Key Takeaway
NY court vacates default judgment using inherent discretionary power when plaintiff failed to move for default within one year, demonstrating Woodson theory application.
This article is part of our ongoing defaults coverage, with 90 published articles analyzing defaults issues across New York State. Attorney Jason Tenenbaum brings 24+ years of hands-on experience to this analysis, drawing from his work on more than 1,000 appeals, over 100,000 no-fault cases, and recovery of over $100 million for clients throughout Nassau County, Suffolk County, Queens, Brooklyn, Manhattan, and the Bronx. For personalized legal advice about how these principles apply to your specific situation, contact our Long Island office at (516) 750-0595 for a free consultation.
Default judgments in New York no-fault insurance litigation come with strict procedural requirements and time limitations. While CPLR 3215(c) requires plaintiffs to move for default judgment within one year of a defendant’s default, courts retain inherent discretionary power to remedy situations where rigid application of procedural rules would create unfair outcomes. This case demonstrates how appellate courts can exercise the “Woodson theory” — using inherent judicial power to vacate judgments in circumstances not specifically addressed by CPLR 5015(a).
The case also illustrates the delicate balance between protecting defendants’ due process rights and enforcing procedural compliance by plaintiffs. When a plaintiff delays too long in seeking a default judgment, even if ultimately successful, the judgment remains vulnerable to challenge on procedural grounds.
Jason Tenenbaum’s Analysis:
DJS Med. Supplies, Inc. v Infinity Ins. Co., 2013 NY Slip Op 52073(U)(App. Term 2d Dept. 2013)
‘Plaintiff commenced this action in April 2006 to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits. Defendant defaulted. More than a year later, plaintiff moved for leave to enter a default judgment. By order dated July 13, 2007, the Civil Court granted plaintiff’s motion on defendant’s default.’
“s plaintiff failed to offer any excuse for its delay in moving for leave to enter a default judgment, the dismissal of the complaint was required pursuant to CPLR 3215 (c), and it was improper for the court to have granted plaintiff’s motion.”
THE BEST PART OF THE OPINION
While defendant failed to demonstrate that the default judgment should have been vacated pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (3), under the circumstances presented, we exercise our inherent discretionary power to vacate judgments in situations that warrant vacatur but were not specifically codified in CPLR 5015 (a).
So Plaintiff was able to enter a default, on notice, after the one year time period through Defendant defaulting to oppose. Defendant wakes up, opposes entry of the default judgment, and the court vacates the default under a Woodson catch-all theory.
Key Takeaway
This decision highlights courts’ inherent power to vacate judgments even when statutory grounds under CPLR 5015(a) aren’t met. The Woodson theory provides a safety valve allowing judges to remedy procedural unfairness, particularly when plaintiffs fail to comply with the one-year requirement for seeking default judgments. However, defendants cannot rely solely on plaintiff’s procedural delays — they must still demonstrate why vacatur is warranted.
Legal Update (February 2026): Since this 2013 post, New York courts have continued to develop jurisprudence around default judgment procedures and the Woodson theory, with potential amendments to CPLR provisions and evolving appellate interpretations of inherent judicial power to vacate defaults. Practitioners should verify current procedural requirements under CPLR 3215 and 5015, as well as recent appellate decisions that may have refined the standards for applying discretionary relief in delayed default judgment scenarios.
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Legal Context
Why This Matters for Your Case
New York law is among the most complex and nuanced in the country, with distinct procedural rules, substantive doctrines, and court systems that differ significantly from other jurisdictions. The Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) governs every stage of civil litigation, from service of process through trial and appeal. The Appellate Division, Appellate Term, and Court of Appeals create a rich and ever-evolving body of case law that practitioners must follow.
Attorney Jason Tenenbaum has practiced across these areas for over 24 years, writing more than 1,000 appellate briefs and publishing over 2,353 legal articles that attorneys and clients rely on for guidance. The analysis in this article reflects real courtroom experience — from motion practice in Civil Court and Supreme Court to oral arguments before the Appellate Division — and a deep understanding of how New York courts actually apply the law in practice.
About This Topic
Default Judgments in New York Practice
Default judgments arise when a party fails to answer, appear, or respond within required time limits. Vacating a default under CPLR 5015 requires showing a reasonable excuse for the failure and a meritorious defense or cause of action. In no-fault practice, defaults occur frequently in arbitration and court proceedings, and the standards for granting and vacating defaults have generated substantial case law. These articles analyze default practice, restoration motions, and the circumstances under which courts excuse procedural failures.
90 published articles in Defaults
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Mar 17, 2021Court addresses lack of meritorious defense and fails to evaluate reasonable excuse
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Jun 10, 2017Dismissal for failure to take a default itself failed
Court rules that making a timely default judgment application protects plaintiffs from CPLR 3215(c) dismissal, even if the application ultimately fails.
May 4, 2015Settlement negotiations constitute a reasonable execuse under 3012(d) and 5015(a)(1) by implication
NY court ruling that settlement negotiations constitute reasonable excuse for delay under CPLR 3012(d) and 5015(a)(1), protecting defendants from default judgments.
Apr 5, 2011Motion for leave to enter a default insufficient
Attorney Jason Tenenbaum analyzes a questionable court decision regarding notice requirements for default judgment motions when defendants have already defaulted.
Jun 30, 2020Common Questions
Frequently Asked Questions
What is a default in New York civil litigation?
A default occurs when a party fails to respond to a legal action within the required time frame — for example, failing to answer a complaint within 20 or 30 days of service under CPLR 320. When a defendant defaults, the plaintiff can seek a default judgment under CPLR 3215. However, a defaulting party can move to vacate the default under CPLR 5015(a) by showing a reasonable excuse for the delay and a meritorious defense to the action.
What constitutes a 'reasonable excuse' to vacate a default?
Courts evaluate reasonable excuse on a case-by-case basis. Accepted excuses can include law office failure (under certain circumstances), illness, lack of actual notice of the proceeding, or excusable neglect. However, mere neglect or carelessness is generally insufficient. The movant must also demonstrate a meritorious defense — meaning they have a viable defense to the underlying claim that warrants a determination on the merits.
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About the Author
Jason Tenenbaum, Esq.
Jason Tenenbaum is the founding attorney of the Law Office of Jason Tenenbaum, P.C., headquartered at 326 Walt Whitman Road, Suite C, Huntington Station, New York 11746. With over 24 years of experience since founding the firm in 2002, Jason has written more than 1,000 appeals, handled over 100,000 no-fault insurance cases, and recovered over $100 million for clients across Long Island, Nassau County, Suffolk County, Queens, Brooklyn, Manhattan, the Bronx, and Staten Island. He is one of the few attorneys in the state who both writes his own appellate briefs and tries his own cases.
Jason is admitted to practice in New York, New Jersey, Florida, Texas, Georgia, and Michigan state courts, as well as multiple federal courts. His 2,353+ published legal articles analyzing New York case law, procedural developments, and litigation strategy make him one of the most prolific legal commentators in the state. He earned his Juris Doctor from Syracuse University College of Law.
Disclaimer: This article is published by the Law Office of Jason Tenenbaum, P.C. for informational and educational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and no attorney-client relationship is formed by reading this content. The legal principles discussed may not apply to your specific situation, and the law may have changed since this article was last updated.
New York law varies by jurisdiction — court decisions in one Appellate Division department may not be followed in another, and local court rules in Nassau County Supreme Court differ from those in Suffolk County Supreme Court, Kings County Civil Court, or Queens County Supreme Court. The Appellate Division, Second Department (which covers Long Island, Brooklyn, Queens, and Staten Island) and the Appellate Term (which hears appeals from lower courts) each have distinct procedural requirements and precedents that affect litigation strategy.
If you need legal help with a defaults matter, contact our office at (516) 750-0595 for a free consultation. We serve clients throughout Long Island (Huntington, Babylon, Islip, Brookhaven, Smithtown, Riverhead, Southampton, East Hampton), Nassau County (Hempstead, Garden City, Mineola, Great Neck, Manhasset, Freeport, Long Beach, Rockville Centre, Valley Stream, Westbury, Hicksville, Massapequa), Suffolk County (Hauppauge, Deer Park, Bay Shore, Central Islip, Patchogue, Brentwood), Queens, Brooklyn, Manhattan, the Bronx, Staten Island, and Westchester County. Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.