Submit order?

New York’s court rules impose strict deadlines for submitting proposed orders following judicial decisions. Understanding when these deadlines apply and what consequences flow from missing them can significantly impact litigation outcomes. The 60-day rule established by 22 NYCRR 202.48 governs the submission of proposed orders and judgments, but its application depends on specific language used by the court in its directive.

The distinction between different types of order submission directives may seem technical, but it determines whether a party faces potential abandonment of their claim or motion for failing to timely submit a proposed order. Courts use specific terminology, and practitioners must understand the legal significance of these different formulations.

Understanding 22 NYCRR 202.48 and the 60-Day Rule

Section 202.48 of the Uniform Rules for Trial Courts establishes procedures for submitting proposed orders and judgments. The rule requires that when a court directs an order to be “settled or submitted on notice,” the prevailing party must submit the proposed order within 60 days. Failure to comply with this deadline can result in deemed abandonment of the motion or action.

The critical phrase “settled or submitted on notice” triggers the 60-day deadline and its consequences. When a court uses this specific language, all parties receive notice of the proposed order and an opportunity to object before the court signs it. This process allows for adversarial review of the proposed order’s language and ensures accuracy.

However, not every directive to submit an order triggers the 60-day abandonment rule. Courts frequently direct parties to “submit order,” “settle order,” or “submit order on notice” without using the precise formulation that invokes 202.48. When the court’s directive lacks the specific language requiring settlement or submission “on notice,” the 60-day abandonment provision does not apply.

Case Background

In 47 Thames Realty, LLC v Robinson, the Supreme Court directed the defendants to submit a proposed order regarding an award of attorney’s fees. The defendants did not submit the proposed order within 60 days of the court’s decision. The plaintiff argued that this delay constituted abandonment of the attorney’s fee claim under the 60-day rule set forth in 22 NYCRR 202.48.

The issue on appeal was whether the Supreme Court’s directive triggered the 60-day abandonment rule, or whether the rule did not apply because the court had not specifically directed that the order be “settled or submitted on notice.”

The Second Department had to parse the exact language used by the trial court and determine whether it fell within the scope of 22 NYCRR 202.48.

Jason Tenenbaum’s Analysis

47 Thames Realty, LLC v Robinson, 2014 NY Slip Op 06051 (2d Dept. 2014)

“22 NYCRR 202.48, entitled “ubmission of orders, judgments and decrees for signature,” states in pertinent part:

“(a) Proposed orders or judgments, with proof of service on all parties where the order is directed to be settled or submitted on notice, must be submitted for signature, unless otherwise directed by the court, within 60 days after the signing and filing of the decision directing that the order be settled or submitted.

“(b) Failure to submit the order or judgment timely shall be deemed an abandonment of the motion or action, unless for good cause shown.”

Here, the so-called 60-day rule set forth in 22 NYCRR 202.48 is not applicable because the Supreme Court’s direction that the defendants submit a proposed order with respect to an award of an attorney’s fee did not specify that the proposed order be settled or submitted on notice (see Farkas v Farkas, 11 NY3d 300, 309; Shamshovich v Shvartsman, 110 AD3d 975, 976-977; Matter of Village of Dobbs Ferry v Stanley Ave. Props., Inc., 95 AD3d 1027, 1029). Accordingly, the plaintiff’s contention that the defendants abandoned their claim for an award of an attorney’s fee by failing to comply with the 60-day rule is without merit.”

Just note the difference between the three directives that do not arise from a “decision/order”: (a) Submit order ; (b) Settle order ; (c) submit order on notice .

Legal Significance

This decision clarifies that the language used by courts in directing order submission matters significantly. The 60-day abandonment rule applies only when the court specifically directs that an order be “settled or submitted on notice.” Generic directives to “submit order” or “settle order,” without the “on notice” component, do not trigger the abandonment provision even if more than 60 days elapse.

The distinction serves important procedural purposes. When an order must be settled or submitted “on notice,” the adversarial process provides a check on the accuracy and appropriateness of the proposed order’s language. This process takes time and requires coordination among parties, justifying the imposition of a firm deadline with meaningful consequences for non-compliance.

Conversely, when a court simply directs submission of an order without the “on notice” requirement, the prevailing party can prepare and submit the order unilaterally. The absence of required adversarial review eliminates the need for the structured 60-day timeline and abandonment consequences. The court retains discretion to reject proposed orders that inaccurately reflect its decision, regardless of timing.

The Second Department’s decision aligns with Court of Appeals precedent in Farkas v Farkas, which emphasized that the specific language “settled or submitted on notice” triggers the 60-day rule. This bright-line approach provides clarity and predictability, allowing practitioners to know with certainty when the abandonment provision applies.

Practical Implications

Attorneys must carefully review the exact language courts use when directing submission of proposed orders. If the directive includes the phrase “settled or submitted on notice” or similar language indicating adversarial review, the 60-day abandonment rule applies and must be scrupulously followed. Missing this deadline can result in loss of the underlying relief, even if the party otherwise prevailed on the merits.

When courts use generic language directing submission or settlement of orders without specifying the “on notice” requirement, practitioners have more flexibility regarding timing. However, this flexibility is not unlimited. Courts expect reasonable promptness in submitting proposed orders, and unexplained delays may result in the court declining to sign the proposed order or taking other corrective action.

Practitioners should also recognize that opposing counsel may attempt to invoke the 60-day rule even when it does not apply. As this case demonstrates, careful analysis of the court’s actual language is essential to determining whether abandonment arguments have merit.

When preparing proposed orders, attorneys should distinguish between situations requiring notice to adversaries and those where unilateral submission is appropriate. If uncertainty exists about whether the court intended the “on notice” requirement, seeking clarification from the court is preferable to risking either unnecessary delay or inadvertent abandonment.

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