Jackson v Doe, 2019 NY Slip Op 04765 (1st Dept. 2019)
“Defendant satisfied his prima facie burden of showing that plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury to his cervical spine, lumbar spine or left wrist as a result of the 2013 motor vehicle accident. Defendant’s neurologist found that plaintiff had full range of motion and negative test results in his cervical and lumbar spine, and that any injuries had resolved (see Alverio v Martinez, 160 AD3d 454 [1st Dept 2018]; Frias v Son Tien Liu, 107 AD3d 589 [1st Dept 2013]). Defendant’s expert was not required to review plaintiff’s medical records before forming his opinion (see Mena v White City Car & Limo Inc., 117 AD3d 441[1st Dept 2014]). Defendant also relied on plaintiff’s deposition testimony admitting that he returned to work full-time as a personal trainer within two months of the accident, received just three months of physical therapy and sought no further medical treatment following a November 2014 procedure to his lumbar spine. This testimony both defeats plaintiff’s 90/180-day claim and demonstrates that his injuries were not serious, but were minor in nature (see Castro v DADS Natl. Enters., Inc., 165 AD3d 601, 602 [1st Dept 2018]; Frias v Son Tien Liu, 107 AD3d at 590). Defendant further pointed out that plaintiff was required to explain his extended gap in treatment following the November 2014 procedure (see Pommells v Perez, 4 NY3d 566, 574 ).
In opposition, plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. He provided no medical evidence of serious injury to his cervical spine or wrist, but only the report of his treating physician, who first examined plaintiff’s lumbar spine six months after the accident. Neither plaintiff nor the physician explained plaintiff’s two separate two-year gaps in treatment (see [*2]Pommells at 576; Alverio v Martinez, 160 AD3d at 455). Furthermore, in the absence of any admissible evidence of contemporaneous, post-accident treatment or evaluation of his alleged injuries, plaintiff failed to raise an issue of fact as to whether his conditions were causally related to the accident (see Santos v Traylor-Pagan, 152 AD3d 406 [1st Dept 2017]; Rosa v Mejia, 95 AD3d 402, 404 [1st Dept 2012]).”
So what happened here? There’s a finding of resolution of injury. The court required that Plaintiff explain gaps in treatment. Moreover, the failure to present evidence contemporaneous to the accident raised an issue of causation.
Now, for those following 5102(d) cases, the Second Department has held that absent prima faice proof of lack of causation, gap in treatment is irrelevant. In addition and in citing Perl, the Second Department does not require treatment contemporaneous with the loss.
Critically, I think it is time for the Second Department to weigh in. This may not be the right case because the Plaintiff’s own evidence refutes a serious injury. But I think a surgery case where there is a gap in treatment or 3 or or more months elapsed prior to treatment occurring would be a good case to take up.
Martinez v Keenan, 2019 NY Slip Op 50474(U)(App. Term 2d Dept. 2019)
” We note that, contrary to defendant’s argument, plaintiff was not required to submit a contemporaneous examination to raise a triable issue of fact (see Perl v Meher, 18 NY3d 208, 218 ).”
This is a token 5102(d) appeal from an order not dismissing the complaint. In the Second Department, these appeals usually lose. These threshold motions in the First Department are often dispositive as that Court takes a more technical approach to Plaintiff’s proof in opposition. One of the issues where there is a clear split is the contemporaneous examination. The First Department still requires it; The Second Department never comments on it but we can assume they do not. And the Appellate Term, which rarely gets to rule on these motions since a 325(d) order is usually well post notice of issue, get to explicitly state what we already knew.
Oh, and shout out to my friend Gary Novins. ” Zimmerman Law, P.C. (Gary R. Novins of counsel), for respondent. “
Savilo v Denner, 2019 NY Slip Op 01972 (4th Dept. 2019)
Plaintiff lost his threshold motion, which are common in the Fourth Department based upon their rules of establishing liability. But this was an interesting tidbit. ” Although plaintiff submitted a decision of the Social Security Administration in which an administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that, since the date of the accident, plaintiff has a disability within the meaning of the Social Security [*2]Act, that conclusion was based on the ALJ’s finding that plaintiff has a degenerative disc disease. We therefore conclude that plaintiff was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law with respect to the permanent consequential limitation of use and significant limitation of use categories.”
The what-if’s are mind boggling.
Ampofo v Key, 2019 NY Slip Op 00559 (1st Dept. 2019)
“Defendants established prima facie that plaintiff’s claimed right ankle and foot sprains were not serious injuries within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) through affirmed reports by their orthopedist, who documented normal range of motion (see Hernandez v Adelango Trucking, 89 AD3d 407 [1st Dept 2011]; Whisenant v Farazi, 67 AD3d 535 [1st Dept 2009]). They also submitted an affirmed report by an orthopedic surgeon who performed a no-fault peer review, which noted that plaintiff’s MRI reports showed osteoarthritis and other conditions, and opined that the right ankle arthroscopy performed four months after the collision was not medically necessary or causally related to the accident. “
The no-fault peer review: If properly performed and utilized, it is a death trap. So I found the file online. The peer review was performed by Dr. Westerband. (He actually lost a threshold case as a plaintiff on a PI action). It has a Geico claim number and the vendor is my next door neighbor MedSource National. The medical rationale would not suffice for most arbitrators, but alas the Appellate Division found it persuasive. LOL?
Gore v Cardany, 2018 NY Slip Op 08632 (2d Dept. 2018)
“The plaintiff has the burden of establishing damages for past and future lost earnings with reasonable certainty (see Lodato v Greyhawk N. Am., LLC, 39 AD3d 494, 495; Harris v City of New York, 2 AD3d 782, 784). A plaintiff is not required to prove that he or she sustained a serious injury as defined by Insurance Law § 5102(d) in order to recover for economic loss exceeding $50,000 incurred as a result of a motor vehicle accident (see Insurance Law § 5104[a]; Thomas v Cefola, 99 AD3d 986, 987).”
Here is a case that addresses the issue better –
“While plaintiffs correctly contend that they need not await the full $50,000 payout for basic economic losses from their first-party no-fault policy before making a claim under Insurance Law § 5102 (a) for those additional economic losses that exceed the basic economic loss threshold, they still failed to establish that plaintiff’s total economic losses here did actually “exceed basic economic loss”” Wilson v Colosimo, 101 A.D.3d 1765, 1767 (4th Dept. 2012)
Lambropoulos v Gomez, 2018 NY Slip Op 08118 (2d Dept. 2018)
In opposition, however, the plaintiff submitted evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether he sustained serious injuries to the cervical and lumbar regions of his spine under the permanent consequential limitation of use and significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102(d) (see Perl v Meher, 18 NY3d 208, 218-219). As the defendants failed to establish, prima facie, a lack of causation, the burden did not shift to the plaintiff to raise a triable issue of fact regarding causation or to explain any gap in treatment (see Pommells v Perez, 4 NY3d 566, 572; Rivera v Ramos, 132 AD3d 655, 656).
Nice to a gap in treatment is limited to “causation” issues. This is an interesting wrinkle on gap in treatment law.
Ortega v Healthcare Servs. Group, Inc., 2018 NY Slip Op 07568 (4th Dept. 2018)
(1) “Plaintiffs commenced this action seeking damages for injuries Rose Ortega (plaintiff) allegedly sustained as a result of a slip and fall that occurred at a facility, which was maintained by defendant. Following the damages phase of a bifurcated trial, the jury awarded plaintiff $4,200 for past pain and suffering, $3,300 for past lost wages, and $2,500 for past medical expenses. Plaintiffs moved to set aside the verdict as against the weight of the evidence on the issue of damages, and for a new trial thereon (see CPLR 4404 [a]).”
(2) “Defendant appeals from an order that, inter alia, granted the motion and ordered a new trial on damages unless defendant stipulated to increase the award for past pain and suffering to $300,000”
(3) “Here, the central issue at the damages trial was whether plaintiff’s claimed shoulder and cervical spine injuries were causally related to the subject fall, or if they resulted from unrelated prior motor vehicle accidents or other unrelated incidents or conditions. Given the conflicting evidence on that issue, plaintiff’s selective and incomplete disclosure of her health history to her healthcare providers and the examining physicians, and her inability to recall prior accidents and injuries during cross-examination, we conclude that the verdict on damages is not against the weight of the evidence because a fair interpretation of the evidence supports the jury’s determination that plaintiff’s shoulder and cervical spine injuries were unrelated to the subject fall and that the only injury sustained by plaintiff in the fall was a knee sprain.”
Tejada v LKQ Hunts Point Parts, 2018 NY Slip Op 07663 (1st Dept. 2018)
In opposition, plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact as to the existence of an injury involving a “significant” limitation of use of his lumbar spine, but not as to a “permanent consequential” limitation of use injury (see Kang v Almanzar, 116 AD3d 540 [1st Dept 2014]; Kone v Rodriguez, 107 AD3d 537 [1st Dept 2013]). Plaintiff’s orthopedic surgeon, who performed a discectomy procedure in May 2014, sufficiently addressed the findings of degeneration by opining that the MRI films did not show degeneration and that plaintiff’s acute onset lumbar condition was causally related to the accident (see Rabb v Mohammed, 132 AD3d at 528; Young Kyu Kim v Gomez, 105 AD3d at 415). Plaintiff also demonstrated the existence of significant limitations in his lumbar spine range of motion, both shortly after the accident and nine months later, through the reports of his orthopedic surgeon and his post-accident treatment records (see Castillo v Abreu, 132 AD3d 520, 521 [1st Dept 2015]). Since the medical records were submitted by defendants and were properly before the court, plaintiff was entitled to rely on them (see Wenegieme v Harriott, 157 AD3d 412 [1st Dept 2018]).
However, plaintiff failed to provide a reasonable explanation for his complete cessation of treatment for his lumbar spine conditions after the May 2014 procedure. Plaintiff’s claim that he ceased treatment because of an inability to pay due to a lack of no-fault insurance, is unpersuasive in light of his testimony that he had other insurance (see Alverio v Martinez, 160 AD3d 454 [1st Dept 2018]; Vila v Foxglove Taxi Corp., 159 AD3d 431 [1st Dept 2018]). The cessation of treatment renders the opinion of a nontreating physician, based on an examination of plaintiff in December 2016, speculative concerning the permanence and causation of plaintiff’s condition at that time (id. at 432; see Merrick v Lopez-Garcia, 100 AD3d 456 [1st Dept 2012]).
Check out the disunion of the “significant limitation” and “permanent consequential” branches of the 5102(d) serious injury statute. Also, has this order now disallowed the Plaintiff from proving a permanent injury? I would say no, but I am unsure.
Fiorucci-Melosevich v Harris, 2018 NY Slip Op 07410 (2d Dept. 2018)
“In opposition, the plaintiff submitted, inter alia, the affirmation of a physician who stated that he measured the range of motion of the cervical and lumbar regions of the plaintiff’s spine at a recent examination and found significant restrictions. The plaintiff’s physician did not specify the objective test he used to measure the plaintiff’s range of motion.”
Always comes down to the objective tests that were performed, the listing and quantification of the same,
Kholdarov v Hyman, 2018 NY Slip Op 07111 (2d Dept. 2018)
“In opposition, the plaintiff submitted the affirmed report of a neurologist who examined the plaintiff on March 16, 2016. The neurologist measured the range of motion of the cervical region of the plaintiff’s spine and compared his results to what would be considered normal range of motion. The neurologist found a 20 percent deficit in the flexion of the plaintiff’s cervical spine, but otherwise found the results to be normal”