Quality Health Prods., Inc. v NY Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 2010 NY Slip Op 50990(U)(App. Term 2d Dept. 2010)
“Plaintiff argues, among other things, that defendant’s motion should have been denied because defendant failed to establish that its denial of claim forms constituted evidence in admissible form pursuant to the business records exception to the rule against hearsay as set forth in CPLR 4518. This argument is unavailing. Defendant did not offer the denial of claim forms to establish the truth of the matters asserted therein, such as the lack of medical necessity of the services rendered, but rather to show that such denials were sent, and that, therefore, the claims were denied. As the denial of claim forms were not offered for a hearsay purpose, they did not need to qualify as business records (see e.g. Dawson v Raimon Realty Corp., 303 AD2d 708 ; Splawn v Lextaj Corp., 197 AD2d 479 ).
Plaintiff raises the same argument regarding the notice of cancellation offered by defendant with respect to the insurance policy issued to Manuel Espinal which defendant had canceled. Again, since this document was not being offered for a hearsay purpose, it did not need to qualify as a business record. As plaintiff’s remaining contentions are meritless, the order is affirmed.”
In St. Vincent Medical, P.C. v. Mercury (App. Term 2d Dept. 2009) and NY&P v. Elrac Inc.(2d Dept. 2004), it was held that the denials constituted business records despite the objections of the respective plaintiffs. Also, Dan Medical holds that a bill has to be placed into evidence to satisfy a provider’s prima facie case. So, I am confused by this one.
CORRECTION – See, St. Vincent Medical Care, P.C. v. Mercury Cas. Co. 23 Misc.3d 135(A)(App. Term 2d Dept. 2009)(“The affidavit of defendant’s claim representative set forth the affiant’s personal knowledge of defendant’s business practices and procedures, so as to lay a foundation for the admission of the documents annexed to the affidavit as business records (see CPLR 4518; Dan Med., P.C. v New York Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 14 Misc 3d 44 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]”).
The second case I cited above should be: Hospital for Joint Diseases v. Elrac, Inc. 11 A.D.3d 43 (2d Dept. 2004)(“We expressly reject the argument of NY & P Hospital that the affidavit of a claims representative based on records maintained by an insurer in the ordinary course of business did not constitute admissible evidence sufficient to establish a valid defense (see DeLeon v Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 306 AD2d 146 ; First Interstate Credit Alliance v Sokol, 179 AD2d 583, 584 ). Personal knowledge of such documents, their history, or specific content are not necessarily required of a document custodian (see DeLeon v Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., supra”)
There is another case: Montefiore Medical Center v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. 31 A.D.3d 724 (2d Dept. 2006)(“Contrary to the contention of the plaintiff Montefiore Medical Center, the affidavit of the defendant’s claims representative based on records maintained by the insurer in the ordinary course of business was sufficient to establish the defense (see Hospital for Joint Diseases v. ELRAC, 11 A.D.3d 432, 433, 783 N.Y.S.2d 612). Similarly, the documents submitted on the cross motion demonstrate that the insurer effectively canceled the policy (see Hughson v. National Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 110 A.D.2d 1072, 488 N.Y.S.2d 930″).
Urban Radiology, P.C. v Tri-State Consumer Ins. Co., 2010 NY Slip Op 50987(U)(App. Term 2d Dept. 2010)
This case really should be in the misc.3d reporter and Habif, the last case we discussed, should have the aforesaid (U) cite. The predominant issue that is presented in this case involves peer hearsay. But, there is a subtle jab at how certain Kings County judges adjudicate the mailing issue; a mention of 3212(g) and a way to possibly invoke it; and the duty to communicate when an additional verification request is received. Now on to the discussion of this case.
1. Peer hearsay – exception to the hearsay rule
The case starts off with the observation that the plaintiff assignor’s medical records are fair game under the standard argument that a medical provider is estopped from challenging medical records that reference or discuss the assignor. This rule follows the long line of cases, which holds that the plaintiff’s medical records constitute admissions when used by the defendant. The court was correct in invoking this rule, and should have stopped here in its analysis.
2. Peer hearsay – it is non hearsay
“Moreover, we note that, while defendant’s peer review doctor may have considered medical records received from other providers who had rendered treatment to the assignor, defendant was not seeking to use such records to establish the truth of the facts set forth therein. Defendant was not attempting to prove that Rafailova was injured as documented in her medical records, or that she was treated as set forth in those records. Instead, defendant’s peer review doctor simply opined that, assuming the facts set forth in Rafailova’s records were true, the treatment allegedly provided was not medically necessary. Therefore, as defendant was not using the underlying medical records for their truth, such records were not being used for a hearsay purpose (see e.g. Dawson v Raimon Realty Corp., 303 AD2d 708 ; Splawn v Lextaj Corp., 197 AD2d 479 ). This is distinguishable from a situation in which a medical expert relies upon medical records to establish the fact of an injury (see e.g. Hambsch v New York City Tr. Auth., 63 NY2d 723 ; Wagman v Bradshaw, 292 AD2d 84 ). Consequently, plaintiff’s argument that defendant failed to establish the reliability of the underlying medical records in support of its claim that the treatment provided was not medically necessary is irrelevant.”
I am not sure that I agree with theabove reasoning. If a patient’s medical chart shows normal Range of Motion and symmetrical Deep Tendon Reflexes, then of course I as a competent defense attorney am going to use these findings for their truth, to show that certain diagnostic testing was medically unreasonable. This also runs counter to the Ninth and Tenth Districts’ determination in Progressive Medical Inc. v. Allstate. Finally, it runs counter to the Second, Eleventh and Thirteenth Districts’ determination in Pan Chiro, P.C. v. Mercury Ins. Co.
But, the real problem with this case is the application it has to personal injury and medical malpractice litigation. I will let your imagination craft the creative lawyering this case presents.
The rule in Civil Kings with certain judges is that the affidavit must be specific as to the dates an item is mailed. It is insufficient, according to these judges, to present an affidavit that discusses the general mailing procedure, which will allow a reader to infer that an annexed denial was mailed on the date of the denial or the next business date. The fact that certain plaintiff’s prevailed using this argument forever baffled my mind, and was always a key determination as to whether or not I appealed an adverse decision. Here is an example of case from Kings County where I reversed a judge who said my affidavit was not specific enough: Quality Psychological Services, P.C. v. Mercury Ins. Group, 27 Misc.3d 129(A)(App. Term 2d Dept. 2010). Here is an example from Queens County where I reversed a judge who said my affidavit was not specific enough : Innovative Chiropractic, P.C. v. Mercury Ins. Co., 25 Misc.3d 137(A)(App. Term 2d Dept. 2010).
Here is the language from Urban:
“The Civil Court denied the motion due to the lack of specificity in the affidavit of defendant’s mail clerk regarding mailing of the denial & requests for additional verification. The instant appeal by defendant ensued. Contrary to the determination of the Civil Court, the affidavits of defendant’s no-fault claims examiner and mail clerk were sufficient to establish that defendant had timely mailed the additional verification requests and NF-10 denial of claim forms in that they described, in detail, based on the affiants’ personal knowledge, defendant’s standard office practice and procedure designed to ensure that said documents were mailed”
4. Communicate or be estopped
A reoccurring theme in the case law has involved the insurance carrier sending a verification request to a provider who the insurance carrier knows, or should know, does not have the requested information. A similar theme involves the sending of verification requests to a provider when they have an attorney submitting their bills.
The Court, in following recent precedent, held that the provider must communicate that it does not have the information in order to stop the tolling of the time to pay or deny the claim. The Urban court said the following: “While plaintiff argues that the requests should have been sent to the referring physician, inaction was, in this case, not a proper response (see Westchester Med. Ctr. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 262 AD2d 553, 555 ). Plaintiff should have informed defendant that the requests should be sent elsewhere.”
5. The door opens up to the invocation of 3212(f)
“Furthermore, plaintiff did not demonstrate that it needed the records from the other providers in order to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the services at issue were medically necessary when they were rendered (see CPLR 3212 [f]; GZ Med. & Diagnostic, P.C. v Mercury Ins. Co., 26 Misc 3d 146[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 50491[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2010]), and that it had served discovery demands during the ample opportunity that it had to commence discovery proceedings to obtain such records before the instant summary judgment motion was brought (see Meath v Mishrick, 68 NY2d 992 ).
It looks like the Defendant failed to annex the medical records that its peer review doctor relied upon in its motion for summary judgment. Interestingly, the court held that if Plaintiff was diligent in seeking discovery, it would have been able to invoke 3212(f). This is very interesting and it also makes sense.
All that in one case.
Rivera v GT Acquisition 1 Corp., 2010 NY Slip Op 03158 (1st Dept. 2010)
“The motion court properly disregarded the uncertified police report and unauthenticated photographs as they constituted inadmissible hearsay”
In all fairness to Plaintiff, the courts have really been all over the place with the necessity of a police report to be certified. On some days, they say it is admissible in accordance with CPLR 4518(a) because a foundation may be imputed based upon the duties of the police officer. Other days, the courts have held that the police report contains admissions, which are admissible against the declarant. Now today, they have held that an uncertified police report is inadmissible.
Matter of Fortunato v Murray, 2010 NY Slip Op 03122 (2d Dept. 2010)
“Contrary to the Family Court’s general statement of the applicable law, “[a] physician’s office records, supported by the statutory foundations set forth in CPLR 4518(a), are admissible in evidence as business records. However, medical reports, as opposed to day-to-day business entries of a treating physician, are not admissible as business records where they contain the doctor’s opinion or expert proof” (Matter of Bronstein-Becher v Becher, 25 AD3d 796, 797 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Batts v Rutrick, 298 AD2d 417; Napolitano v Branks, 141 AD2d 705, 705-706). Moreover, a physician’s office records “may be received as evidence despite the fact that a physician is available to testify as to the substance and contents of the records” (Napolitano v Branks, 141 AD2d at 705-706; see Clarke v New York City Tr. Auth., 174 AD2d 268). Here, upon the father’s appeal of the Family Court’s order, this Court does not have the benefit of the actual medical documents in dispute since the documents are not part of the original papers before this Court. Thus, from the record, it is unclear whether the subject documents were the type which this Court views as admissible. Accordingly, we remit the matter to the Family Court, Nassau County, for a review by the Support Magistrate of the subject medical documents in light of and pursuant to the aforementioned standard as to admissibility.”
This case tells us a few things about business records and medical opinions. First, day to records, i.e., soap notes, treatment logs, and other day to day documentationare admissible as business records. As we also learned in Faust v. McPherson, 4 Misc.3d 89 (App. Term 2d Dept. 2004), an employee of the physician or the medical facility can lay this foundation. Second, medical reports are admissible as business records except for the portion that contains “the doctor’s opinion or expert proof”.
Keep this in the back of your head when you are a plaintiff in an IME cut-off case and you want to have an expert opine on the medical records subsequent to the IME cut off. As a defendant, keep your eyes open for when you see certain violations of the above-stated rule.
IAV Med. Supply, Inc. v Progressive Ins. Co., 2010 NY Slip Op 50433(U)(Civ. Ct. Richmond Co. 2010)
Here is a civil court decision from Judge Dollard in Civil Richmond, which is well written and correct in all respects on the law. First, she found that a 3101(d) demand, although tardy, was proper since plaintiff was not in any way prejudiced. Second, she found that a claims representative could not lay a foundation for entry into evidence of the report of a a non-testifying peer review doctor. Why someone would go down this road, especially with Pine Hollow being reversed, boggles my mind. Moreover, I also tend to think that the admission of a peer report into evidence is tantamount to improper bolstering, since the report memorializes what the doctor – or his substitute – will testify about. It is similar to a police officer telling a jury that the complainant identified the defendant, after the complainant herself identified the defendant to the jury. Those of you who have a criminal practice know that this is improper. People v Trowbridge, 305 NY 471 (1953).
As to whether the doctor, through his testimony satisfied his burden of persuasion, I have no idea; and for purposes of this discussion, it is irrelevant. What is relevant, however, is the path this court took to reach its decision. And this was “on the mark”.
Intervenor major medical insurance carrier tried to recoup settlement proceeds between the injured person and the tortofeasor – but to no avail
Reiss v Roadhouse Rest., 2010 NY Slip Op 01632 (2d Dept. 2010)
“At the hearings before the JHO, the intervenors failed to prove that GHI was entitled to reimbursement under its insurance contract with the plaintiff. More particularly, the intervenors failed to prove that any part of the settlement proceeds in this action included a recovery for past medical expenses and, thus, could not demonstrate that GHI was entitled to the reimbursement of medical benefits it paid on the plaintiff’s behalf. The intervenors’ sole witness, the attorney representing Healthcare Recoveries, which itself was only an agent retained by GHI to pursue the reimbursement claim, was not qualified to testify regarding the terms of the health insurance agreement between GHI and the plaintiff (see Franklyn Folding Box Co. v Grinnell Mfg., 234 AD2d 505, 506), and his testimony that the plaintiff’s past medical expenses were considered by the parties in reaching their settlement was mere speculation based upon inadmissible hearsay (see generally Matter of Hausknecht v Comprehensive Med. Care of N.Y., P.C., 24 AD3d 778, 779). The intervenors also improperly sought to prove the amount of GHI’s claim by seeking to admit into evidence, as a business record, the consolidated statement of benefits prepared by Healthcare Recoveries from information it obtained from GHI. Since the intervenors’ sole witness also was not qualified to give testimony regarding GHI’s record-keeping practices, that document should not have been admitted into evidence (see Lodato v Greyhawk N. Am., LLC, 39 AD3d 494, 495).”
Many times – and this is happening more frequently – the injured person seeks to have post no-fault IME medical treatment paid for through his or her major medical carrier. When a personal injury case settles or even is tried to a verdict, the major medical carrier through their collection agent will usually attempt to recoup the paid-out benefits against the injured person through recovery on the underlying lien. This will take place in the context of a Civil action. The injured person, assuming there is no assignment of benefits, will then bring a third-party against the no-fault carrier.
The no-fault carrier is subject to suit in a contractual and contribution role of sorts. As we can see, the collection agent of the major medical carrier has some hurdles – not insurmountable but significant – to recoup the benefits from the injured person. Should the major medical carrier fail to make a prima facie case as seen above in Reiss, then the no-fault carrier is not on the hook.
Finally, and somewhat related is that the collection agent cannot get around the business record foundation necessary to put the documentation and interpretation of the major medical carrier’s records into evidence.
This case is interesting to say the least.
An interesting case from the First Department came out on this topic. It it discussed on the evidence blog. It is worth a read. Click here.
Since proof of standing is generally not an affirmative part of a no-fault claimant’s prima facie case, this case from the First Department might be of minimal importance to the no-fault bar. For those of us who are called to help friends, loved ones and members of the armed services avoid foreclosures, the “assignment” defense has scored major victories at the Appellate Division, Second Department.
The matter of IRB-Brasil Resseguros S.A. v Eldorado Trading Corp. Ltd., 2009 NY Slip Op 09395 (1st Dept. 2009), takes away some steam from this defense as set forth herein:
“Plaintiff’s original motion for summary judgment was denied because of the court’s concern that the Euroclear statement and other documents suggested that BB Securities, rather than plaintiff, may have been the true holder under the terms of the note. Plaintiff moved to renew, submitting an affidavit by BB’s managing director, clearly averring that it held the note solely as custodian for plaintiff, as well as an assignment agreement between BB and plaintiff, establishing the latter’s exclusive entitlement to sue under the note. Under these circumstances, the court providently exercised its discretion in granting renewal in the interest of justice (see Garner v Latimer, 306 AD2d 209 ). The additional affidavit by an officer familiar with the corporate records, accompanying a true copy of the assignment agreement, was admissible (see DeLeon v Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 306 AD2d 146 ), and established plaintiff’s entitlement to summary judgment.
In view of our finding that summary judgment was correctly granted upon renewal, we dismiss plaintiff’s appeal of the denial of its original motion for summary judgment as academic. However, had we not done so, we would hold that plaintiff met its prima facie burden on the initial motion for summary judgment by submitting evidence of defendant Eldorado Trading’s promise to pay under the note, the guarantee by defendants Eldorado S.A. and Verpar, and nonpayment (see Eastbank v Phoenix Garden Rest., 216 AD2d 152 , lv denied 86 NY2d 711 ). Plaintiff also submitted evidence demonstrating it had purchased the note, which was held by BB Securities on its behalf in a secure account at Euroclear. Contrary to defendants’ contention, the affidavit of a corporate officer with personal knowledge, together with [*2]authenticated business records, is admissible in support of a motion for summary judgment (see First Interstate Credit Alliance v Sokol, 179 AD2d 583, 584 ).”
This case also has a rare appearance of the “interest of justice” exception to the general rule that renewal is not allowed unless new facts are presented. It also has a standard business records discussion. I will cross-link this on the evidence blog.
In another interesting evidentiary based case, the Fourth Department in People v Manges, 2009 NY Slip Op 08258 (4th Dept. 2009) evaluated the “contemporaneous” and “business duty to enter the information” prongs of the business record rule. As you can see, the People failed miserably in their marshaling of the evidence to prove pivotal elements of the crimes of felony possession of a forged instrument and attempted grand larceny.
“We agree with defendant that County Court erred in admitting in evidence a printout of electronic data that was displayed on a computer screen when defendant presented a check, the allegedly forged instrument, to a bank teller. The People failed to establish that the printout falls within the business records exception to the hearsay rule (see CPLR 4518 [a]), which applies here (see CPL 60.10). The People presented no evidence that the data displayed on the computer screen, resulting in the printout, was entered in the regular course of business at the time of the transaction (see CPLR 4518 [a]). Indeed, the bank teller who identified the computer screen printout testified that “anyone [at the bank] can sit down at a computer and enter information.” Because the computer screen printout was the only evidence establishing the identity of the purported true account owner upon which the check was drawn, we conclude that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the conviction.”
The Fourth Department in Palisades Collection, LLC v Kedik, 2009 NY Slip Op 08259 (4th Dept. 2009) discussed standing and the business record rule, all in one decision. Interestingly, the failure to get the assignment of benefits into evidence proved fatal to the Plaintiff Assignee’s prima facie case. I think Judge Billings 5 years ago wrote a similar decision in the no-fault realm, prior to the Appellate Division and Court of Appeals’ decisions, which held that technical standing is not part of a plaintiff’s prima facie case.
For those who venture outside no-fault and deal with assigned actions, here is how the Fourth Division evaluates these issues:
“Plaintiff, as the alleged assignee of Discover Bank (Discover), commenced this action for breach of contract and account stated seeking to recover the balance owed on a credit card issued to defendant. Supreme Court denied in part plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment dismissing seven of the affirmative defenses, reserved decision in part, and ordered plaintiff to provide evidence that it had standing. Following plaintiff’s further submissions, the court concluded that plaintiff failed to provide admissible evidence of its standing and sua sponte granted defendant summary judgment dismissing the complaint. We affirm.
To establish standing to sue, plaintiff was required to submit admissible evidence that Discover assigned its interest in defendant’s debt to plaintiff (see generally Rockland Lease Funding Corp. v Waste Mgt. of N.Y., 245 AD2d 779). Here, plaintiff submitted an affidavit from its agent with exhibits, including a printed copy of several pages from an electronic spreadsheet listing defendant’s Discover account as one of the accounts sold to plaintiff. Contrary to the contention of plaintiff, the court properly determined that it failed to establish a proper foundation for the admission of the spreadsheet under the business record exception to the hearsay rule (see generally Speirs v Not Fade Away Tie Dye Co., 236 AD2d 531).
A business record is admissible if “it was made in the regular course of any business and . . . it was the regular course of such business to make it, at the time of the act, transaction, occurrence or event, or within a reasonable time thereafter” (CPLR 4518 [a]; see generally People v Kennedy, 68 NY2d 569, 579-580). “A proper foundation for the admission of a [*2]business record must be provided by someone with personal knowledge of the maker’s business practices and procedures” (West Val. Fire Dist. No. 1 v Village of Springville, 294 AD2d 949, 950). Although plaintiff’s agent averred that the spreadsheet was kept in the regular course of business and that the entries therein were made in the regular course of business, the agent did not establish that he was familiar with plaintiff’s business practices or procedures, and he further failed to establish when, how, or by whom the electronic spreadsheet submitted in paper form was made (see CPLR 4518 [a]; West Val. Fire Dist. No. 1, 294 AD2d at 950). Furthermore, although an electronic record “shall be admissible in a tangible exhibit that is a true and accurate representation of such electronic record” (id.), plaintiff’s agent failed to establish that the printed electronic spreadsheet submitted to the court was a true and accurate representation of the electronic record kept by plaintiff.”