New York Default Judgment Laws: When Insurance Delays Don’t Excuse Missing Court Deadlines

Shavin’s insurer-related explanation failed because there was no admissible proof that the insurer had been notified of the lawsuit before the default. Evidence of a later delay in appointing counsel did not fill that gap. The Second Department reversed the order granting vacatur and left the liability-default order in place.

Still current (September 2026): Reinhold (2026) again rejected an unsupported excuse for default; the default-judgment hub places Shy’s insurer-notification problem alongside distinct office and service failures.

Last reviewed: September 2026.

Shy’s actual procedural history

Shy v Shavin Corp., 174 AD3d 936, was decided July 31, 2019 by the Appellate Division, Second Department. It arose from a personal-injury action in Nassau County.

The plaintiff served the defendant through the Secretary of State in July 2017 and later mailed the summons and complaint to its last known address. In October, the plaintiff moved for leave to enter a default judgment on liability and for an inquest on damages. The defendant did not oppose that motion, which was granted in December 2017.

In May 2018, the defendant moved under CPLR 5015(a)(1) to vacate the December order. The Supreme Court accepted insurance-carrier delay as a reasonable excuse and granted that branch of the motion. The plaintiff appealed.

The appellate court reversed. It denied the requested excusable-default relief. The distinction between liability and damages matters: the earlier order granted leave to enter a liability default and directed an inquest. The opinion did not decide the amount of injury damages.

The consultant could not supply the missing firsthand account

The defendant offered an affidavit from a litigation consultant employed by its insurer. The consultant said the defendant’s insurance agent or broker had attempted to forward the lawsuit papers in October 2017. The court treated that assertion as inadmissible hearsay.

The problem was not simply the witness’s job title. The submission failed to provide admissible evidence showing notification of the insurer before default. Without that link, the defendant had not established that carrier delay caused its failure to respond.

A record search, a statement about what a broker was told, and evidence of an actual transmission are not interchangeable. A person explaining a communication must identify how they know it occurred. Shy does not prescribe one universal document for proving notification, but it does reject the hearsay showing made in this case.

This is a useful contrast with Urban Radiology. There, the claims supervisor who handled the claims described a lost file and prompt action after discovery of default. The court accepted that account. The different outcomes turn on different records, not an automatic preference for or against insurers.

Why events after default did not explain it

The defendant also showed that the insurer delayed assigning counsel to move to vacate after the default order. That later delay could not establish a reasonable excuse for the original default.

The chronology therefore has two separate periods: the time to appear or answer, and the response after the court had granted default relief. Evidence concerning the second period did not establish what happened during the first. A motion can describe genuine later difficulty and still fail to explain the missed obligation that produced the order.

The New Age Medical decision makes a related point from another angle. There, the court focused on an unexplained year between rejection of an answer and its correction. A problem with the initial paper and a later failure to address that problem can require separate explanations.

Shy did not decide that insurer delay can never be reasonable. It decided that this defendant had not proved the causal account offered for this default. The original page’s broad title should be read with that evidentiary limit.

Why the court did not reach the proposed defense

A defendant seeking excusable-default relief under CPLR 5015(a)(1) must show a reasonable excuse and a potentially meritorious defense. Because Shavin did not establish the first requirement, the appellate court did not need to address the second.

That disposition is not a finding that the defendant had no possible defense to the injury action. It means the motion failed before the merits question had to be resolved. Describing every denied vacatur motion as proof that the underlying defense was meritless would misstate this decision.

The current archive comparison is JPMorgan Chase Bank v Reinhold, 2026 NY Slip Op 02636. Reinhold rejected an unsupported account that prior counsel caused the defaults and likewise did not reach the defenses. It was a foreclosure dispute, not an insurer-delay case, but the sequence of the analysis is comparable.

Timing and service need their own review

CPLR 5015(a)(1) has a stated one-year limit. It runs from service on the moving party of the judgment or order with written notice of entry, or from entry if that party entered it. That statutory limit should not be confused with the requirements for a different ground of relief.

Other grounds may require a different inquiry. CPLR 317 addresses specified nonpersonal service, nonreceipt in time to defend, merit and its own time limits. Shy did not decide an application under that provision. Service through the Secretary of State does not by itself establish entitlement to relief.

The answer period itself also depends on service. CPLR 3012(c) provides 30 days after service is complete for the specified methods, including delivery of the summons and complaint to a state official authorized to receive them. Shy’s Secretary-of-State service therefore should not be analyzed by assuming every defendant has the same personal-delivery deadline. The opinion did not resolve a disputed calculation of that period; its stated problem was the absence of admissible proof connecting insurer notification to the default.

Renelique separately illustrates why a challenge to service and an excusable-default motion should not be conflated. The grounds actually pursued, the service method and the supporting affidavits determine the inquiry.

Frequently Asked Questions About Default Judgments

What constitutes a reasonable excuse for default in New York personal injury cases?

The explanation must address the particular missed obligation and be supported by appropriate evidence. Shy rejected hearsay about forwarding the lawsuit before default; it did not hold that every insurance delay is unreasonable. A potentially meritorious defense is a separate requirement under CPLR 5015(a)(1).

How long do defendants have to move to vacate a default judgment?

CPLR 5015(a)(1) specifies one year after service on the moving party of the judgment or order with written notice of entry, or after entry if that party entered it. Other grounds, including CPLR 317 and jurisdictional relief, have different conditions. Do not treat Shy as permission to wait indefinitely.

Can insurance delays always excuse a default?

No. The defendant must connect the delay to the default with admissible evidence. In Shy, the consultant’s account of the broker’s attempted transmission was hearsay, and the later delay in assigning vacatur counsel did not explain the initial default.

What happens if a default vacation motion is denied?

The challenged default order or judgment remains unless other relief is obtained. In Shy, the order concerned liability and an inquest on damages, not an appellate determination of a damages amount. The next available step depends on the order, the grounds already raised and applicable deadlines.

Should defendants always attempt to vacate defaults?

That requires an assessment of the service record, the explanation, potential defenses and the available procedural ground. Shy identifies a failed evidentiary showing; it does not establish that every motion is worthwhile or that every default can be reopened.

Connect to the Encyclopedia

Start with the default-judgment and vacatur hub. Follow the closest procedural comparisons:

• Renelique: a missing computer entry did not explain service.
• Urban Radiology: a claims handler’s supported lost-file account.
• New Age Medical: delay after rejection of an answer.
• MAPFRE v Callahan: counsel’s explanation did not address every absence.
• Longevity: excuse and potentially meritorious opposition are separate.

For review of a particular default or litigation deadline, contact the Law Office of Jason Tenenbaum. Have the summons, service proof, relevant orders, notice of entry and motion papers available. This case note does not determine the outcome of a new application.