When interest clearly does not matter

When Desantis gets to appoint an entire kingdom of DCA judges, the wrecking ball to Florida PIP litigation is unleashed. This does not even take into account the likely repeal of this coverage in the not so distant future in Fla. In a way, moving to a Med-payment system with mandatory $25k/$50k coverage will be better for the public and the attorneys looking to earn a living in the Fla. PI jungle.

Here are two cases that are off the charts.

(1) PRECISION DIAGNOSTIC, INC. vs PROGRESSIVE AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, No. 4D21-48 (Fla 4th DCA 2021)

“However, regardless of the incorrect interpretation of how to calculate interest, we affirm the trial court’s finding that the amount in controversy is de minimis. “The legal maxim ‘de minimis non curat lex,’ simply means that the law does not care for small things.” Loeffler v. Roe, 69 So. 2d 331, 338 (Fla. 1953). The amount in controversy here, $4.17, is de minimis and is a trifling amount.

The principle of de minimis “is a hallowed, long established and long recognized principle of law, and a party is entitled to call it in aid.” Alec Samuels, De Minimis Non Curat Lex, 1985 Statute L. Rev. 167, 167 (1985). Seeking trifling amounts of money involving the courts is a “waste of time and money, and impairing the dignity of the court and the judge.” Id. at 168.

The principle of de minimis has been upheld in this court and other courts. See L.H. v. State, 803 So. 2d 862, 864 n.1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (finding a $4 discrepancy in the calculation of restitution was de minimis); Winter Garden Citrus v. Parrish, 438 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (denying attorney’s fees because a loss of supplemental benefits for a
period of five days was de minimis); Wilkerson v. Wilkerson, 717 So. 2d 1118, 1119 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (affirming child support obligation that exceeded support guidelines by $1.50, finding that the “negligible amount … does not warrant remand for justification, recalculation or other proceedings”); Texas State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792 (1989) (“ technical victory may be so insignificant … as to be insufficient to support prevailing party status” for the purposes of an award of attorney’s fees.).

A de minimis amount in controversy does not warrant reversal. See Eureka Corp. v. Guardian Tr. Co., 139 So. 198, 199 (Fla. 1932) (“y the well-settled rule of this court under the facts of this case such an allowance was de minimis no curat lex, for which reversal does not lie.”). In United Automobile Insurance Co. v. Alfonso, 17 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 887a (Fla. 11th Jud. Cir. July 1, 2010), the court applied the doctrine of “de minimis non curat lex” to a suit for a purported interest miscalculation of $2.53 “brought painfully for no other justification than the award of attorney’s fees.” Id. Similarly, it appears that the present case was brought not for the de minimis interest, but rather for the award of attorney’s fees.

In summary, we affirm the trial court’s determination that the accumulated interest of $4.17 was de minimis, and clarify the proper computation of interest pursuant to these statutes.

No attorney fee due to the de minimus theory.

(2) LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. PAN AM DIAGNOSTIC SERVICES, INC, 4D21-2156 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022)

“Applying the plain language and in para materia principles to sections 627.730, 627.731, and 627.736(1), (4)(b), (4)(d), and (8), we conclude that the statutory entitlement to interest on overdue PIP benefits is not in and of itself a PIP benefit for which attorney’s fees are payable under section 627.736(8). In other words, a dispute over whether interest is due or paid in the correct amount is not a dispute as to benefits payable for medical, surgical, funeral, and disability insurance benefits. Thus, litigation over the payment of interest due on PIP benefits does not trigger entitlement to attorney’s fees for the claimant.”

…

“Applying section 627.428(1)’s plain language, the trial court erred in awarding the Provider’s attorney’s fees because no contractual or policy provision supports the award for enforcing the payment of interest.
Applying the plain language and in para materia principles to the pertinent provisions of the Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law discussed above, the trial court erred in awarding the Provider’s attorney’s fees because interest owed on a late PIP benefit payment is not in and of itself a PIP benefit.

Having determined the trial court erred in awarding the Provider’s attorney’s fees, we reverse and remand with instructions for the trial court to vacate the final judgment awarding the Provider’s attorney’s fees rendered on June 18, 2021. Our reversal is without prejudice to the entry of a judgment imposing taxable costs.”

Why pay interest if the only penalty is a $7.00 lawsuit? At best, I can see a class action that could trigger a class action attorney fee, but that is a headache.

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