Key Takeaway
Court grants vacatur of default judgment when plaintiff's counsel misrepresented defendant's address for service, establishing new precedent under CPLR 5015(a)(3).
When a plaintiff seeks a default judgment against a defendant who has failed to respond to a lawsuit, New York law requires strict compliance with procedural requirements, particularly regarding proper service of process. One critical requirement under CPLR 3215(g)(4) is that additional summons must be served at the defendant’s last known address before a default judgment can be entered.
The case of Li Xian v Tat Lee Supplies Co., Inc. presents an important development in how courts evaluate default judgment procedures. This decision demonstrates that misrepresentations to the court about service requirements can constitute grounds for vacating a default judgment under CPLR 5015(a)(3), which allows relief based on misrepresentation or misconduct.
The procedural safeguards surrounding default judgments exist to ensure that defendants receive adequate notice of legal proceedings against them. When attorneys make incorrect representations about available addresses for service, they undermine these fundamental due process protections.
This case expands the traditional understanding of what constitutes “misrepresentation” in the context of vacating default judgments, potentially making it easier for defendants to challenge defaults obtained through procedural oversights.
Jason Tenenbaum’s Analysis:
Li Xian v Tat Lee Supplies Co., Inc., 2015 NY Slip Op 01751 (1st Dept. 2015)
“Vacatur was also warranted pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(3), since the default judgment was obtained through misrepresentation or misconduct. Defendant demonstrated that plaintiffs’ motion for a default judgment was granted, in part, based on plaintiffs’ counsel’s incorrect representation that defendant’s old address was the “only known” address for service of the additional summons required by CPLR 3215(g)(4), when, in fact, plaintiffs’ sublease provided another address for service of legal notices on defendant.”
This is a new twist on CPLR 5015(a)(3) jurisprudence.
Key Takeaway
This decision establishes that attorneys’ misrepresentations about available service addresses can constitute misconduct sufficient to vacate a default judgment. The court’s ruling emphasizes that even inadvertent misstatements regarding procedural requirements like CPLR 3215(g)(4) can undermine the validity of default judgments, particularly when alternative addresses for service were readily available in contractual documents.
Legal Update (February 2026): Since this 2015 post, there may have been amendments to CPLR 3215 and 5015 provisions regarding default judgment procedures and service requirements, including potential changes to last known address service standards and misrepresentation grounds for vacatur. Additionally, intervening case law may have further refined the standards for what constitutes adequate service and actionable misrepresentation in default judgment contexts. Practitioners should verify current CPLR provisions and recent appellate decisions when handling default judgment matters.
