CPLR 3212(a): Parties Cannot Stipulate Around the 120-Day Summary Judgment Deadline

Looking for the complete rule? This post analyzes one CPLR 3212(a) stipulation decision. For the full practitioner’s guide to CPLR § 3212 — deadlines, leading cases, and practice pointers — see CPLR § 3212 Summary Judgment: The New York Practitioner’s Guide.

New York’s Civil Practice Law and Rules establish strict deadlines for filing summary judgment motions, primarily through CPLR 3212(a). This statute generally requires that summary judgment motions be filed within 120 days after the note of issue is filed. However, practitioners sometimes wonder whether parties can work around these timing constraints through mutual agreement.

A First Department decision provides crucial clarification about what it takes to deviate from these procedural requirements. The case highlights an important distinction that could significantly impact litigation strategy and timing considerations for attorneys handling summary judgment motions.

The Decision

Jason Tenenbaum’s Analysis:

Reeps v BMW of N. Am., LLC, 2018 NY Slip Op 02907 (1st Dept. 2018)

“Prior court orders and stipulations between the parties show that the parties, with the court’s consent, charted a procedural course that deviated from the path established by the CPLR and allowed for defendants’ filing of this round of summary judgment motions more than 120 days after the filing of the note of issue ”

I originally read this and belied the parties could by-pass the 120-day rule by side stipulation. But upon a more thorough reading today, I saw that express Court approval is needed to bypass the 120-day rule (or shorter depending on court rule). Do not be lulled into believing that the parties can stipulate around 3212(a)‘s time limitations without express court approval.

The 120-Day Rule: Legal Background

CPLR 3212 is New York’s summary judgment statute, and subdivision (a) sets the clock: unless the court sets an earlier date, a summary judgment motion must be made no later than 120 days after the filing of the note of issue — the document that certifies the case is trial-ready and places it on the trial calendar. Many courts and individual judges shorten that window by rule or order, commonly to 60 days, so the operative deadline in any given case may be considerably tighter than the statute’s outer limit.

The deadline has real teeth. A late motion may be entertained only on a showing of “good cause,” and the Court of Appeals has construed that phrase strictly: good cause means a satisfactory explanation for the delay in making the motion, not an argument that the motion is meritorious or that deciding it would conserve judicial resources. A strong motion filed late without an excuse for the lateness is simply not heard. The rule exists to stop the once-common practice of eve-of-trial summary judgment motions that functioned as litigation delay devices.

Against that backdrop, Reeps answers a narrower question: can the parties contract around the deadline? The First Department’s language is instructive. What saved the late motions there was not the parties’ stipulation standing alone — it was that the parties, “with the court’s consent,” charted a procedural course deviating from the CPLR. The court’s blessing was the operative ingredient. A side stipulation between counsel, never so-ordered or otherwise approved, does not extend the statutory deadline.

Why This Matters

For litigators, the trap is easy to fall into. Adversaries frequently agree between themselves to extend briefing schedules, and most of the time those professional courtesies work fine. But CPLR 3212(a)‘s deadline is different in kind: it protects the court’s calendar, not just the parties’ convenience, so the parties cannot waive it for the court. Counsel who relies on an unapproved stipulation and files at day 150 risks having a dispositive motion rejected as untimely regardless of its merits — a potential malpractice exposure on an otherwise winnable case.

The practice point is simple. If the parties want more time for summary judgment motions, get the stipulation so-ordered, or build the extended schedule into a court order — a status conference order, a discovery order, anything bearing the court’s express consent. Do it before the deadline runs, because after it runs the only path is the demanding good cause standard.

For clients — injured plaintiffs and defendants alike — the rule explains why summary judgment timing is choreographed so carefully around the note of issue, and why an attorney’s calendar discipline in the post-note-of-issue window matters as much as the strength of the motion itself.

Practical Takeaways

• CPLR 3212(a) requires summary judgment motions within 120 days of the note of issue — or sooner where a court rule or order sets a shorter deadline.
• Parties cannot extend that deadline by private stipulation; express court approval is required.
• Late motions are heard only on good cause shown, meaning a satisfactory explanation for the delay itself.
• Best practice: have any extension stipulation so-ordered before the deadline expires.

Related Resources

• A formulation of a prima facie case — our cluster hub on summary judgment proof in New York no-fault litigation
• The firm’s Legal Encyclopedia — plain-language explainers on New York civil practice
• Personal Injury practice — how we litigate injury cases across Long Island and NYC
• CPLR 3212 Summary Judgment: When Relief Becomes Improper (Complete Guide)
• CPLR 3212(a) not applicable in the lower courts? Not again.
• Avoiding the 120-day rule to make a summary judgment motion
• 3211(b) motion not subject to 3212(a) time limitations