Key Takeaway
First Department demonstrates lenient approach to vacating default judgments based on law office failure, contrasting with Second Department's stricter stance on defaults.
Default judgments represent one of the most serious consequences an attorney can face when defending a client. When a defendant fails to timely answer a complaint, the court may enter a default judgment against them, potentially resulting in substantial financial liability. However, New York courts recognize that mistakes happen, and under certain circumstances, these defaults can be vacated.
The ability to vacate a default judgment varies significantly between judicial departments in New York. While all courts require defendants to demonstrate both a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious defense, some departments are more forgiving than others when evaluating what constitutes a “reasonable excuse.”
The case of Rosenblatt v New York City Transit Authority provides a telling example of how different departments approach default judgment vacatur. This decision highlights the contrast between the First Department’s relatively lenient approach and other departments’ stricter standards when attorneys claim law office failure as grounds for vacating a default.
Jason Tenenbaum’s Analysis:
Rosenblatt v New York City Tr. Auth., 2014 NY Slip Op 07575 (1st Dept. 2014)
“Defendants demonstrated an excuse of law office failure through the assigned attorney’s detailed affirmation setting forth the series of mistakes that resulted in the granting of plaintiff’s motion for entry of a default judgment, just after defendants had served an answer, which was about six months late”
This case is another illustration of the ease that default judgments can be vacated in the First Department, as opposed to the Second Department, where the Courts take a more stern stance towards vacating default judgments.
Key Takeaway
The First Department’s approach in Rosenblatt demonstrates a willingness to accept detailed explanations of law office failure as reasonable excuses for defaults, even when answers are filed significantly late. This contrasts sharply with the Second Department’s more stringent requirements, where similar explanations might not suffice. Attorneys practicing in different departments should be aware of these varying standards when seeking default relief.
