August 5, 2026), a letter dated July 24, 2019 could not save a January 2021 foreclosure on a debt accelerated in May 2014. The writing that can move your date is one you sign, under General Obligations Law § 17-105(1).

What happened in Ahmed

The opinion is short; the dates carry it.

The Ahmed calendar

Twelve years, one acceleration, one letter that changed nothing

  1. 2014May The lender commences the first foreclosureThe complaint elects to call due the entire amount secured by the consolidated mortgage. The debt is accelerated and the six-year period under CPLR 213(4) begins.
  2. 2019January The 2014 action is dismissedThe lender failed to appear for a pretrial conference.
  3. 2019July 24 The de-acceleration letterThe lender later argues that this letter revoked the 2014 acceleration.
  4. 2020May Six years from the accelerationThe last month in which a new action on the accelerated debt could be timely under CPLR 213(4).
  5. 2021January The lender commences a second foreclosure on the same mortgageIndex No. 700941/21, Supreme Court, Queens County.
  6. 2022September 26 First rulingSummary judgment to the homeowners on an RPAPL 1304 mailing ground; the statute of limitations branch is denied because the July 2019 letter leaves a triable issue of fact.
  7. 2022December 30 The Foreclosure Abuse Prevention Act takes effectL 2022, ch 821. CPLR 203(h) bars any unilateral reset of the accrual.
  8. 2023April The homeowners move for leave to renewGround: a change in the law, CPLR 2221(e)(2).
  9. 2023September 1 Renewal granted; complaint dismissed as time-barredSupreme Court vacates its earlier finding and grants the homeowners' motion.
  10. 2026August 5 The Second Department affirms, with costsU.S. Bank N.A. v Ahmed, 2026 NY Slip Op 04889.

The homeowners had already won a dismissal on the RPAPL 1304 ground in September 2022. They went back for the statute of limitations ruling anyway, and the reason is in the statute. RPAPL 1301(4) provides that once an action to foreclose “is adjudicated to be barred by the applicable statute of limitations, any other action seeking to foreclose the mortgage or recover any part of the same mortgage debt shall also be barred.” A dismissal for a defective pre-foreclosure notice does not carry that sentence. A dismissal on the statute of limitations does.

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The reasoning is brief. “A motion for leave to renew is the appropriate vehicle for seeking relief from a prior order based on a change in the law.” FAPA was such a change. Upon renewal, the homeowners established that the debt was accelerated in May 2014 when the lender commenced the prior action and elected to call due the entire amount. The second action was not commenced until January 2021. That showing was prima facie proof that the action was time-barred, and the lender “failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see CPLR 203[h]).” The court disposed of everything else in one sentence: “The plaintiff’s remaining contentions are without merit.” The opinion does not say what those contentions were.

The court did not announce a rule about which cases FAPA reaches. It applied that subdivision, on a motion to renew, to an action that had been pending since January 2021, nearly two years before the Act took effect. For a homeowner whose case is still open, that is the fact that matters.

Why the letter no longer works

Before December 30, 2022, the controlling case was Freedom Mtge. Corp. v Engel, 37 NY3d 1 (2021), decided by the Court of Appeals on February 18, 2021. Two of its rules stand. Two do not.

The first is the definition of an acceleration. An election to accelerate must be made by an “unequivocal overt act,” and “the filing of a verified complaint seeking foreclosure and containing a sworn statement that the noteholder is demanding repayment of the entire outstanding debt” is such an act. The second is its corollary. In the Vargas appeal decided with Engel, the letter warned that the lender “will accelerate” the loan if the borrower failed to cure within 32 days. The court held that the letter “did not seek immediate payment of the entire, outstanding loan, but referred to acceleration only as a future event.” Without an acceleration there is no accrual, and without an accrual there is no clock.

The rule that did not survive is the one lenders relied on. Engel held that “where the maturity of the debt has been validly accelerated by commencement of a foreclosure action, the noteholder’s voluntary withdrawal of that action revokes the election to accelerate, absent the noteholder’s contemporaneous statement to the contrary.” The court also described, without adopting or rejecting it, the Appellate Division’s rule that a revocation “can be accomplished by an ‘affirmative act’ of the noteholder within six years of the election to accelerate,” and gave as an example “an express statement in a forbearance agreement that the noteholder is revoking its prior acceleration.” That is the ancestry of the de-acceleration letter. Engel went further: it rejected the argument “that a lender should be barred from revoking acceleration if the motive of the revocation was to avoid the expiration of the statute of limitations,” because “a noteholder’s motivation for exercising a contractual right is generally irrelevant.”

The legislature answered each piece with a verb. CPLR 3217(e) now provides that a voluntary discontinuance “shall not, in form or effect, waive, postpone, cancel, toll, extend, revive or reset the limitations period.” CPLR 203(h) provides that no party may “unilaterally waive, postpone, cancel, toll, revive, or reset the accrual.” A letter is a unilateral act. A discontinuance is a unilateral act. Consequently, the lender’s motive, which Engel said did not matter, still does not matter, because the power itself is gone.

In the statute's words

Seven rules that decide whether a New York foreclosure is time-barred

CPLR 213(4): the period
Six years for "an action upon a bond or note, the payment of which is secured by a mortgage upon real property, or upon a bond or note and mortgage so secured, or upon a mortgage of real property." Under paragraph (a), a lender whose prior action accelerated the debt "shall be estopped from asserting that the instrument was not validly accelerated, unless the prior action was dismissed based on an expressed judicial determination, made upon a timely interposed defense, that the instrument was not validly accelerated." Paragraph (b) applies the same estoppel against the lender in a homeowner's action under RPAPL 1501(4).
CPLR 203(h): no unilateral reset
"Once a cause of action upon an instrument described in subdivision four of section two hundred thirteen of this article has accrued, no party may, in form or effect, unilaterally waive, postpone, cancel, toll, revive, or reset the accrual thereof, or otherwise purport to effect a unilateral extension of the limitations period prescribed by law to commence an action and to interpose the claim, unless expressly prescribed by statute."
CPLR 3217(e): discontinuance
In an action on one of these instruments, "the voluntary discontinuance of such action, whether on motion, order, stipulation or by notice, shall not, in form or effect, waive, postpone, cancel, toll, extend, revive or reset the limitations period to commence an action and to interpose a claim, unless expressly prescribed by statute."
CPLR 205-a: the six-month re-filing window
After a timely action terminates, the original plaintiff "may commence a new action upon the same transaction or occurrence" within six months, but not where the prior action ended by "a voluntary discontinuance, a failure to obtain personal jurisdiction over the defendant, a dismissal of the complaint for any form of neglect," a violation of court rules or scheduling orders, "default due to nonappearance for conference or at a calendar call," or failure to timely submit an order or judgment. A successor or assignee may not use it "unless pleading and proving that such assignee is acting on behalf of the original plaintiff," and "in no event shall the original plaintiff receive more than one six-month extension."
RPAPL 1301(4): one bar ends every action
"If an action to foreclose a mortgage or recover any part of the mortgage debt is adjudicated to be barred by the applicable statute of limitations, any other action seeking to foreclose the mortgage or recover any part of the same mortgage debt shall also be barred by the statute of limitations." Subdivision (3) separately provides that a second action commenced without leave of court while the first is pending causes the former action to be "deemed discontinued," subject to exceptions the subdivision lists.
General Obligations Law § 17-105: what the borrower signs
Under subdivision 1, a waiver of the expired time, a promise not to plead it, or "a promise to pay the mortgage debt," made after the right to foreclose accrued "by the express terms of a writing signed by the party to be charged," is effective "to make the time limited for commencement of the action run from the date of the waiver or promise." Under subdivision 4, no acknowledgment, waiver, promise or agreement, "express or implied in fact or in law," extends the time "in any other manner than that provided in this section." Subdivision 5 leaves "a payment or part payment of the principal or interest" and "a stipulation made in an action or proceeding" outside the section.
RPAPL 1501(4): clearing the record
"Where the period allowed by the applicable statute of limitation for the commencement of an action to foreclose a mortgage . . . has expired, any person having an estate or interest in the real property subject to such encumbrance may maintain an action . . . to secure the cancellation and discharge of record of such encumbrance," except where the mortgagee "shall be in possession of the affected real property." In that action "it shall be immaterial whether the debt upon which the mortgage or lien was based has, or has not, been paid."

In my experience the motion is decided by the first complaint, not the last letter. Stop reading the letter and find that complaint. It either demanded the whole balance or it did not, and that decides the case. Everything the lender mailed after it is argument. Do not sign a modification or a forbearance until someone has counted your dates. Your signature is the one thing that can move them.

How to count your own dates

Every one of these cases is a calendar, and the homeowner’s lawyer should build it before the lender’s does. The order below is the order I use, and the order the Brentwood homeowner’s file is read in.

  1. Find the first acceleration. Pull the court file for every prior action on the property, including one you do not remember being served in. A complaint that demanded the entire balance is the acceleration. A letter that described acceleration as a future event is not. When your defense rests on an acceleration made before, or by, a prior action, CPLR 213(4)(a) estops the lender “from asserting that the instrument was not validly accelerated,” unless that action was dismissed on “an expressed judicial determination, made upon a timely interposed defense,” that it was not.

  2. Add six years. CPLR 213(4). If the current action was commenced after that date, the defense exists.

  3. Set aside every unilateral act by the lender. The label on the letter does not matter, and a voluntary discontinuance of the old case is treated the same way.

  4. Read what you signed. General Obligations Law § 17-105(1) is the exception the statute writes in the borrower’s hand: a promise to pay the mortgage debt, or a waiver of the expired time, “by the express terms of a writing signed by the party to be charged,” makes the time run from the date of that writing. A loan modification or forbearance agreement can be that writing, which is the subject of our earlier warning about signing a loan modification when the statute of limitations may have run. A payment on the loan, and a stipulation made in an action, sit outside the section; bring both and let the lawyer read them.

  5. Check how the old case ended. CPLR 205-a(a) gives a lender six months to re-file after a timely action terminates, once, and only to the original plaintiff, and not where the prior action ended “by default due to nonappearance for conference or at a calendar call,” which is how the 2014 action in Ahmed ended. The court did not reach the window; the second action came two years after the dismissal, so it could not have helped.

  6. If a court already denied the defense, look at renewal. CPLR 2221(e)(2) permits a motion for leave to renew that demonstrates “a change in the law that would change the prior determination.” Ahmed was decided on exactly that motion.

If you would rather hand the file to someone who does this every week, send it to us and we will build the calendar with you.

What a time-barred foreclosure means

A dismissal on the statute of limitations ends more than the case in front of you. The sentence in RPAPL 1301(4) quoted above attaches the bar to the mortgage and the debt, not to the case number: no further action to foreclose that mortgage or to recover any part of that debt may be brought.

The dismissal does not, by itself, remove the mortgage from the county record. That is a second action, and RPAPL 1501(4) gives it to you: once the period to foreclose has expired, any person with an estate or interest in the property may sue “to secure the cancellation and discharge of record of such encumbrance,” whether or not the debt was paid, unless the lender is in possession of the property.

For a Nassau or Suffolk family in and out of foreclosure since the last decade, the two actions together are the difference between a house with a cloud on it and a house.

What to bring to the first call

The first document I ask for is the complaint from the first foreclosure, not the letter from the last servicer. Bring these:

  1. Every summons and complaint ever filed on the mortgage, with the index numbers, and the order or stipulation that ended each case.
  2. Every letter from the lender or servicer about acceleration, de-acceleration, reinstatement, or the loan being “no longer in foreclosure,” with the envelopes if you kept them.
  3. Anything you signed after the first default: a modification, a forbearance, a repayment plan, or a stipulation in the old action.
  4. Your payment history since the first complaint.
  5. If a court denied a statute of limitations defense before December 30, 2022, that order and the motion papers.

Sources


The Brentwood homeowner’s case is not in the letter on her table. It is in the first complaint in her file, the one that demanded the whole balance, and in anything she signed after it. If the count comes out in her favor, the foreclosure defense does not end at the dismissal; the action that clears her title comes next.

If a lender’s letter says your acceleration was revoked and a new foreclosure has been filed or threatened on your Long Island home, call (516) 750-0595 or request a free review of your timeline. Bring the complaint from the first case, not the letter from the last servicer.

Legal Context

Why This Matters for Your Case

New York law is among the most complex and nuanced in the country, with distinct procedural rules, substantive doctrines, and court systems that differ significantly from other jurisdictions. The Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) governs every stage of civil litigation, from service of process through trial and appeal. The Appellate Division, Appellate Term, and Court of Appeals create a rich and ever-evolving body of case law that practitioners must follow.

Attorney Jason Tenenbaum has practiced across these areas for over 24 years, writing more than 1,000 appellate briefs and publishing over 2,600 legal articles that attorneys and clients rely on for guidance. The analysis in this article reflects real courtroom experience — from motion practice in Civil Court and Supreme Court to oral arguments before the Appellate Division — and a deep understanding of how New York courts actually apply the law in practice.

Frequently Asked Questions

Common Questions About This Topic

5 answers from the firm's New York personal-injury and employment-law practice. Click any question to expand.

Can a bank revoke a mortgage acceleration by sending a letter in New York?

Not since December 30, 2022. CPLR 203(h) provides that once a foreclosure cause of action has accrued, "no party may, in form or effect, unilaterally waive, postpone, cancel, toll, revive, or reset the accrual thereof." *U.S. Bank N.A. v Ahmed* (2d Dept August 5, 2026) applied it to the July 24, 2019 letter described above.

When does the six-year foreclosure clock start?

When the debt is accelerated. Under *Freedom Mtge. Corp. v Engel*, 37 NY3d 1 (2021), acceleration requires an "unequivocal overt act," and a foreclosure complaint that demands the entire balance is one. A default letter that describes acceleration as a future event does not start the clock.

Does FAPA apply to a foreclosure that was filed before December 30, 2022?

It did in *Ahmed*, to an action commenced in January 2021, on a motion for leave to renew based on the change in the law. Whether the Act reaches your case depends on your dates and your procedural posture, which is a question for the first call.

What can extend the six years after FAPA?

The only writing that extends it is one you sign. General Obligations Law § 17-105(1) makes a signed promise to pay the mortgage debt, or a signed waiver of the expired time, run the time from the date of the writing, and subdivision 4 provides that nothing else, "express or implied in fact or in law," extends it. Subdivision 5 leaves payments and stipulations in an action to other rules. A loan modification or forbearance agreement signed after the clock has run is the document to worry about.

What happens to a Long Island mortgage once the foreclosure is time-barred?

The lender cannot foreclose it, and no other action to foreclose or to recover any part of the same debt may be brought. The mortgage stays of record until the homeowner brings an action under RPAPL 1501(4) "to secure the cancellation and discharge of record of such encumbrance." For a Nassau or Suffolk homeowner that is a separate action from the foreclosure defense, and the one that clears the title.

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Disclaimer: This article is published by the Law Office of Jason Tenenbaum, P.C. for informational and educational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and no attorney-client relationship is formed by reading this content. The legal principles discussed may not apply to your specific situation, and the law may have changed since this article was last updated.

New York law varies by jurisdiction — court decisions in one Appellate Division department may not be followed in another, and local court rules in Nassau County Supreme Court differ from those in Suffolk County Supreme Court, Kings County Civil Court, or Queens County Supreme Court. The Appellate Division, Second Department (which covers Long Island, Brooklyn, Queens, and Staten Island) and the Appellate Term (which hears appeals from lower courts) each have distinct procedural requirements and precedents that affect litigation strategy.

If you need legal help with a foreclosure defense matter, contact our office at (516) 750-0595 for a free consultation. We serve clients throughout Long Island (Huntington, Babylon, Islip, Brookhaven, Smithtown, Riverhead, Southampton, East Hampton), Nassau County (Hempstead, Garden City, Mineola, Great Neck, Manhasset, Freeport, Long Beach, Rockville Centre, Valley Stream, Westbury, Hicksville, Massapequa), Suffolk County (Hauppauge, Deer Park, Bay Shore, Central Islip, Patchogue, Brentwood), Queens, Brooklyn, Manhattan, the Bronx, Staten Island, and Westchester County. Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Jason Tenenbaum, Personal Injury Attorney serving Long Island, Nassau County and Suffolk County

Written By

Jason Tenenbaum, Esq.

Jason Tenenbaum is a personal injury attorney serving Long Island, Nassau & Suffolk Counties, and New York City. Admitted to practice in NY, NJ, FL, TX, GA, MI, and Federal courts, Jason is one of the few attorneys who writes his own appeals and tries his own cases. Since 2008, he has authored more than 2,600 articles on no-fault insurance law, personal injury, and employment law — a resource other attorneys rely on to stay current on New York appellate decisions.

Education
Syracuse University College of Law
Experience
24+ Years
Articles
2,600+ Published
Licensed In
6 States + Federal

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