90/180 discussion – interpretation of Perl.

Crawford-Reese v Woodard, 2012 NY Slip Op 03502 (3d Dept. 2012)

Interesting discussion on this 5102(d) topic. The evidence that Defendant presented in his 90/180 threshold motion:

The police report reflects that no injuries were reported at the accident scene and, although plaintiff sought medical treatment at a hospital emergency room eight days later complaining of pain in her chest, neck, shoulder and right knee, radiology reports from the hospital indicate calcification and arthritic changes, with no acute fractures or malalignment. Thereafter, several times over the next few months, plaintiff sought medical treatment for various complaints, including chest, head, neck, arm, hip and knee pain, but no limitation of range of motion was documented in the months following her accident, nor were there any recommendations for limitations on plaintiff’s work or activities. Diagnoses by various physicians who examined plaintiff during this period included muscle strain, tendinitis, mild arthritis, degenerative arthritis and obesity . Two independent medical examinations conducted on plaintiff by different doctors in 2007 found no disabilities that would limit her work status or daily activities. Significantly, plaintiff could not remember whether she had been working at the time of the accident or enrolled as a student but, in any event, no evidence was submitted demonstrating that plaintiff missed any time from work or classes as a result of her injuries”

  There was insufficient evidence in Plaintiff’s answering papers. But the conclusion of law is interesting:

“Further, although quantitative testing of an injury made years after an accident may be relevant to ascertain the severity of a permanent injury suffered by a plaintiff (see Perl v Meher, 18 NY3d 208, 217 ), contemporaneous findings of injury are highly relevant to causation (see id. at 218) and to establishing the 90/180-day category of serious injury (see Houston v [*3]Hofmann, 75 AD3d at 1049; Tuna v Babendererde, 32 AD3d 574, 577 ).”

The contemporaneous hurdle that was determined to be an issue of in Perl came back on this case as a barrier as a matter of law.

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Legal Update (February 2026): Since this 2012 post, New York Insurance Law Section 5102(d) and its implementing regulations may have been amended, particularly regarding serious injury threshold standards and medical documentation requirements. Additionally, case law interpreting the 90/180-day disability categories has continued to evolve, and practitioners should verify current statutory provisions, regulatory amendments, and recent appellate decisions when evaluating serious injury threshold motions.