S.O.V. Acupuncture, P.C. v Global Liberty Ins. Co. of N.Y., 2020 NY Slip Op 51004(U)(App. Term 2d Dept. 2020)
Well in a few weeks and to the extent people still treat for motor vehicle accidents, this will be placed in the New York no-fault relic garbage can.
“With respect to the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover the unpaid portion of plaintiff’s claims which were denied on the ground that the amount sought exceeded the amount permitted by the workers’ compensation fee schedule, defendant established that it had fully paid plaintiff for the services billed under CPT codes 97810, 97811, 99202, and 99212 in accordance with the workers’ compensation fee schedule for acupuncture services performed by chiropractors (see Great Wall Acupuncture, P.C. v Geico Ins. Co., 26 Misc 3d 23 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]). Likewise, defendant demonstrated that it had fully paid plaintiff for the services billed under CPT codes 97026, except for the services rendered on December 11, 2015, March 1, 2016, March 17, 2016 and March 28, 2016, in accordance with the workers’ compensation fee schedule for acupuncture services performed by chiropractors (see id.). Thus, defendant established its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment upon the unpaid portion of those claims.”
Crystal Acupuncture, P.C. v Travelers Ins., 2019 NY Slip Op 52055(U)(App. Term 2d Dept. 2019)
“With respect to the branches of defendant’s cross motion which sought summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover upon the claims in the amounts of $281.98, $140.99, $422.97, and $140.99, which claims defendant had denied on the [*2]ground that plaintiff had failed to provide requested verification within 120 days of the initial verification requests (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.5 [o]), defendant demonstrated, prima facie, that it had not received all of the requested verification. Plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact to rebut defendant’s showing.
“With respect to the branches of defendant’s cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the unpaid portion of claims which had sought the sums of $1,452.90 and $1,281.91, which defendant had denied on the ground that the amount sought exceeded the amount permitted by the workers’ compensation fee schedule, defendant’s proof was sufficient to establish that defendant had properly paid those claims pursuant to the workers’ compensation fee schedule. In opposition, plaintiff’s affidavit failed to raise a triable issue of fact with respect to those branches of defendant’s cross motion.”
Blackman v Nationwide Ins., 2019 NY Slip Op 52038(U) (App. Term 2d Dept. 2019)
Two lessons. The Appellate Term is still finding the generic I mailed the verification affidavit sufficient to raise an issue of fact. Seems wrong to me. Secondly, the Judge Hackeling’s constitutional findings on FS predictability seem to be in doubt.
“Defendant demonstrated, prima facie, that it had timely mailed initial and follow-up requests for verification (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 ) and had not received the requested verification. However, the affidavit submitted by plaintiff in opposition to defendant’s motion was sufficient to give rise to a presumption that the requested verification had been mailed to, and received by, defendant (see Compas Med., P.C. v Praetorian Ins. Co., 49 Misc 3d 152[A], 2015 NY Slip Op 51776[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2015]). In light of the foregoing, there is a triable issue of fact as to whether plaintiff provided the requested verification. Moreover, we find that, on this record, there is also a triable issue of fact as to defendant’s fee schedule defense, which defense, contrary to the finding of the Civil Court, defendant was not required to establish that it had preserved, as the services at issue were rendered in 2015 (see 11 NYCRR 65—3.8 [g]  [ii]; ).
Accordingly, the judgment is reversed, so much of the order entered December 8, 2017 as granted plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment is vacated, and plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment is denied.”
Excel Surgery Ctr., LLC v Metropolitan Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 2019 NY Slip Op 51843(U)(App. Term 2d Dept. 2019)
Well, this one has been written before, not in this manner.
” While plaintiff argues that defendant failed to establish that it had timely mailed its denial of claim form, 11 NYCRR 65-3.8 (g) (1) (ii), effective April 1, 2013 (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.8 [g] ), provides that “no payment shall be due for . . . claimed medical services under any circumstances . . . for those claimed medical service fees that exceed the charges permissible pursuant to Insurance Law sections 5108 (a) and (b) and the regulations promulgated thereunder for services rendered by medical providers” (see also Oleg’s Acupuncture, P.C. v Hereford Ins. [*2]Co., 58 Misc 3d 151[A], 2018 NY Slip Op 50095[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2018]). As the services at issue were provided on February 9, 2015, defendant was not required to establish that it had timely denied the claim in order to preserve its fee schedule defense (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.8 [g]  [ii]; Precious Acupuncture Care, P.C. v Hereford Ins. Co., 58 Misc 3d 147[A], 2018 NY Slip Op 50042[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2018])
(2) ” Upon a review of the record, we find that the coder’s affidavit was sufficient to establish, prima facie, that defendant had fully paid the claim submitted by the New Jersey provider in accordance with the New Jersey medical fee schedule (see 11 NYCRR 68.6 [b], [c]) “
“Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, the affidavit executed by defendant’s certified medical coder, submitted in support of defendant’s motion, established that, to the extent that plaintiff sought to recover fees in excess of $425.88 for each bill, the amount sought exceeded the amount permitted by the workers’ compensation fee schedule (see e.g. Sama Physical Therapy, P.C. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 53 Misc 3d 129[A], 2016 NY Slip Op 51359[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2016]). “
I think we can say “enough said”
Bronx Acupuncture Therapy, P.C. v Hereford Ins. Co., 2019 NY Slip Op 06059 (2d Dept. 2019)
The oral argument and facts of this case were uninspiring. The legal issue was well settled. When a service is “BR”, does a prima facie case involving proving compliance with the “BR” as a condition precedent to bringing the law suit? This is how i would have argued the appeal for Hereford; that said, the argument is just not meritorious no matter how you spin it.
The best analogy involves (for the old timers here) when the Appellate Term once upon a time required a DME provider to prove that the bills were 150% of wholesale cost as part of a prima face case. The failure to offer this evidence required denial of the motion for summary judgment or dismissal of the case at trial. This line of cases was overruled about 13 years ago I think and the Court held that the DME bill was itself prima facie proof of the cost.
The same framework would probably apply here. The bill itself is prima facie proof of the cost. Whether or not the cost is in compliance with the fee schedule requires submission of a verification if the information is insufficient. The alternative would be to review the bill and to code it based upon the information provided, assuming the information in the possession of the insurance carrier is sufficient to make this determination.
“We agree with the Appellate Term’s determination that the denial of the plaintiff’s claim for services billed under CPT code 97039 was without merit as a matter of law. Although an unlisted modality must be justified by report, this requirement has no bearing on the insurer’s burden of requesting additional verification in the first instance (see Hospital for Joint Diseases v Travelers Prop. Cas. Ins. Co., 9 NY3d at 319), which the defendant insurer did not do. ”
And that is all she wrote on this issue.
Matter of Global Liberty Ins. Co. v McMahon, 2019 NY Slip Op 03692 (1st Dept. 2019)
This appears to be a very large issue in modern NY no-fault jurisprudence, as the coding of billings becomes the main issue in many arbitration. I was only zapped by this issue once, but once is enough. Despite the clear wording of the regulation and the Fee Schedule, I knew I was going to be at the First Department on this case.
Here is the substance of the case:
“The lower arbitrator, in rendering an award to respondent in that amount, refused to consider CPT Assistant, on which Global had relied, based on the arbitrator’s view that CPT Assistant was “not authorized by statute or regulation applicable to the No-Fault Law.” On Global’s appeal, the master arbitrator affirmed the lower arbitrator’s award. Thereafter, Supreme Court denied Global’s petition to vacate the award. On Global’s appeal, we reverse and grant the petition.
The Official New York Workers’ Compensation Medical Fee Schedule, promulgated by the chair of the Workers’ Compensation Board, directs users to “refer to the CPT book for an explanation of coding rules and regulations not listed in this schedule.” The CPT book, in turn, expressly makes reference to CPT Assistant. By both statute and regulation, the fee schedules established by the chair of the Workers’ Compensation Board are expressly made applicable to claims under the No-Fault Law (see Insurance Law § 5108; 11 NYCRR 68.0, 68.1[a]; see generally Government Empls. Ins. Co. v Avanguard Med. Group, PLLC, 127 AD3d 60, 63-64 [2d Dept 2015], affd 27 NY3d 22 ). Accordingly, because CPT Assistant is incorporated by reference into the CPT book, which is incorporated by reference into the Official New York Workers’ Compensation Medical Fee Schedule applicable to this claim under the No-Fault Law, the award rendered without consideration of CPT Assistant [*2]is incorrect as a matter of law (see 11 NYCRR 65-4.10[a]) “
To me, the rule that I cannot reference the CPT Code book or the CPT Assistant was meritless. Apparently, this was another “Maslow rule” that a sizable minority of arbitrators held as gospel. You could find out who the arbitrator and master arbitrator was in this case as it is e-filed.
My angst here is not so much with the lower arbitrator as (s)he had a body of “law” to rely upon in coming to his/her decision. Why the arbitrators are so moved by Maslow rules of regulatory interpretation is a question I may never get an answer to (this is the second Maslow rule the Appellate Division reverse d- no easy feat), but I can live with the underlying lower arbitrator’s decision.
My problem here is with the master arbitration program. For starters, if you move from New York, you should not be a master arbitrator. Aren’t there plenty of New York attorneys with coverage backgrounds who can review arbitrator decisions? Second, if you find that Petrofsky blocks you from making legal determinations (or disguising factual issues and legal issues), then you should be appearing on traffic tickets and not as a master arbitrator. Third, if you require me to prove the merits of my case by clear and convincing evidence (I will not call out this master arbitrator) because you have not followed the recent Article 75 cases in the First and Second Department, you also should not be a master arbitrator. I master a lot of cases and the awards I read are absolutely horrible. Honestly, they should allow us to go directly to Court as we do on UM cases. Having to write a $325 check is the expression of putting good money after bad money.
Healing Art Acupuncture, P.C. v Progressive Ins. Co., 2019 NY Slip Op 50574(U)(App. Term 2d Dept 2019)
(1) “At the trial, the court took judicial notice of the workers’ compensation chiropractic fee schedule and the parties stipulated that defendant’s witness was a certified medical coder. The witness testified that she had applied the workers’ compensation chiropractic fee schedule to determine payment for the services, which had been provided by a licensed acupuncturist. In the GL Acupuncture trial, the court, finding that the testimony of defendant’s witness was credible and, noting that plaintiff had failed to rebut the testimony, [*2]determined, insofar as is relevant, that defendant had properly paid the claims for services billed under CPT codes 97810 and 97811. In the case at bar, plaintiff’s attorney told the court that he agreed with defense counsel’s statement that defendant’s witness would similarly testify that she had applied the chiropractic rate to the services, which had been provided by a licensed acupuncturist. The court found, as it did in GL Acupuncture, that defendant had correctly applied the fee schedule codes. Consequently, a judgment was entered on August 4, 2016 dismissing the complaint.”
(2) “We find that defendant established that it had fully paid plaintiff for the services billed in accordance with the workers’ compensation fee schedule for acupuncture services performed by chiropractors (see Great Wall Acupuncture, P.C. v Geico Ins. Co., 26 Misc 3d 23, 24 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009] [“we hold, as a matter of law, that an insurer may use the workers’ compensation fee schedule for acupuncture services performed by chiropractors to determine the amount which a licensed acupuncturist is entitled to receive for such acupuncture services”]) and that plaintiff failed to rebut defendant’s showing.”
So the ministerial act of multiplying the “RVU” with the “Region IV conversion factor” was proven with a certified coder.
I am just giving the highlights here.
“The Superintendent therefore, deems it necessary to delay for 18 months the adoption of the medical fee schedules that the Chair has prepared and established to take effect on April 1, 2019, and so those fee schedules will take effect on October 1, 2020 for use in no-fault pursuant to Insurance Law 5108.”
” However, this amendment to Insurance Regulation 83 will exclude certain workers’ compensation ground rules from the 18-month delay, to wit: General Ground Rule 10 in the Workers’ Compensation Chiropractic Fee Schedule, General Ground Rule 13 in the Workers’ Compensation Behavioral Health Fee Schedule, and General Ground Rule 16 in the Workers’ Compensation Podiatry Fee Schedule, which prohibit providers to whom these fee schedules apply from billing under current procedural terminology (“CPT”) codes not listed in their respective fee schedules; and General Ground Rule 19 in the Workers’ Compensation Medical Fee Schedule, which prohibits any chiropractor, podiatrist or provider of behavioral health services from billing under CPT codes in the medical fee schedule. Per the Chair, these rules are not new but clarification of existing rules; therefore, the Superintendent determined it was not necessary to delay their implementation”
“the Superintendent determined an additional 20% reimbursement increase solely for general medicine specialty providers of no-fault-related health services is unwarranted, and will not be adopted for use pursuant to Insurance Law Section 5108. “
Effective April, 2019, MUA’s that chiropractors perform are not reimbursable. This is a good change for all involved in the system. All other fee changes including the de-listing of surface EMGs and all of the names of which they are known and de-listing of the computerized range of motion and every corollary of which they are known come later.
At its simplest, when the codes is not in the ASC, there is no compensation for it.
NEW JERSEY MANUFACTURERS INSURANCE COMPANY VS. SPECIALTY SURGICAL CENTER OF NORTH BRUNSWICK, ET AL. L-3647-17 AND L-4927-17, BERGEN COUNTY
” In both cases, the trial court held the PIP1 medical fee schedule does not provide for payment to an ambulatory surgical center (ASC) for procedures not listed as reimbursable when performed at an ASC. We affirm. “
” We conclude that ASCs should not receive reimbursement for CPT code 63030 procedures because no reimbursement was listed in the ASC columns in the Fee Schedule, as originally proposed. This omission provides a clear indication of the Department’s intent not to reimburse ASCs for CPT code 63030 procedures. The fact that Medicare now includes the CPT code does not result in the automatic amendment of the Fee Schedule; instead, we conclude it is the Department, not Medicare, that amends the Fee Schedule. “