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Failure to enter default within one year allows vacatur of default under a Woodson theory
Defaults

Failure to enter default within one year allows vacatur of default under a Woodson theory

By Jason Tenenbaum 8 min read

Key Takeaway

NY court vacates default judgment using inherent discretionary power when plaintiff failed to move for default within one year, demonstrating Woodson theory application.

This article is part of our ongoing defaults coverage, with 90 published articles analyzing defaults issues across New York State. Attorney Jason Tenenbaum brings 24+ years of hands-on experience to this analysis, drawing from his work on more than 1,000 appeals, over 100,000 no-fault cases, and recovery of over $100 million for clients throughout Nassau County, Suffolk County, Queens, Brooklyn, Manhattan, and the Bronx. For personalized legal advice about how these principles apply to your specific situation, contact our Long Island office at (516) 750-0595 for a free consultation.

Default judgments in New York no-fault insurance litigation come with strict procedural requirements and time limitations. While CPLR 3215(c) requires plaintiffs to move for default judgment within one year of a defendant’s default, courts retain inherent discretionary power to remedy situations where rigid application of procedural rules would create unfair outcomes. This case demonstrates how appellate courts can exercise the “Woodson theory” — using inherent judicial power to vacate judgments in circumstances not specifically addressed by CPLR 5015(a).

The case also illustrates the delicate balance between protecting defendants’ due process rights and enforcing procedural compliance by plaintiffs. When a plaintiff delays too long in seeking a default judgment, even if ultimately successful, the judgment remains vulnerable to challenge on procedural grounds.

Jason Tenenbaum’s Analysis:

DJS Med. Supplies, Inc. v Infinity Ins. Co., 2013 NY Slip Op 52073(U)(App. Term 2d Dept. 2013)

‘Plaintiff commenced this action in April 2006 to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits. Defendant defaulted. More than a year later, plaintiff moved for leave to enter a default judgment. By order dated July 13, 2007, the Civil Court granted plaintiff’s motion on defendant’s default.’

“s plaintiff failed to offer any excuse for its delay in moving for leave to enter a default judgment, the dismissal of the complaint was required pursuant to CPLR 3215 (c), and it was improper for the court to have granted plaintiff’s motion.”

THE BEST PART OF THE OPINION

While defendant failed to demonstrate that the default judgment should have been vacated pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (3), under the circumstances presented, we exercise our inherent discretionary power to vacate judgments in situations that warrant vacatur but were not specifically codified in CPLR 5015 (a).

So Plaintiff was able to enter a default, on notice, after the one year time period through Defendant defaulting to oppose. Defendant wakes up, opposes entry of the default judgment, and the court vacates the default under a Woodson catch-all theory.

Key Takeaway

This decision highlights courts’ inherent power to vacate judgments even when statutory grounds under CPLR 5015(a) aren’t met. The Woodson theory provides a safety valve allowing judges to remedy procedural unfairness, particularly when plaintiffs fail to comply with the one-year requirement for seeking default judgments. However, defendants cannot rely solely on plaintiff’s procedural delays — they must still demonstrate why vacatur is warranted.


Legal Update (February 2026): Since this 2013 post, New York courts have continued to develop jurisprudence around default judgment procedures and the Woodson theory, with potential amendments to CPLR provisions and evolving appellate interpretations of inherent judicial power to vacate defaults. Practitioners should verify current procedural requirements under CPLR 3215 and 5015, as well as recent appellate decisions that may have refined the standards for applying discretionary relief in delayed default judgment scenarios.

Legal Context

Why This Matters for Your Case

New York law is among the most complex and nuanced in the country, with distinct procedural rules, substantive doctrines, and court systems that differ significantly from other jurisdictions. The Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) governs every stage of civil litigation, from service of process through trial and appeal. The Appellate Division, Appellate Term, and Court of Appeals create a rich and ever-evolving body of case law that practitioners must follow.

Attorney Jason Tenenbaum has practiced across these areas for over 24 years, writing more than 1,000 appellate briefs and publishing over 2,353 legal articles that attorneys and clients rely on for guidance. The analysis in this article reflects real courtroom experience — from motion practice in Civil Court and Supreme Court to oral arguments before the Appellate Division — and a deep understanding of how New York courts actually apply the law in practice.

About This Topic

Default Judgments in New York Practice

Default judgments arise when a party fails to answer, appear, or respond within required time limits. Vacating a default under CPLR 5015 requires showing a reasonable excuse for the failure and a meritorious defense or cause of action. In no-fault practice, defaults occur frequently in arbitration and court proceedings, and the standards for granting and vacating defaults have generated substantial case law. These articles analyze default practice, restoration motions, and the circumstances under which courts excuse procedural failures.

90 published articles in Defaults

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More Defaults Analysis

View all Defaults articles

Common Questions

Frequently Asked Questions

What is a default in New York civil litigation?

A default occurs when a party fails to respond to a legal action within the required time frame — for example, failing to answer a complaint within 20 or 30 days of service under CPLR 320. When a defendant defaults, the plaintiff can seek a default judgment under CPLR 3215. However, a defaulting party can move to vacate the default under CPLR 5015(a) by showing a reasonable excuse for the delay and a meritorious defense to the action.

What constitutes a 'reasonable excuse' to vacate a default?

Courts evaluate reasonable excuse on a case-by-case basis. Accepted excuses can include law office failure (under certain circumstances), illness, lack of actual notice of the proceeding, or excusable neglect. However, mere neglect or carelessness is generally insufficient. The movant must also demonstrate a meritorious defense — meaning they have a viable defense to the underlying claim that warrants a determination on the merits.

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Attorney Jason Tenenbaum

About the Author

Jason Tenenbaum, Esq.

Jason Tenenbaum is the founding attorney of the Law Office of Jason Tenenbaum, P.C., headquartered at 326 Walt Whitman Road, Suite C, Huntington Station, New York 11746. With over 24 years of experience since founding the firm in 2002, Jason has written more than 1,000 appeals, handled over 100,000 no-fault insurance cases, and recovered over $100 million for clients across Long Island, Nassau County, Suffolk County, Queens, Brooklyn, Manhattan, the Bronx, and Staten Island. He is one of the few attorneys in the state who both writes his own appellate briefs and tries his own cases.

Jason is admitted to practice in New York, New Jersey, Florida, Texas, Georgia, and Michigan state courts, as well as multiple federal courts. His 2,353+ published legal articles analyzing New York case law, procedural developments, and litigation strategy make him one of the most prolific legal commentators in the state. He earned his Juris Doctor from Syracuse University College of Law.

24+ years in practice 1,000+ appeals written 100K+ no-fault cases $100M+ recovered

Disclaimer: This article is published by the Law Office of Jason Tenenbaum, P.C. for informational and educational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and no attorney-client relationship is formed by reading this content. The legal principles discussed may not apply to your specific situation, and the law may have changed since this article was last updated.

New York law varies by jurisdiction — court decisions in one Appellate Division department may not be followed in another, and local court rules in Nassau County Supreme Court differ from those in Suffolk County Supreme Court, Kings County Civil Court, or Queens County Supreme Court. The Appellate Division, Second Department (which covers Long Island, Brooklyn, Queens, and Staten Island) and the Appellate Term (which hears appeals from lower courts) each have distinct procedural requirements and precedents that affect litigation strategy.

If you need legal help with a defaults matter, contact our office at (516) 750-0595 for a free consultation. We serve clients throughout Long Island (Huntington, Babylon, Islip, Brookhaven, Smithtown, Riverhead, Southampton, East Hampton), Nassau County (Hempstead, Garden City, Mineola, Great Neck, Manhasset, Freeport, Long Beach, Rockville Centre, Valley Stream, Westbury, Hicksville, Massapequa), Suffolk County (Hauppauge, Deer Park, Bay Shore, Central Islip, Patchogue, Brentwood), Queens, Brooklyn, Manhattan, the Bronx, Staten Island, and Westchester County. Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Filed under: Defaults
Jason Tenenbaum, Personal Injury Attorney serving Long Island, Nassau County and Suffolk County

About the Author

Jason Tenenbaum

Jason Tenenbaum is a personal injury attorney serving Long Island, Nassau & Suffolk Counties, and New York City. Admitted to practice in NY, NJ, FL, TX, GA, MI, and Federal courts, Jason is one of the few attorneys who writes his own appeals and tries his own cases. Since 2002, he has authored over 2,353 articles on no-fault insurance law, personal injury, and employment law — a resource other attorneys rely on to stay current on New York appellate decisions.

Education
Syracuse University College of Law
Experience
24+ Years
Articles
2,353+ Published
Licensed In
7 States + Federal

Discussion

Comments (1)

Archived from the original blog discussion.

JT
Jason Tenenbaum Author
This holding is incorrect under the Appellate Division, Second Department’s decision in Fuentes v. Virgil, 88 A.D.3d 643, which held that a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3215(c) is untimely when made after the default judgment has already been entered.

Legal Resources

Understanding New York Defaults Law

New York has a unique legal landscape that affects how defaults cases are litigated and resolved. The state's court system includes the Civil Court (for claims up to $25,000), the Supreme Court (the primary trial court for unlimited jurisdiction), the Appellate Term (which hears appeals from lower courts), the Appellate Division (divided into four Departments, with the Second Department covering Long Island, Brooklyn, Queens, Staten Island, and several upstate counties), and the Court of Appeals (the state's highest court). Each court has its own procedural requirements, local rules, and case-assignment practices that can significantly impact the outcome of your case.

For defaults matters on Long Island, cases are typically filed in Nassau County Supreme Court (at the courthouse in Mineola) or Suffolk County Supreme Court (in Riverhead). No-fault arbitrations are heard through the American Arbitration Association, which assigns arbitrators throughout the metropolitan area. Workers' compensation claims go to the Workers' Compensation Board, with hearings at district offices across the state. Understanding which forum is appropriate for your case — and the specific procedural rules that apply — is essential for a successful outcome.

The procedural landscape in New York also includes important timing requirements that can affect your case. Most civil actions are subject to statutes of limitations ranging from one year (for intentional torts and claims against municipalities) to six years (for contract actions). Personal injury cases generally have a three-year deadline under CPLR 214(5), while medical malpractice claims must be filed within two and a half years under CPLR 214-a. No-fault insurance claims have their own regulatory deadlines, including 30-day filing requirements for applications and 45-day deadlines for provider claims. Understanding and complying with these deadlines is critical — missing a filing deadline can permanently bar your claim, regardless of how strong your case may be on the merits.

Attorney Jason Tenenbaum regularly practices in all of these venues. His office at 326 Walt Whitman Road, Suite C, Huntington Station, NY 11746, is centrally located on Long Island, providing convenient access to courts and offices throughout Nassau County, Suffolk County, and New York City. Whether you need representation in a no-fault arbitration, a personal injury trial, an employment discrimination hearing, or an appeal to the Appellate Division, the Law Office of Jason Tenenbaum, P.C. brings $24+ years of real courtroom experience to your case. If you have questions about the legal issues discussed in this article, call (516) 750-0595 for a free, no-obligation consultation.

New York's substantive law also presents distinct challenges. In motor vehicle cases, the no-fault system under Insurance Law Article 51 provides first-party benefits regardless of fault, but limits the right to sue for non-economic damages unless the plaintiff establishes a "serious injury" under one of nine statutory categories. This threshold — codified at Insurance Law Section 5102(d) — requires medical evidence showing more than a minor or subjective injury, and courts have developed detailed standards for each category. Fractures must be documented through imaging studies. Claims of permanent consequential limitation or significant limitation of use require quantified range-of-motion testing with comparison to norms. The 90/180-day category demands proof that the plaintiff was unable to perform substantially all of their usual daily activities for at least 90 of the 180 days following the accident.

In employment discrimination cases, the legal standards vary depending on whether the claim arises under state or local law. The New York State Human Rights Law employs a burden-shifting framework: the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case by showing membership in a protected class, qualification for the position, an adverse employment action, and circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. The burden then shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its decision. If the employer meets this burden, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the stated reason is pretextual. The New York City Human Rights Law, by contrast, applies a broader standard, asking whether the plaintiff was treated less well than other employees because of a protected characteristic.

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