Funny joke – but not sufficient for recusal

Judicial recusal—when a judge must step aside from a case due to a conflict of interest—is a serious matter that ensures fairness in legal proceedings. However, not every comment or connection rises to the level requiring a judge to withdraw from a case. The First Department’s decision in Glatzer v Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc. illustrates the distinction between harmless judicial humor and actual bias that would compromise a fair trial.

The case involved a plaintiff’s motion to have the trial judge recused based on comments the judge made comparing judicial salaries to attorney salaries, including a lighthearted remark about potentially seeking employment with the defendants’ law firm. Understanding when recusal is appropriate is crucial in New York no-fault insurance law cases, where parties often appear before the same judges repeatedly.

The Legal Standard for Judicial Recusal

Courts apply a high standard when evaluating recusal motions. The appearance of impropriety alone isn’t sufficient—there must be a reasonable basis to question the judge’s impartiality. The Caperton case referenced in this decision established that extraordinarily large financial contributions to a judge’s election campaign can create such bias, particularly when the contributor appears as a party in a case involving millions of dollars.

Jason Tenenbaum’s Analysis:

Glatzer v Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc., 2012 NY Slip Op 04080 (1st Dept. 2012)

“The trial court’s generalized comments comparing judicial salaries to first year attorney salaries as recently reported in the news, coupled with an attendant joke that he might have to seek employment with defendants’ counsel’s law firm, stand in stark contrast to the facts in Caperton v A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc. (556 US 868 ), relied upon by plaintiff, in which the president and chief executive officer of a corporation appearing as a defendant before the judge against whom recusal was sought had contributed some $3 million to his election campaign and at issue was a $50 million judgment against the defendant corporation.”

I think the trial justice probably raised a good point.

Key Takeaway

The appellate court correctly distinguished between a judge’s casual humor about attorney salaries and actual conflicts of interest that would require recusal. While judicial propriety is important, not every offhand comment creates grounds for disqualification, especially when compared to substantial financial conflicts involving millions of dollars.

Related Articles

• Understanding the CPLR 3212(g) paradigm for summary judgment motions
• When reasonable excuse is satisfied despite jurisdictional challenges
• Critical timing rules for summary judgment motions under CPLR 3212(a)
• New York No-Fault Insurance Law

Legal Update (February 2026): Since this 2012 post, New York’s judicial ethics rules and recusal standards may have been refined through amendments to the Code of Judicial Conduct or updated appellate decisions. The referenced Caperton precedent and its application to campaign contributions and judicial bias may also have evolved through subsequent federal and state court interpretations. Practitioners handling no-fault insurance matters should verify current judicial recusal standards and procedural requirements with recent case law and ethics opinions.