Key Takeaway
Court's inherent power to vacate default judgments in NY personal injury cases - Gurin v Pogge demonstrates when intentional defaults may be excused for substantial justice.
This article is part of our ongoing defaults coverage, with 90 published articles analyzing defaults issues across New York State. Attorney Jason Tenenbaum brings 24+ years of hands-on experience to this analysis, drawing from his work on more than 1,000 appeals, over 100,000 no-fault cases, and recovery of over $100 million for clients throughout Nassau County, Suffolk County, Queens, Brooklyn, Manhattan, and the Bronx. For personalized legal advice about how these principles apply to your specific situation, contact our Long Island office at (516) 750-0595 for a free consultation.
Gurin v Pogge, 2013 NY Slip Op 08174 (3d Dept. 2013)
“In November 2011, defendants moved to vacate the default judgment, putting in dispute the contents of the indemnification agreement that Pogge signed. In an affidavit in support of defendants’ motion to vacate, Pogge asserted that he knowingly defaulted because the indemnification agreement he signed did not contain a fourth handwritten provision that would hold him personally responsible for plaintiffs’ losses.’
“Supreme Court declined to vacate the default judgment pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (1), finding that defendants did not demonstrate a reasonable excuse for their default. Instead, the court vacated the judgment against Pogge individually “for sufficient reason and in the interests of substantial justice.” Plaintiffs now appeal.”
In order to obtain vacatur of a default judgment under CPLR 5015 (a) (1), a party must demonstrate a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious defense (see Eugene DiLorenzo, Inc. v A.C. Dutton Lbr. Co., 67 NY2d 138, 141 ; Wade v Village of Whitehall, 46 AD3d 1302, 1303 ). However, the grounds set forth in CPLR 5015 are not exclusive, and courts retain “inherent discretionary power” to vacate their own judgments “for sufficient reason and in the interests of substantial justice” (Woodson v Mendon Leasing Corp., 100 NY2d 62, 68 ; Boyd v Town of N. Elba, 28 AD3d 929, 931 , lv dismissed 7 NY3d 783 ; Matter of Culberson, 11 AD3d 859, 861 ). Notably, the decision to vacate “a default judgment lies within the discretion of the trial court … should not be disturbed unless it reflects an ‘improvident exercise of discretion’” (Chase Manhattan Automotive Fin. Corp. v Allstate Ins. Co., 272 AD2d 772, 773 , quoting Lucas v United Helpers Cedars Nursing Home, 239 AD2d 853, 853 ).”
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Affirmed.
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Legal Update (February 2026): Since this 2013 post, CPLR 5015 and related court procedures governing default judgment vacatur may have been subject to amendments or clarifying case law developments. Additionally, court practices regarding the exercise of inherent discretionary power to vacate defaults “in the interests of substantial justice” may have evolved through subsequent appellate decisions. Practitioners should verify current CPLR provisions and recent precedential authority when advising clients on default judgment vacatur strategies.
Legal Context
Why This Matters for Your Case
New York law is among the most complex and nuanced in the country, with distinct procedural rules, substantive doctrines, and court systems that differ significantly from other jurisdictions. The Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) governs every stage of civil litigation, from service of process through trial and appeal. The Appellate Division, Appellate Term, and Court of Appeals create a rich and ever-evolving body of case law that practitioners must follow.
Attorney Jason Tenenbaum has practiced across these areas for over 24 years, writing more than 1,000 appellate briefs and publishing over 2,353 legal articles that attorneys and clients rely on for guidance. The analysis in this article reflects real courtroom experience — from motion practice in Civil Court and Supreme Court to oral arguments before the Appellate Division — and a deep understanding of how New York courts actually apply the law in practice.
About This Topic
Default Judgments in New York Practice
Default judgments arise when a party fails to answer, appear, or respond within required time limits. Vacating a default under CPLR 5015 requires showing a reasonable excuse for the failure and a meritorious defense or cause of action. In no-fault practice, defaults occur frequently in arbitration and court proceedings, and the standards for granting and vacating defaults have generated substantial case law. These articles analyze default practice, restoration motions, and the circumstances under which courts excuse procedural failures.
90 published articles in Defaults
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Disclaimer: This article is published by the Law Office of Jason Tenenbaum, P.C. for informational and educational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and no attorney-client relationship is formed by reading this content. The legal principles discussed may not apply to your specific situation, and the law may have changed since this article was last updated.
New York law varies by jurisdiction — court decisions in one Appellate Division department may not be followed in another, and local court rules in Nassau County Supreme Court differ from those in Suffolk County Supreme Court, Kings County Civil Court, or Queens County Supreme Court. The Appellate Division, Second Department (which covers Long Island, Brooklyn, Queens, and Staten Island) and the Appellate Term (which hears appeals from lower courts) each have distinct procedural requirements and precedents that affect litigation strategy.
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