Is this our Judge Cooper from Nassau?

The legal community in New York’s no-fault insurance practice is relatively small, and practitioners often develop familiarity with the judges who regularly hear these cases. District Court judges in Nassau County, in particular, have played significant roles in shaping no-fault jurisprudence through their trial-level decisions. One such judge, Alfred Cooper, appears in a 2011 criminal appeal that sparked curiosity about whether this was the same jurist known to no-fault practitioners.

While this post reflects a personal anecdote rather than a substantive legal holding, it illustrates the practical realities of appearing before different judges and the importance of understanding judicial tendencies and procedural preferences when litigating no-fault cases.

Case Background

The case People v Thomas (William) involved a criminal appeal from a conviction rendered by Judge Alfred Cooper, serving as a Judicial Hearing Officer (J.H.O.) in New York County Criminal Court. The decision itself has no relevance to no-fault insurance law, but the judge’s name prompted questions about whether this was the same Judge Cooper who presided over countless no-fault matters in Nassau County District Court.

Jason Tenenbaum’s Analysis

People v Thomas (William), 2011 NY Slip Op 51338(U)(App. Term 1st Dept. 2011)

“Defendant appeals from a judgment of the Criminal Court of the City of New York, New York County (Alfred Cooper, J.H.O.), rendered January 15, 2009, after a nonjury trial, convicting him of two counts of disorderly conduct, and imposing sentence.”

Does anyone know if this is the same judge Cooper who sat in District Nassau for a gazillion years?

I remember when I first started in this practice, I appeared before Judge Cooper in District Nassau, Third District, Great Neck Part (when there was a Great Neck part).

I had an IME no-show cross-motion for summary judgment, in opposition to a Plaintiff’s summary judgment motion. This was before the first Fogel and about contemporaneous to Millenium, so there was an open question as to whether the failure to appear for two IMEs was an absolute defense to no-fault benefits.

My motion was withdrawn, sua sponte, and was converted to an opposition.  I asked the judge why he did that, and he said because that is what I meant to do.  There was no use arguing with him, unless I wanted to be held in contempt.  I still to this day fail to understand what happened.

Legal Significance and Practical Context

While this post does not discuss a substantive no-fault law holding, it illustrates important practical considerations for litigators. The anecdote about Judge Cooper’s sua sponte conversion of a cross-motion for summary judgment into an opposition highlights the discretion trial judges exercise in managing their calendars and controlling litigation before them.

The procedural issue described—whether a party can bring a cross-motion for summary judgment in opposition to plaintiff’s summary judgment motion, or whether they must simply oppose and file a separate motion—has been addressed by CPLR § 3212(a) and relevant case law. Generally, cross-motions for summary judgment are permissible and common, but some judges prefer parties to oppose first and move separately if necessary.

The reference to Fogel and Millennium cases places this anecdote in historical context. These early decisions addressed whether IME no-shows constituted absolute defenses to no-fault benefits or whether carriers needed to demonstrate prejudice. The evolution of this legal issue demonstrates how no-fault law developed through trial-level decisions and subsequent appeals.

Jason’s observation about the risk of contempt if he argued with the judge’s ruling reflects a practical reality: trial judges have broad discretion over procedural matters, and challenging those decisions in real-time can be counterproductive. The better practice is often to preserve the issue for appeal while complying with the court’s directive.

Practical Implications

For practitioners appearing before different judges in no-fault matters, this anecdote underscores the importance of understanding individual judges’ preferences and tendencies. Some judges are more formalistic about procedure, while others exercise greater flexibility in managing their calendars. Successful litigation requires adapting to these different judicial styles while preserving rights and protecting the record for appeal.

The story also illustrates why institutional knowledge matters in no-fault practice. Knowing which judges previously sat in which courts, understanding their procedural preferences, and being familiar with their substantive leanings can inform litigation strategy and help attorneys better serve their clients.

Related Articles

• Understanding IME No-Shows in New York No-Fault Insurance: Rights, Consequences, and Strategic Considerations
• Understanding CPLR 3212(a): Critical Timing Rules for Summary Judgment Motions in New York
• The CPLR 3212(g) paradigm
• Reasonable excuse satisfied despite claim of lack of personal jurisdiction
• New York No-Fault Insurance Law

Legal Update (February 2026): The no-fault insurance regulatory landscape, including IME procedures and procedural requirements referenced in this post, may have been substantially modified through amendments to 11 NYCRR 65 and related Department of Financial Services regulations since 2011. Practitioners should verify current provisions regarding examination compliance requirements and summary judgment standards, as the legal framework governing these issues has evolved significantly over the past 15 years.