Key Takeaway
NY court vacates default judgment using inherent discretionary power when plaintiff failed to move for default within one year, demonstrating Woodson theory application.
Default judgments in New York no-fault insurance litigation come with strict procedural requirements and time limitations. While CPLR 3215(c) requires plaintiffs to move for default judgment within one year of a defendant’s default, courts retain inherent discretionary power to remedy situations where rigid application of procedural rules would create unfair outcomes. This case demonstrates how appellate courts can exercise the “Woodson theory” — using inherent judicial power to vacate judgments in circumstances not specifically addressed by CPLR 5015(a).
The case also illustrates the delicate balance between protecting defendants’ due process rights and enforcing procedural compliance by plaintiffs. When a plaintiff delays too long in seeking a default judgment, even if ultimately successful, the judgment remains vulnerable to challenge on procedural grounds.
Jason Tenenbaum’s Analysis:
DJS Med. Supplies, Inc. v Infinity Ins. Co., 2013 NY Slip Op 52073(U)(App. Term 2d Dept. 2013)
‘Plaintiff commenced this action in April 2006 to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits. Defendant defaulted. More than a year later, plaintiff moved for leave to enter a default judgment. By order dated July 13, 2007, the Civil Court granted plaintiff’s motion on defendant’s default.’
“s plaintiff failed to offer any excuse for its delay in moving for leave to enter a default judgment, the dismissal of the complaint was required pursuant to CPLR 3215 (c), and it was improper for the court to have granted plaintiff’s motion.”
THE BEST PART OF THE OPINION
While defendant failed to demonstrate that the default judgment should have been vacated pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (3), under the circumstances presented, we exercise our inherent discretionary power to vacate judgments in situations that warrant vacatur but were not specifically codified in CPLR 5015 (a).
So Plaintiff was able to enter a default, on notice, after the one year time period through Defendant defaulting to oppose. Defendant wakes up, opposes entry of the default judgment, and the court vacates the default under a Woodson catch-all theory.
Key Takeaway
This decision highlights courts’ inherent power to vacate judgments even when statutory grounds under CPLR 5015(a) aren’t met. The Woodson theory provides a safety valve allowing judges to remedy procedural unfairness, particularly when plaintiffs fail to comply with the one-year requirement for seeking default judgments. However, defendants cannot rely solely on plaintiff’s procedural delays — they must still demonstrate why vacatur is warranted.
Legal Update (February 2026): Since this 2013 post, New York courts have continued to develop jurisprudence around default judgment procedures and the Woodson theory, with potential amendments to CPLR provisions and evolving appellate interpretations of inherent judicial power to vacate defaults. Practitioners should verify current procedural requirements under CPLR 3215 and 5015, as well as recent appellate decisions that may have refined the standards for applying discretionary relief in delayed default judgment scenarios.
