Key Takeaway
Court rules plaintiff's failure to enter default judgment within one year of calendar default constitutes abandonment under CPLR 3215(c), dismissing no-fault case.
This article is part of our ongoing defaults coverage, with 90 published articles analyzing defaults issues across New York State. Attorney Jason Tenenbaum brings 24+ years of hands-on experience to this analysis, drawing from his work on more than 1,000 appeals, over 100,000 no-fault cases, and recovery of over $100 million for clients throughout Nassau County, Suffolk County, Queens, Brooklyn, Manhattan, and the Bronx. For personalized legal advice about how these principles apply to your specific situation, contact our Long Island office at (516) 750-0595 for a free consultation.
Understanding CPLR 3215(c)‘s One-Year Rule for Default Judgments
Default judgments are a powerful remedy in civil litigation, allowing plaintiffs to obtain relief when defendants fail to respond to lawsuits. However, New York’s Civil Practice Law and Rules impose strict timing requirements on when default judgments must be entered. While most practitioners are familiar with the one-year deadline following a defendant’s failure to answer or reply, a less commonly understood application of this rule involves calendar defaults—when a party fails to appear at a scheduled court appearance.
The one-year abandonment rule under CPLR 3215(c) serves an important policy objective: ensuring that litigation proceeds expeditiously and preventing plaintiffs from holding default judgments in reserve as leverage while cases remain dormant. Courts strictly enforce this deadline to promote judicial economy and protect defendants from indefinite exposure to unresolved legal claims. The statute provides that when plaintiffs fail to take proceedings for entry of judgment within one year after a default, courts must dismiss the complaint as abandoned unless sufficient cause is shown.
This procedural requirement becomes particularly significant in no-fault insurance litigation, where healthcare providers often pursue thousands of small-dollar claims simultaneously. Case management challenges can lead to oversights, and the consequences of missing the one-year deadline are severe: mandatory dismissal without prejudice to commence a new action, though subject to statute of limitations considerations.
Case Background: Josephson v. State Farm Insurance Co.
The case of Josephson v. State Farms Ins. Co. arose from a typical no-fault insurance dispute where a medical provider sought to recover assigned first-party benefits from an insurance company. The factual timeline proved fatal to the plaintiff’s claim. The defendant failed to appear at a calendar call on June 30, 2008, resulting in a calendar default. However, the plaintiff did not enter the default judgment until February 9, 2016—more than seven years after the calendar default occurred.
State Farm moved to vacate the default judgment and dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3215(c), arguing that the plaintiff’s failure to enter judgment within one year of the June 30, 2008 calendar default constituted abandonment of the action. The Civil Court granted the motion, and the plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Term, Second Department.
The procedural posture raised a critical question: Does CPLR 3215(c)‘s one-year rule apply not only to defaults based on failure to answer or reply, but also to calendar defaults when a party fails to appear at a scheduled court proceeding?
Jason Tenenbaum’s Analysis:
Josephson v State Farms Ins. Co., 2018 NY Slip Op 51132(U)(App. Term 2d Dept. 2018)
“In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which granted a motion by defendant State Farm Insurance Company (sued herein as State Farms Insurance Company) to vacate a default judgment that had been entered on February 9, 2016, upon defendant’s failure to appear at a calendar call of the case on June 30, 2008, and to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3215 (c) for failure to enter the default judgment within one year. Plaintiff did not rebut defendant’s motion papers by demonstrating that it had taken proceedings for the entry of a judgment within one year of defendant’s calendar default on June 30, 2008 (see CPLR 3215 ). As CPLR 3215 (c) provides that “f the plaintiff fails to take proceedings for the entry of judgment within one year after the default, the court shall not enter judgment but shall dismiss the complaint as abandoned, without costs, upon its own initiative or on motion, unless sufficient cause is shown why the complaint should not be dismissed,” the Civil Court did not abuse its discretion in [*2]granting defendant’s motion to vacate the default judgment and dismiss the complaint ”
We have seen the one year period to dismiss due to the failure to tale a default judgment when a judgment it not taken within one year to answer or reply to a counterclaim. This is a new twist. When a calendar default occurs, the failure to enter a judgment within one year serves as an abandonment of the action. I have never seen this one before but I will keep this case on my short list.
Legal Significance and Broader Implications
The Josephson decision extends the reach of CPLR 3215(c) beyond its traditional application to answer defaults, establishing that calendar defaults trigger the same one-year deadline for entering judgment. This interpretation promotes consistency in the application of abandonment principles across different types of defaults and reinforces the statute’s underlying policy of requiring plaintiffs to prosecute their claims diligently.
The ruling also clarifies the burden-shifting framework when defendants challenge stale default judgments. Once a defendant demonstrates that more than one year elapsed between the default and entry of judgment, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show either that proceedings were taken within the one-year period or that sufficient cause exists for the delay. The court’s language is unequivocal: CPLR 3215(c) provides that courts “shall not enter judgment but shall dismiss the complaint as abandoned” when the one-year deadline is missed, absent a showing of sufficient cause.
This mandatory language leaves little room for judicial discretion once the one-year period has expired without action. Unlike other procedural defaults that courts may excuse upon a showing of reasonable excuse and meritorious claim, CPLR 3215(c) requires dismissal unless the plaintiff can demonstrate “sufficient cause”—a more demanding standard than mere reasonable excuse.
Practical Implications for Litigants and Attorneys
For plaintiffs and their attorneys, the Josephson decision highlights the critical importance of calendaring and case management systems that track not only answer deadlines but also calendar call appearances. When a defendant fails to appear at any scheduled court proceeding, plaintiffs must immediately begin proceedings to enter a default judgment or risk losing their claims entirely.
The decision also serves as a cautionary tale for high-volume practices, particularly in no-fault insurance litigation where providers may be managing hundreds or thousands of active cases simultaneously. Automated docketing systems must account for calendar defaults as distinct triggering events for the one-year deadline, separate from traditional answer defaults. Failure to implement such systems can result in the wholesale dismissal of otherwise meritorious claims simply due to administrative oversight.
For defendants, this ruling provides a valuable procedural defense against stale default judgments. Defense counsel should carefully review the timeline between any default—whether based on failure to answer or failure to appear—and the entry of judgment. When more than one year has elapsed, a motion to vacate the judgment and dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3215(c) may succeed even when the defendant has no substantive defense to the underlying claim, as the statute mandates dismissal based solely on the timing violation.
Related Articles
Legal Context
Why This Matters for Your Case
New York law is among the most complex and nuanced in the country, with distinct procedural rules, substantive doctrines, and court systems that differ significantly from other jurisdictions. The Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) governs every stage of civil litigation, from service of process through trial and appeal. The Appellate Division, Appellate Term, and Court of Appeals create a rich and ever-evolving body of case law that practitioners must follow.
Attorney Jason Tenenbaum has practiced across these areas for over 24 years, writing more than 1,000 appellate briefs and publishing over 2,353 legal articles that attorneys and clients rely on for guidance. The analysis in this article reflects real courtroom experience — from motion practice in Civil Court and Supreme Court to oral arguments before the Appellate Division — and a deep understanding of how New York courts actually apply the law in practice.
About This Topic
Default Judgments in New York Practice
Default judgments arise when a party fails to answer, appear, or respond within required time limits. Vacating a default under CPLR 5015 requires showing a reasonable excuse for the failure and a meritorious defense or cause of action. In no-fault practice, defaults occur frequently in arbitration and court proceedings, and the standards for granting and vacating defaults have generated substantial case law. These articles analyze default practice, restoration motions, and the circumstances under which courts excuse procedural failures.
90 published articles in Defaults
Keep Reading
More Defaults Analysis
Civil Court shenanigans
Civil Court procedural delays and discovery disputes in no-fault insurance provider case, including stay orders and preclusion motions in New York courts.
Apr 24, 2021
Interest of justice vacatur
New York court grants vacatur of default judgment in no-fault insurance case where claim was barred by res judicata, demonstrating interests of justice standard.
Mar 17, 2021
Defaults – the right to notice
Analysis of Paulus v Christopher Vacirca ruling on CPLR 3215(g)(1) notice requirements for default judgments when defendants have appeared in NY actions.
Apr 14, 2015
Settlement negotiations constitute a reasonable execuse under 3012(d) and 5015(a)(1) by implication
NY court ruling that settlement negotiations constitute reasonable excuse for delay under CPLR 3012(d) and 5015(a)(1), protecting defendants from default judgments.
Apr 5, 2011
Motion for leave to enter a default insufficient
Attorney Jason Tenenbaum analyzes a questionable court decision regarding notice requirements for default judgment motions when defendants have already defaulted.
Jun 30, 2020
2 consecutive error disallow default vacatur
New York court rules two consecutive errors by insurance claims examiner - failing to forward summons and default motion - disallow default judgment vacatur despite reasonable...
Jun 10, 2017Common Questions
Frequently Asked Questions
What is a default in New York civil litigation?
A default occurs when a party fails to respond to a legal action within the required time frame — for example, failing to answer a complaint within 20 or 30 days of service under CPLR 320. When a defendant defaults, the plaintiff can seek a default judgment under CPLR 3215. However, a defaulting party can move to vacate the default under CPLR 5015(a) by showing a reasonable excuse for the delay and a meritorious defense to the action.
What constitutes a 'reasonable excuse' to vacate a default?
Courts evaluate reasonable excuse on a case-by-case basis. Accepted excuses can include law office failure (under certain circumstances), illness, lack of actual notice of the proceeding, or excusable neglect. However, mere neglect or carelessness is generally insufficient. The movant must also demonstrate a meritorious defense — meaning they have a viable defense to the underlying claim that warrants a determination on the merits.
Was this article helpful?
About the Author
Jason Tenenbaum, Esq.
Jason Tenenbaum is the founding attorney of the Law Office of Jason Tenenbaum, P.C., headquartered at 326 Walt Whitman Road, Suite C, Huntington Station, New York 11746. With over 24 years of experience since founding the firm in 2002, Jason has written more than 1,000 appeals, handled over 100,000 no-fault insurance cases, and recovered over $100 million for clients across Long Island, Nassau County, Suffolk County, Queens, Brooklyn, Manhattan, the Bronx, and Staten Island. He is one of the few attorneys in the state who both writes his own appellate briefs and tries his own cases.
Jason is admitted to practice in New York, New Jersey, Florida, Texas, Georgia, and Michigan state courts, as well as multiple federal courts. His 2,353+ published legal articles analyzing New York case law, procedural developments, and litigation strategy make him one of the most prolific legal commentators in the state. He earned his Juris Doctor from Syracuse University College of Law.
Disclaimer: This article is published by the Law Office of Jason Tenenbaum, P.C. for informational and educational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and no attorney-client relationship is formed by reading this content. The legal principles discussed may not apply to your specific situation, and the law may have changed since this article was last updated.
New York law varies by jurisdiction — court decisions in one Appellate Division department may not be followed in another, and local court rules in Nassau County Supreme Court differ from those in Suffolk County Supreme Court, Kings County Civil Court, or Queens County Supreme Court. The Appellate Division, Second Department (which covers Long Island, Brooklyn, Queens, and Staten Island) and the Appellate Term (which hears appeals from lower courts) each have distinct procedural requirements and precedents that affect litigation strategy.
If you need legal help with a defaults matter, contact our office at (516) 750-0595 for a free consultation. We serve clients throughout Long Island (Huntington, Babylon, Islip, Brookhaven, Smithtown, Riverhead, Southampton, East Hampton), Nassau County (Hempstead, Garden City, Mineola, Great Neck, Manhasset, Freeport, Long Beach, Rockville Centre, Valley Stream, Westbury, Hicksville, Massapequa), Suffolk County (Hauppauge, Deer Park, Bay Shore, Central Islip, Patchogue, Brentwood), Queens, Brooklyn, Manhattan, the Bronx, Staten Island, and Westchester County. Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.
