Key Takeaway
Crawford-Reese v Woodard case analysis: 90/180 threshold motion requirements, medical evidence standards, and Perl interpretation for NY serious injury law.
This article is part of our ongoing 5102(d) issues coverage, with 90 published articles analyzing 5102(d) issues issues across New York State. Attorney Jason Tenenbaum brings 24+ years of hands-on experience to this analysis, drawing from his work on more than 1,000 appeals, over 100,000 no-fault cases, and recovery of over $100 million for clients throughout Nassau County, Suffolk County, Queens, Brooklyn, Manhattan, and the Bronx. For personalized legal advice about how these principles apply to your specific situation, contact our Long Island office at (516) 750-0595 for a free consultation.
⚠️ Major Update — June 2026: The 90/180 Category Has Been Eliminated
On May 26, 2026, Governor Hochul signed S9008-C / A10008-C (Part EE), which deleted the 90/180-day category from Insurance Law §5102(d) as part of New York’s auto tort reform package. The reform takes effect immediately and applies to actions and proceedings commenced on or after the effective date — not accidents occurring on or after. That distinction matters enormously: a claim from an earlier accident that has not yet been filed may be governed by the new, narrower threshold. Cases already pending before May 26, 2026 (like the framework discussed in this 2012 post) continue under the old rules, and the Perl/contemporaneous-findings analysis below remains relevant to them.
Full analysis: NY Auto Tort Reform Passed: 90/180 Eliminated, 50% Fault Bar Enacted · Live tracker: NY 50% Fault Bar — Current Status
If you have an unfiled injury claim from an accident before May 26, 2026, get legal advice now — filing timing may determine which threshold rules apply to your case. Call (516) 750-0595 for a free consultation.
Last reviewed: June 2026
Crawford-Reese v Woodard, 2012 NY Slip Op 03502 (3d Dept. 2012)
Defendant’s evidence on the 90/180 threshold motion
Interesting discussion on this 5102(d) topic. The evidence that Defendant presented in his 90/180 threshold motion:
Free Consultation · No Fee Unless We Win
Does this apply to your situation?
Every case is different. Get a free, confidential case review from an experienced attorney who can tell you exactly where you stand.
The police report reflects that no injuries were reported at the accident scene and, although plaintiff sought medical treatment at a hospital emergency room eight days later complaining of pain in her chest, neck, shoulder and right knee, radiology reports from the hospital indicate calcification and arthritic changes, with no acute fractures or malalignment. Thereafter, several times over the next few months, plaintiff sought medical treatment for various complaints, including chest, head, neck, arm, hip and knee pain, but no limitation of range of motion was documented in the months following her accident, nor were there any recommendations for limitations on plaintiff’s work or activities. Diagnoses by various physicians who examined plaintiff during this period included muscle strain, tendinitis, mild arthritis, degenerative arthritis and obesity . Two independent medical examinations conducted on plaintiff by different doctors in 2007 found no disabilities that would limit her work status or daily activities. Significantly, plaintiff could not remember whether she had been working at the time of the accident or enrolled as a student but, in any event, no evidence was submitted demonstrating that plaintiff missed any time from work or classes as a result of her injuries”
Quantitative testing years after the accident under Perl
There was insufficient evidence in Plaintiff’s answering papers. But the conclusion of law is interesting:
“Further, although quantitative testing of an injury made years after an accident may be relevant to ascertain the severity of a permanent injury suffered by a plaintiff (see Perl v Meher, 18 NY3d 208, 217 ), contemporaneous findings of injury are highly relevant to causation (see id. at 218) and to establishing the 90/180-day category of serious injury (see Houston v Hofmann, 75 AD3d at 1049; Tuna v Babendererde, 32 AD3d 574, 577 ).”
Why contemporaneous findings matter to causation and 90/180
The contemporaneous hurdle that was determined to be an issue of in Perl came back on this case as a barrier as a matter of law.
Related Articles
- Critical mistakes that can destroy your 5102(d) case
- When IME doctors must explain why range of motion is self-restricted
- Understanding permanent consequential vs. significant limitation categories
- How suboptimal effort can derail serious injury threshold claims
- A serious-injury threshold reversal in the Second Department
- Personal Injury
Legal Update (June 2026): The 90/180-day category discussed in this post was eliminated from Insurance Law §5102(d) by the May 26, 2026 auto tort reform (S9008-C / A10008-C, Part EE) for actions commenced on or after the effective date. The Perl contemporaneous-findings analysis above remains governing law for cases commenced before that date and continues to inform causation arguments under the surviving §5102(d) categories. See our full breakdown of the 2026 reform and the current-status tracker.
Legal Context
Why This Matters for Your Case
New York law is among the most complex and nuanced in the country, with distinct procedural rules, substantive doctrines, and court systems that differ significantly from other jurisdictions. The Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) governs every stage of civil litigation, from service of process through trial and appeal. The Appellate Division, Appellate Term, and Court of Appeals create a rich and ever-evolving body of case law that practitioners must follow.
Attorney Jason Tenenbaum has practiced across these areas for over 24 years, writing more than 1,000 appellate briefs and publishing over 2,600 legal articles that attorneys and clients rely on for guidance. The analysis in this article reflects real courtroom experience — from motion practice in Civil Court and Supreme Court to oral arguments before the Appellate Division — and a deep understanding of how New York courts actually apply the law in practice.
About This Topic
Serious Injury Threshold Under Insurance Law 5102(d)
New York Insurance Law 5102(d) defines the categories of serious injury that a plaintiff must prove to recover non-economic damages in a motor vehicle accident case. The statute lists specific categories — significant disfigurement, fracture, loss of a fetus, permanent consequential limitation, significant limitation of use, and the 90/180-day rule. Courts apply these categories strictly, and the sufficiency of medical evidence supporting a serious injury claim is one of the most frequently litigated issues in New York personal injury law.
90 published articles in 5102(d) issues
Keep Reading
More 5102(d) issues Analysis
Defense Engineer Says Your Injury Is Degenerative? Bonilla-Acosta v Max Services (2026)
A NY appeals court held a defense engineer was qualified on crash force but not shown qualified to call spine injuries degenerative. What it means for you.
Oct 23, 2026Significant limitation v. permanent consequential, again
New York court ruling creates apparent contradiction in no-fault threshold requirements for significant limitation vs. permanent consequential limitation cases.
May 22, 2021Police Accident Reports and CPLR 4518(a): When They Come Into Evidence — and When They Get Redacted
Shehab v Powers explains when a police accident report is admissible under CPLR 4518(a) — officer observations come in, witness statements get redacted.
May 11, 2017Inconsistency between chiropractor report and MRI reports spells the end of personal injury plaintiff's claim
Court dismisses personal injury case when chiropractor's findings contradicted MRI results showing normal spine images with no disc damage.
Jun 25, 2013Strategic MRI Timing in Personal Injury Cases: Why Later Can Be Better
Expert analysis of strategic MRI timing in NY personal injury cases. Learn why delayed imaging can be better. Long Island & NYC attorneys. Call 516-750-0595.
Feb 4, 2011Gap in treatment analyzed
Court ruling clarifies that gaps in medical treatment only matter for causation issues when defendants fail to establish prima facie lack of causation in serious injury claims.
Nov 29, 2018Was this article helpful?
Disclaimer: This article is published by the Law Office of Jason Tenenbaum, P.C. for informational and educational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and no attorney-client relationship is formed by reading this content. The legal principles discussed may not apply to your specific situation, and the law may have changed since this article was last updated.
New York law varies by jurisdiction — court decisions in one Appellate Division department may not be followed in another, and local court rules in Nassau County Supreme Court differ from those in Suffolk County Supreme Court, Kings County Civil Court, or Queens County Supreme Court. The Appellate Division, Second Department (which covers Long Island, Brooklyn, Queens, and Staten Island) and the Appellate Term (which hears appeals from lower courts) each have distinct procedural requirements and precedents that affect litigation strategy.
If you need legal help with a 5102(d) issues matter, contact our office at (516) 750-0595 for a free consultation. We serve clients throughout Long Island (Huntington, Babylon, Islip, Brookhaven, Smithtown, Riverhead, Southampton, East Hampton), Nassau County (Hempstead, Garden City, Mineola, Great Neck, Manhasset, Freeport, Long Beach, Rockville Centre, Valley Stream, Westbury, Hicksville, Massapequa), Suffolk County (Hauppauge, Deer Park, Bay Shore, Central Islip, Patchogue, Brentwood), Queens, Brooklyn, Manhattan, the Bronx, Staten Island, and Westchester County. Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.