Cornell May 29, 2009
Cornell Med., P.C. v Mercury Cas. Co.
2009 NY Slip Op 29228 (App. Term 2d Dept. 2009)
This case is extremely complicated. There are two points of law that came from this case. The first point of law that came from this case, and it is significant, is that a prima facie demonstration of failure to bill in accordance with the fee schedule raises an inference that a plaintiff attorney is not entitled to an attorney fee. The plaintiff attorney must then prove the two exceptions that are set forth in 65-4.6(i). Secondly, a counterclaim for monies paid in excess of the fee schedule is untenable.
Acupuncture may be paid at the chiropractor rates as a matter of law May 29, 2009
AVA Acupuncture, P.C. v GEICO Gen. Ins. Co.
2009 NY Slip Op 51017(U)
It is amazing that Plaintiffs are still fighting what the proper reimbursement is for acupuncture services that are paid at the chiropractor rate. Some Plaintiffs are still arguing that the “geographic reasonable value” is the proper basis for no-fault compensation. Others are arguing that the defendant’s claims representative needs to affirmatively state that the insurance carrier’s standard practice is to pay claims at the chiropractor rate.
This case holds that reimbursement at the chiropractor rate is proper as a matter of law. Period. No strings, no streamers and no conditional statements to the contrary. From a point of practice, this case only discusses reimbursement under CPT Code 97780. Thus, a case coded with CPT Code 97780 and paid at the physician rate ($42.84) or at the chiropractor rate ($29.30), should allow the insurance carrier to prevail on motion or at trial.
Once the Appellate Term breaks down the proper amount of compensation for CPT Codes 97810, 97811, 97813 and 97814, then the paradigm will be completed.
Stricken v. dismissed May 29, 2009
V.S. Med. Servs., P.C. v Travelers Ins. Co.
2009 NY Slip Op 29226 (App. Term 2d Dept. 2009)
I am not sure why this case did not receive a (u) or Misc.3d(A) citation, but I take it the Appellate Term is trying to remind people what the difference is between an action that is sticken from the calendar verses an action that is dismissed due to a party’s non-appearance. If a non-superior court case is stricken, you have one year to restore it. Restoration needs to be made by motion (or so-ordered stipulation) and a reasonable excuse needs to be set forth as to why the matter was stricken. Compare, CPLR 3404 (Superior court actions can be revived as a matter of right within one year from the Note of Issue being stricken). After one year, you need to satisfy the four factors that defendant and the Civil Court argued needed to be satisfied. Contrariwise, if a case is dismissed, then the traditional 5015 factors need to be proved in order to revive the case.
Strategically, a no-fault plaintiff many times would prefer to have a case dismissed for non-appearance provided the six year SOL has not expired, than have it marked off the calendar. A dismissed case can be refiled, as long as it is without prejudice which is usually the case in the Civil Courts. A case marked off the calendar is not dismissed. And, in the Second Department, it probably can never be dismissed since 3404 does not apply.
A plain disaster May 29, 2009
A.M. Med. Servs., P.C. v GEICO Ins. Co.
2009 NY Slip Op 51029(U)(App. Term 2d Dept. 2009)
Simply put, you have to read this case. It looks to be a real disaster. Three points of law seem to come from this case.
First, if you have an order that conditionally dismisses or precludes a party should an EBT not be performed on or before a certain date, the party wishing to give effect to that order needs to follow the Appellate Term’s Fogel decision. Yes Fogel.
The Appellate Term has previously applied Fogel, in a 5102(d) action, when it denied an EBT dismissal motion on the basis that the Defendant failed to offer evidence from someone with personal knowledge that EBT was attempted to be scheduled and did not occur. It is the same principle here or even in EUO cases. You need to obtain an affidavit from someone with personal knowledge that the EUO did not occur. This could be from a calendar clerk or attorney, provided the right foundation is laid in the affidavit or affirmation. That was probably missing in this case.
Second, late papers will be accepted provided there is no prejudice. The effect of this is self explanatory.
Third, Golia’s dissent is priceless and explains why we now have a different crop of attorneys (on both sides) fighting the appellate wars. I will leave it at that.
Six year SOL May 29, 2009
Spring World Acupuncture, P.C. v NYC Tr. Auth.
2009 NY Slip Op 29229 (App. Term 2d Dept. 2009)
Finally, someone convinced the Appellate Term that no-fault actions created by statute have a six year SOL. The lead case on this one, Elrac v. Suero, clearly held that a first-party action, created by statute but contractual in nature from the eyes of the injured person should trigger the 6 year SOL that pertains to contractual actions.
Whether or not one agrees with Suero, it is binding precedent. But until the Appellate Division or the Court of Appeals says otherwise, this is the law.
What seemed bizarre in the three years since Suero was that the Appellate Term, in actions against MVAIC, routinely held that the SOL was three years, based upon the portion of the CPLR which states that actions pursuant to a statute have a 3-year SOL. Yet, if a self-insured entity that is forced to provide first-party benefits by statute is bound by the contractual 6-year SOL, why should MVAIC be any different?
Good job to the Plaintiff’s attorneys on this one.