Bronx Acupuncture Therapy, P.C. v Hereford Ins. Co., 2017 NY Slip Op 51452(U)(App. Term 2d Dept. 2017)
“It is undisputed that defendant denied plaintiff’s claim for services billed under CPT code 97039 in its entirety. Because the workers’ compensation fee schedule has assigned a “By Report” designation for that CPT code, a provider billing under that CPT code is required to furnish certain additional documentation to enable the insurer to determine the appropriate amount of reimbursement. Plaintiff properly argues that where, as here, a provider does not [*2]provide such documentation with its claim form, and the insurer will not pay the claim as submitted, 11 NYCRR 65-3.5 (b) requires the insurer to, within 15 business days of its receipt of the claim form, request “any additional verification required by the insurer to establish proof of claim” (see Bronx Acupuncture Therapy, P.C. v Hereford Ins. Co., 54 Misc 3d 135[A], 2017 NY Slip Op 50101[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2017]).
The record demonstrates that defendant received the claim form and that, with respect to the services at issue, its denial of the claim was based upon a failure to provide documentation. Plaintiff correctly argues that, because defendant never requested such documentation, defendant’s denial of claim form is without merit as a matter of law. Consequently, the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover for services billed under CPT code 97039 should have been denied and the branch of plaintiff’s cross motion seeking summary judgment on that portion of the complaint should have been granted (see Westchester Med. Ctr. v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 78 AD3d 1168 ; Ave T MPC Corp. v Auto One Ins. Co., 32 Misc 3d 128[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 51292[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]).”
It is hard not to have seen this result coming. But it should be made clear that the failure to seek verification does not end the inquiry. Assuming, as is usually the case, that verification is not sought, an expert review is necessary to determine the compensability, if any, of the service. Similar to the failure to seek verification when the defense is lack of medical necessity, the provider can argue that the review is based upon an inadequate factual basis.
Surgicare Surgical Assoc. of Fair Lawn v State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 2017 NY Slip Op 32202(U)(Krauss, J.)
Surgery denials on medical necessary grounds are probably the most difficult to substantiate in the arbitral forum. Whether the applicant has no rebuttal, a letter of medical necessity or a full discussion, the losses are unacceptably high. The litigation scene is a little better as the peers often go unrebutted. Yet, this case from Civil Bronx mirrors the common arbitration award I have been reviewing the last few weeks on this project.
(1) Dr. Scarpinto did review the physical therapy notes
Dr. Scarpinto felt that surgery was not warranted based on Assignor’s medical records. Dr. Scarpinto stated that the progress reports for Assignor’s Physical Therapy consistently described his progress as good, and she relied heavily on this fact. The reports she based this on however, are not fact filled narratives about the Assignor’s progress, but rather a series of multiple choice options circled and signed off on by a therapist. Each date has the same options circled from the first date of therapy, through the last. The five options available to circle on the report under progress were very good, good, fair or poor.
(2) Dr. Scarpinto did not review the acupuncture notes
[the acupuncture notes were not reviewed in the report]. These reports cover a period from March through July 2013 and show that Assignor continued to seek relief from the pain, and while the Acupuncture treatments were often noted as
helping, as of July 2013, Assignor continued to suffer from pain and at times perceived no relief in pain even with the treatments
(3) Dr. Scarpinto’s medical rationale for denying treatment
Dr. Sacrpinto did not appear to believe that the physical therapy was as aggressive as it could have been, noting in her peer review “(i)t is important to stress that these physical therapy treatments did not include any form of active rehabilitation which is the standard of care in the rehabilitation of a knee injury. In this case, passive modalities were provided to the claimant …(Peer Review)”.
Dr. Scarpinto also did not believe the information, provided by the Assignor and accepted by his doctors, that Assignor had no prior problems with his knee. She testified at trial that she did not believe the accident caused Assignor’s knee injury. This is also reflected in her Peer Review where she stated “(e)ssentially, the findings notes on this MRI strongly suggest long standing degenerative processes that do not appear to be directly related to the motor vehicle accident in question.”
Dr. Scarpinto then concluded that surgery was not appropriate for a degenerative knee condition and relied upon an article from a medical journal, also submitted in evidence, which specifies the limitations of surgery for a degenerative condition. The article does however state “.. (p)atients with realistic expectations of surgical outcome who specifically understand that the goal of the surgery is to diminish pain and improve function and not to cure their arthritis “ would be appropriate candidates for surgery
(4) Court disproves defense
Dr. Scarpinto was justified in basing her opinion on the assumption that Assignor was lying about previous problems with his left knee, and that the accident was not the cause of his injury, Dr. Scarpinto failed to establish through her testimony that surgery was inconsistent with generally accepted medical practices. While her testimony did establish that there are limitations as to when surgery is appropriate, the authority she relied upon specifically provides that it may be appropriate for patients with realistic expectations as to the surgery being intended to reduce pain rather than cure the degenerative condition. It is precisely due to the ongoing chronic pain that Assignor was referred for the surgery.
It is hard to tell if this decision resulted from naivete, inappropriately stressing a lack of causal relationship defense that cannot be substantiated without the MRI films and the surgical photos discussed to the trier of the fact or the notion that lack of appropraite physical therapy treatment does not substantiate a lack of medical necessity for extremity surgery. I cannot tell where this case fell.
But assume the doctor was asked the hypothetical as to why the acupuncture notes did not matter? Assume the doctor was asked as to why certain types of physical therapy meet some standard (what is the standard)? Assume the doctor was asked as to the articles, treatises or textbooks stating that the appropriateness of a certain type of PT is a condition precedent to surgery? Would any of that have established a lack of medical necessity?
Also, inasmuch as the knee is avascular, does the literature support repairing an organ that will not heal on its own? Will an untreated knee with a tear lead to eventual arthrocis without surgery The decision is disturbing as a defense practitioner – mainly because I cannot grasp what happened at this bench trial.
Cappello v Global Liberty Ins. Co. of N.Y., 2017 NY Slip Op 51415(U)(App. Term 1st Dept. 2017)
(1) “At trial, Dr. Notabartolo testified that in his opinion the services provided by plaintiff, specifically, electromyography and nerve conduction velocity diagnostic testing, were not medically necessary because there was no indication of a “diagnostic dilemma” that would warrant such testing. The witness explained that the assignor was not neurologically deteriorating and was responding to chiropractic treatment. Dr. Notabartolo’s peer review report reaching the same conclusion was also stipulated into evidence.”
(2) “Dr. Notabartolo’s testimony, which the court expressly found credible, demonstrated a factual basis and a medical rationale for his determination that there was no medical necessity for the services at issue here (see New Horizon Surgical Ctr., L.L.C. v Allstate Ins. Co., 52 Misc 3d 139[A], 2016 NY Slip Op 51125[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th and 13th Jud Dists 2016]). Thus, the burden shifted to plaintiff to present his own evidence of medical necessity (see West Tremont Med. Diagnostic, P.C. v GEICO Ins. Co., 13 Misc 3d 131[A], 2006 NY Slip Op 51871[U] [App Term, 2nd and 11th Jud Dists 2006]). Plaintiff, however, called no witnesses to rebut defendant’s evidence. In these circumstances, plaintiff was not entitled to judgment in its favor (see All Is. [*2]Med. Care, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 33 Misc 3d 142[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 52227[U] [App Term, 9th and 10th Jud Dists 2011]; Specialty Surgical Servs. v Travelers Ins. Co., 27 Misc 3d 134[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 50715[U] [App Term, 9th and 10th Jud Dists 2010]). Accordingly, we reverse and direct entry of judgment in favor of defendant dismissing the complaint.”
The impetus to filing this appeal was the report from the attorney stating that the peer was credible but Defendant did not meet its burden. This caused me to obtain the transcript. As this was an EMG/NCV case and the expert gave two of 3 rationales for finding the service not appropriate, it seemed like a candidate for appeal. Except for All Is. Med Care, it looks like my brief made its way into the per curiam opinion.
Montas v Abouel-Ela, 2017 NY Slip Op 07413 (1st Dept. 2017)
“Plaintiff has not demonstrated conduct by defendant’s counsel that would warrant reversal. Defendant’s counsel was properly permitted to cross-examine plaintiff’s expert rebuttal witness about the circumstances surrounding his suspension from chiropractic school for falsely reporting that he had seen patients, a matter relevant to his credibility (see generally Badr v Hogan, 75 NY2d 629, 634 ; Spanier v New York City Tr. Auth., 222 AD2d 219, 220 [1st Dept 1995]). Although the conduct was 30 years ago, the witness opened the door to its relevancy by claiming that his expert knowledge of biomechanics came, in part, from his training as a chiropractor.”
Unfortunately, this case suggests that we look at the quality of the defense experts who testify. In their former lives, many a defense expert well..somethings are better left unsaid.
“At the damages trial, the plaintiff testified as to his symptoms and complaints. His expert, Jerry Lubliner, who was board-certified in orthopedic surgery and sports medicine, did not treat the plaintiff, but examined the plaintiff on March 6, 2014, more than two years after the accident. He reviewed the plaintiff’s medical records, magnetic resonance imaging (hereinafter MRI) reports, and actual MRI films. He concluded that the accident was the cause of bulging discs in the cervical and lumbar regions of the plaintiff’s spine, and a meniscal tear in his right knee. He testified that, by the time of his examination, 2½ years after the accident, “you can realistically state that this is going to be a problem for the rest of [the plaintiff’s] life.” He opined that the plaintiff had [*2]suffered a permanent consequential loss of use of the lumbar region of his spine, as well as swelling, weakness, and loss of range of motion of his right knee. The Supreme Court did not allow Lubliner to testify about the plaintiff’s future treatment or prognosis because Lubliner only examined the plaintiff once and did not treat him. The court instructed the jury to consider the plaintiff’s damages from the date of the accident to the date of the verdict, and refused to submit the issue of future pain and suffering to the jury. The jury awarded the plaintiff damages in the principal sum of $80,000 for past pain and suffering.
A treating physician may testify as to the plaintiff’s complaints and how the accident occurred, if the plaintiff’s statements to the physician are related to the diagnosis and treatment of the plaintiff (see People v Gross, 26 NY3d 689, 695-696). That hearsay exception does not apply to a nontreating physician, “to prevent unfair bolstering of a party’s credibility” (Daliendo v Johnson, 147 AD2d 312, 320). However, a nontreating physician is not precluded from testifying as to a relevant medical opinion (see id. at 320). A physician who sees the plaintiff once can testify as to the plaintiff’s future prognosis, even if the witness does not provide treatment (see Singh v Catamount Dev. Corp, 21 AD3d 824, 825). Further, a nontreating physician can testify as to future pain and suffering (see id. at 825; DaSilva v State, 2007 NY Misc LEXIS 8932 [Ct Cl, No. 104938]). Thus, Lubliner was improperly precluded from testifying as to future pain and suffering. The weight to be given his testimony was a consideration for the jury. Further, the issue of damages for future pain and suffering should have been submitted to the jury. Accordingly, the plaintiff is entitled to a new trial on the issue of damages for future pain and suffering.”
This is an interesting case because I recall a verdict that was reversed due to a non-treating doctor testifying based upon conversations (s)he had with the patient during the one time visit. I am assuming the preclusion motion was based on that case. The Court clarified that this conversation would be hearsay; however, a review of the medical records will allow the expert to offer an opinion within a reasonable degree of certainty as to the past and future pain and suffering.
Dovberg v Laubach, 2017 NY Slip Op 07238 (2d Dept. 2017)
(1) “Prior to the commencement of a trial on the issue of damages, the defendants served an expert witness disclosure notice pursuant to CPLR 3101(d), advising the plaintiff that they intended to call Dr. Alfred Bowles, a biomechanical engineer and board-certified surgeon, who would testify that the force generated by the accident could not have caused any of the plaintiff’s alleged knee injuries, and that those alleged injuries were the result of wear and tear from athletic [*2]activities. The expert disclosure notice indicated that the proposed testimony would be based upon Bowles’s review of deposition testimony and the plaintiff’s medical records. The plaintiff moved in limine to preclude Bowles from testifying, arguing that his proposed testimony was speculative and without basis in fact, and that the expert disclosure notice did not make reference to any empirical data that Bowles may have relied upon, or any peer-reviewed journals, studies, treatises, or texts showing that an accident that does not meet a specific severity threshold cannot cause injury. In opposition, the defendants alleged that Bowles’s testimony would be based on scholarly works that were published in the fields of medicine and biomedical engineering, and had gained general acceptance in those fields. In support of this claim, the defendants listed the names of three works, which, according to their titles, involved head, neck, and mandible injuries. The authors, years of publication, and contents of these works were not set forth.”
(2) “The Supreme Court denied the plaintiff’s motion, and permitted Bowles to testify at the damages trial. Bowles thereafter testified that in his opinion, with a reasonable degree of engineering certainty, the force generated by a low speed rear-end collision that propelled a vehicle into a 2000 Ford Taurus would not have caused the driver of the Ford Taurus to hit her knees against the dashboard. In reaching his conclusion, Bowles relied upon the defendant driver’s deposition testimony that he was driving at a speed of no more than 10 miles per hour at the time of the collision, and the plaintiff’s deposition testimony that she was driving at a speed of 3 to 5 miles per hour. Although Bowles did not know how close the plaintiff’s seat was positioned to the steering wheel and dashboard at the time of the accident, he maintained that moving the seat up would not increase the likelihood of a driver’s knees hitting the dashboard in a rear-end collision. At the conclusion of the damages trial, the jury returned a verdict finding that the accident was not a substantial factor in causing the injuries alleged by the plaintiff. The plaintiff then moved to set aside the verdict as contrary to the weight of the evidence and for a new trial, and the Supreme Court denied the motion. A judgment in favor of the defendants was subsequently entered, and the plaintiff appeals.”
(3)… “The expert disclosure notice simply stated that Bowles analyzed “the medical and engineering aspects of the accident.“ While the defendants cited to three works in opposition to the motion in limine, they did not identify the [*3]authors, years of publication, and contents of those works, or any explanation as to their relevance in evaluating the cause of knee injuries. Moreover, the defendants provided no description of the methodology Bowles utilized to determine the force of the accident, and the biomechanical engineering principles he relied upon in reaching his conclusion that the force generated by the accident could not have caused the plaintiff’s knees to come into contact with the vehicle dashboard. Under these circumstances, the Supreme Court should have granted the plaintiff’s motion to the extent of precluding Bowles from offering his opinion testimony that the force generated by the accident could not have caused the plaintiff’s knee injuries (see Saulpaugh v Krafte, 5 AD3d 934; cf. Valentine v Grossman, 283 AD2d 571). Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, for a new trial on the issue of damages.”
It is interesting to see a more robust review of what is required to allow a bio-mechanical engineer give testimony on the basis of a 3101(d). It would appear to me that a report with relevant and appropriate citations to the principles set forth herein would be the best way to go about this.
Yampolskiy v Baron, 2017 NY Slip Op 03556 (2d Dept. 2007)
“”[A] party’s failure to disclose its experts pursuant to CPLR 3101(d)(1)(i) prior to the filing of a note of issue and certificate of readiness does not divest a court of the discretion to consider an affirmation or affidavit submitted by that party’s experts in the context of a timely motion for summary judgment” (Rivers v Birnbaum, 102 AD3d 26, 31). Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court properly denied the plaintiff’s cross motion to preclude the expert materials submitted by the defendants in support of their motion for summary judgment, as there was no evidence that the failure to disclose the experts was intentional or willful, and there was no showing of prejudice to the plaintiff (see Begley v City of New York, 111 AD3d 5, 36; Salcedo v Weng Qu Ju, 106 AD3d 977, 978; Hayden v Gordon, 91 AD3d 819, 820).”
Bartolacci-Meir v Sassoon, 2017 NY Slip Op 03040 (1st Dept. 2017)
“The nonconclusory opinion of a qualified expert based on competnt evidence that a defendant departed from accepted medical practice and that that departure was a proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury precludes a grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants (see Diaz v New York Downtown Hosp., 99 NY2d 542 ; Cregan v Sachs, 65 AD3d 101, 108 [1st Dept 2009]). However, the affidavit must be by a qualified expert who “profess[es] personal knowledge of the standard of care in the field of  medicine [at issue], whether acquired through his practice or studies or in some other way” (Nguyen v Dorce, 125 AD3d 571, 572 [1st Dept 2015] [pathologist not qualified to render opinion as to whether defendant deviated from the standard of care in the field of emergency medicine]; see also Atkins v Beth Abraham Health Servs., 133 AD3d 491 [1st Dept 2015] [osteopath not qualified to render opinion on treatment of a geriatric patient with diabetes and other conditions]; Udoye v Westchester-Bronx OB/GYN, P.C., 126 AD3d 653 [1st Dept 2015] [pathologist not qualified to render an opinion as to the standard of care in obstetrics or cardiology]; Mustello v Berg, 44 AD3d 1018 [2d Dept 2007] [general surgeon not qualified to render opinion as to gastroenterological treatment], lv denied 10 NY3d 711 ).
Here, there is no indication that Dr. Befeler possessed the requisite background and knowledge to furnish a reliable opinion concerning the practice of gastroenterology (see Browder v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 37 AD3d 375 [1st Dept 2007]). While a gastroenterologist may well be qualified to render an opinion on a surgical procedure involving the gastrointestinal system, it cannot be said that a general surgeon is qualified to opine on any [*4]specialty simply because the specialist may eventually refer the patient for surgery. Indeed, Dr. Befeler averred only that his conclusion that both doctors “were negligent in failing to follow standard and accepted medical procedures” was based upon his “review of the above records, [his] education, years of training, and [his] forty year experience in the field of General Surgery.” Nowhere did the doctor set forth any experience in gastroenterology or detail the standard of care for that specialty. Moreover, the expert did not provide any detail as to what Dr. Scherl should have done other than refer plaintiff to a surgeon, which she did. While he referred to “further diagnostic testing,” he did not say what those tests would be.
Although plaintiffs correctly argue that a doctor may have the requisite knowledge to opine on a specialty outside his particular field (Joswick v Lenox Hill Hosp., 161 AD2d 352, 355 [1st Dept 1990]), here, their expert failed to say that he possessed such knowledge and to explain how he came to it. Further, he failed to set forth the standard of care allegedly violated. Thus, plaintiffs did not adduce the opinion of a qualified expert so as to rebut Dr. Scherl’s showing of her entitlement to summary judgment.”
DiLorenzo v Zaso, 2017 NY Slip Op 02402 (2d Dept. 2017)
“[A] medical expert need not be a specialist in a particular field in order to testify regarding accepted practices in that field” (Behar v Cohen, 21 AD3d 1045, 1046-1047 [internal quotation marks omitted]). However, the witness must “be possessed of the requisite skill, training, education, knowledge or experience from which it can be assumed that the opinion rendered is reliable” (id. at 1047 [internal quotation marks omitted]). “Thus, where a physician opines outside his or her area of specialization, a foundation must be laid tending to support the reliability of the opinion rendered” (id.). Where no such foundation is laid, the expert’s opinion is “of no probative value” (Feuer v Ng, 136 AD3d at 707; see Tsimbler v Fell, 123 AD3d 1009, 1009-1010; Shashi v South Nassau Communities Hosp., 104 AD3d at 839; Geffner v North Shore Univ. Hosp., 57 AD3d at 842; Mustello v Berg, 44 AD3d 1018, 1018-1019).”
Steinberg v Lenox Hill Hosp., 2017 NY Slip Op 02383 (1st Dept. 2017)
Yes, the general rule is that a physician can offer an expert opinion about a medical issue and that will be sufficient evidence to make a prima facie showing or to defeat a prima faice showing. There is a tension on this issue where I am seeing that the exception to the rule is more true than the rule itself.
“Plaintiffs’ expert was also not qualified to offer an opinion as to causation. He specializes in cardiovascular surgery, not neurology or ophthalmology. Moreover, he failed to “profess the requisite personal knowledge” necessary to make a determination on the issue of whether the perforation was responsible for plaintiff’s visual impairment”