Appellate Term fiction

Severance in No-Fault Cases Involving Multiple Accidents

New York procedural rules permit defendants to move for severance when a plaintiff’s complaint joins multiple unrelated claims in a single action. CPLR 603 provides that courts may order separate trials or make separate judgments when joinder creates prejudice or confusion. In no-fault insurance litigation, healthcare providers frequently consolidate claims arising from treatment of different patients in different accidents, seeking to reduce litigation costs and streamline proceedings.

Defendants often resist such consolidation, arguing that claims involving separate accidents require different witnesses, present distinct factual issues, and create jury confusion if tried together. The established rule, particularly in the Third Department, has been that plaintiffs may join multiple no-fault claims in a single action provided they seek similar relief and present common questions of law or fact. Outside the Third Department, courts have been more restrictive, requiring that claims arise from the same accident or involve common elements like identical fee schedule defenses or provider-specific coverage issues.

Case Background

In Colin Clarke, M.D., P.C. v MVAIC, a healthcare provider brought a single action seeking reimbursement for treatment provided to patients injured in six separate accidents occurring on six different dates. The Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation moved to sever the six claims into separate actions, arguing that each claim involved different facts, different claimants, and would require different defense witnesses at trial.

The Civil Court denied MVAIC’s severance motion, permitting the consolidated action to proceed. MVAIC appealed to the Appellate Term, Second Department, arguing that established precedent required severance of claims arising from multiple unrelated accidents. The appellate court reviewed whether the complexity of trying six unrelated claims together warranted severance despite the plaintiff’s interest in consolidated litigation.

Colin Clarke, M.D., P.C. v MVAIC, 2021 NY Slip Op 50729(U)(App. Term 2d Dept 2021)

(1) “The complaint alleges that the claims arose out of six separate accidents which occurred on six different dates.”

(2) “A review of the denial of claim forms, explanations of review and correspondence pertaining to the claims at issue reflects that the facts relating to each claim are likely to raise few, if any, common issues of fact”

(see Mount Sinai Hosp. v Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp., 291 AD2d 536 ; Radiology Resource Network, P.C. v Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 12 AD3d 185 ). Indeed, under the facts of this case, an extraordinary number of defense witnesses would be required at a single trial of all six claims. As a result, defendant’s motion to sever the causes of action should have been granted (see Mount Sinai Hosp. v Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp., 291 AD2d 536; Maria Oca, M.D., P.C. v MVAIC, 35 Misc 3d 134, 2012 NY Slip Op 50758 ).”

Sentence number one comes from Mount Sinai and ends the inquiry. Sentence number two is a make believe addition that the new law clerks at the Appellate Term added to the severance inquiry. The reality is who wants to take up to the App. Div whether sentence (2) is a correct statement of law?

I for one do not think the App. Div. will grant leave to answer that esoteric question. But they really should because the no-fault rule, outside the third department, is no multi-suits unless it is the same accident or plaintiff pleads or can show common elements, i.e, same FS reduction, same coverage defense (probably provider based).

I just think the Court is wrong in their thinking on this issue.

Legal Significance

The Colin Clarke decision represents a departure from established severance jurisprudence in no-fault cases. As Jason notes, the traditional rule derives from Mount Sinai Hospital v Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp., which held that claims involving separate accidents occurring on different dates should be severed. That decision ended the inquiry—if the accidents occurred on different dates, severance was required absent common elements justifying consolidation.

The Appellate Term’s addition of a second inquiry—examining whether “few, if any, common issues of fact” exist and whether “an extraordinary number of defense witnesses” would be required—creates a new analytical framework not supported by controlling precedent. This shifts severance analysis from a bright-line rule based on whether accidents occurred on the same date to a discretionary balancing test examining factual overlap and witness burdens.

Jason’s concern about appellate review is well-founded. The Appellate Division likely would not grant leave to appeal on this esoteric procedural question, leaving the Appellate Term’s new framework in place despite its questionable foundation. Yet the issue matters significantly to no-fault practice. If providers can consolidate unrelated claims regardless of whether they involve the same accident, litigation costs decrease for plaintiffs while discovery burdens and trial complexity increase for defendants.

Practical Implications

Healthcare providers should recognize that while Colin Clarke permits consolidation of claims from multiple accidents, this precedent may not survive appellate review if tested. Providers benefit from consolidation through reduced legal fees and streamlined discovery, but risk reversal if defendants successfully distinguish the case or persuade appellate courts that the Appellate Term exceeded its authority by departing from Mount Sinai.

Defendants facing consolidated multi-accident cases should preserve severance arguments for appeal, documenting the factual distinctions between claims and the witness burdens created by consolidation. Defense motions should emphasize that Mount Sinai establishes the controlling standard—separate accidents require severance—and that the Appellate Term’s additional criteria in Colin Clarke lack precedential support. Defendants may also explore whether strategic stipulations or discovery management can mitigate consolidation prejudice if severance motions fail.

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