Key Takeaway
Court approval is required to bypass CPLR 3212(a)'s 120-day summary judgment deadline - parties cannot simply stipulate around timing requirements without express judicial consent.
Understanding CPLR 3212(a) Bypass Requirements: Court Approval Is Essential
New York’s Civil Practice Law and Rules establish strict deadlines for filing summary judgment motions, primarily through CPLR 3212(a). This statute generally requires that summary judgment motions be filed within 120 days after the note of issue is filed. However, practitioners sometimes wonder whether parties can work around these timing constraints through mutual agreement.
A recent First Department decision provides crucial clarification about what it takes to deviate from these procedural requirements. The case highlights an important distinction that could significantly impact litigation strategy and timing considerations for attorneys handling summary judgment motions.
Jason Tenenbaum’s Analysis:
Reeps v BMW of N. Am., LLC, 2018 NY Slip Op 02907 (1st Dept. 2018)
“Prior court orders and stipulations between the parties show that the parties, with the court’s consent, charted a procedural course that deviated from the path established by the CPLR and allowed for defendants’ filing of this round of summary judgment motions more than 120 days after the filing of the note of issue ”
I originally read this and belied the parties could by-pass the 120-day rule by side stipulation. But upon a more thorough reading today, I saw that express Court approval is needed to bypass the 120-day rule (or shorter depending on court rule). Do not be lulled into believing that the parties can stipulate around 3212(a)‘s time limitations without express court approval.
Key Takeaway
While parties might assume they can mutually agree to extend summary judgment deadlines, the Reeps decision makes clear that court consent is mandatory. The timing requirements of CPLR 3212(a) cannot be bypassed through private stipulation alone—express judicial approval is required to deviate from the statute’s procedural framework.
