CPLR 3212(a): Parties Cannot Stipulate Around the 120-Day Summary Judgment Deadline

Last reviewed: September 2026.

Looking for the complete rule? This post analyzes one CPLR 3212(a) stipulation decision. For the full practitioner’s guide to CPLR § 3212 — deadlines, leading cases, and practice pointers — see CPLR § 3212 Summary Judgment: The New York Practitioner’s Guide.

New York’s Civil Practice Law and Rules establish strict deadlines for filing summary judgment motions, primarily through CPLR 3212(a). This statute generally requires that summary judgment motions be made within 120 days after the note of issue is filed. However, practitioners sometimes wonder whether parties can work around these timing constraints through mutual agreement.

A First Department decision provides crucial clarification about what it takes to deviate from these procedural requirements. The case highlights an important distinction that could significantly impact litigation strategy and timing considerations for attorneys handling summary judgment motions.

The Decision

Jason Tenenbaum’s Analysis:

Reeps v BMW of N. Am., LLC, 2018 NY Slip Op 02907 (1st Dept. 2018)

“Prior court orders and stipulations between the parties show that the parties, with the court’s consent, charted a procedural course that deviated from the path established by the CPLR and allowed for defendants’ filing of this round of summary judgment motions more than 120 days after the filing of the note of issue ”

Jason’s original correction:

I originally read this and belied the parties could by-pass the 120-day rule by side stipulation. But upon a more thorough reading today, I saw that express Court approval is needed to bypass the 120-day rule (or shorter depending on court rule). Do not be lulled into believing that the parties can stipulate around 3212(a)‘s time limitations without express court approval.

The 120-Day Rule: Legal Background

CPLR 3212 is New York’s summary judgment statute, and subdivision (a) sets the clock: unless the court sets an earlier date, a summary judgment motion must be made no later than 120 days after the filing of the note of issue — the document that certifies the case is trial-ready and places it on the trial calendar. Many courts and individual judges shorten that window by rule or order, commonly to 60 days, so the operative deadline in any given case may be considerably tighter than the statute’s outer limit.

The deadline has real teeth. A late motion may be entertained only on a showing of “good cause,” and the Court of Appeals has construed that phrase strictly: good cause means a satisfactory explanation for the delay in making the motion, not an argument that the motion is meritorious or that deciding it would conserve judicial resources. A strong motion filed late without an excuse for the lateness is simply not heard. The rule exists to stop the once-common practice of eve-of-trial summary judgment motions that functioned as litigation delay devices.

Against that backdrop, Reeps answers a narrower question: can the parties contract around the deadline? The First Department’s language is instructive. What saved the late motions there was not the parties’ stipulation standing alone — it was that the parties, “with the court’s consent,” charted a procedural course deviating from the CPLR. The court’s blessing was the operative ingredient. A side stipulation between counsel, never so-ordered or otherwise approved, does not extend the statutory deadline.

Why This Matters

For litigators, the trap is easy to fall into. Adversaries frequently agree between themselves to extend briefing schedules, and most of the time those professional courtesies work fine. But CPLR 3212(a)‘s deadline is different in kind: it protects the court’s calendar, not just the parties’ convenience, so the parties cannot waive it for the court. Counsel who relies on an unapproved stipulation and files at day 150 risks having a dispositive motion rejected as untimely regardless of its merits — a potential malpractice exposure on an otherwise winnable case.

The practice point is simple. If the parties want more time for summary judgment motions, get the stipulation so-ordered, or build the extended schedule into a court order — a status conference order, a discovery order, anything bearing the court’s express consent. Do it before the deadline runs, because after it runs the only path is the demanding good cause standard.

For clients — injured plaintiffs and defendants alike — the rule explains why summary judgment timing is choreographed so carefully around the note of issue, and why an attorney’s calendar discipline in the post-note-of-issue window matters as much as the strength of the motion itself.

Practical Takeaways

• CPLR 3212(a) requires summary judgment motions within 120 days of the note of issue — or sooner where a court rule or order sets a shorter deadline.
• Parties cannot extend that deadline by private stipulation; express court approval is required.
• Late motions are heard only on good cause shown, meaning a satisfactory explanation for the delay itself.
• Best practice: have any extension stipulation so-ordered before the deadline expires.

Court consent was shown by the record

Reeps v BMW, decided April 26, 2018, involved prior orders and stipulations establishing a course of procedure with the court’s consent. The First Department held the motions timely and remitted for consideration of their merits. It did not hold that agreement between counsel, standing alone, suspended the statutory deadline.

Keep the distinction between permission to make the motion and entitlement to win it. Reeps returned the motions for further consideration. The appellate court also directed attention to the expert evidence and a hearing concerning its scientific support. The scheduling ruling did not decide the underlying causation dispute.

Check what the consent actually covers

A court may approve additional discovery or extend an opposition date without addressing the deadline to make a dispositive motion. Read the language rather than assuming every extension changes every date.

A proposed stipulation should identify the particular deadline, the affected parties and the requested new date. Counsel should retain the resulting court approval with the motion papers. An unsigned proposal, an email agreement or a calendar reminder does not establish the same record as the orders and stipulations described in Reeps.

This is a practical documentation method, not a holding that one particular form of order is mandatory. The point is to make the court’s scheduling decision identifiable. If the order is unclear, ask for clarification while there is still time to comply with the existing date.

Three related questions require different proof

First determine the ordinary deadline from CPLR 3212(a) and the applicable order. Next determine whether an approved schedule actually changes it. If neither route makes the motion timely, identify the basis for leave and support the explanation for the delay.

A request for additional discovery under subdivision (f) does not automatically answer the timing question under subdivision (a). The Stoian note explains why a request for unavailable evidence needs its own showing. Similarly, Rivera addresses a calendar strike after the deadline had expired, not an approved extension.

What to keep in a motion-timing handoff

Retain the filed trial-readiness document and all later scheduling orders. Put the parties’ stipulation next to the order approving or addressing it. Include proof of the motion’s actual service, because the date a lawyer finished drafting is not the date a motion was made.

And for an opposition, figure out what exactly the order said that the movant relied upon. So if it was just a briefing extension or a discovery extension, make sure you say that because those two things are different. And then if consent was given, then explain the scope of that consent and don’t just ignore the order and only rely on some default calendar calculation.

Historical note: Reeps recognized a court-consented procedural course shown by the record; it is not authority for private waiver of CPLR 3212(a).

Connect to the Encyclopedia

Start with the CPLR 3212 summary-judgment hub. These notes distinguish the deadline, the relief requested and the evidence needed:

• Metro: service date and the insurer’s failed proof
• Zarnoch: dismissal of a defense under CPLR 3211(b)
• B.Y.: why a stand-alone subdivision (g) motion failed
• Stoian: explain the evidence sought and the delay

For a pending motion, contact the firm with the trial-readiness filing, scheduling orders, served papers and proof of service. This historical discussion is general information, not case-specific advice.