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Dan Medical is safe for now (well sort of) October 13, 2008

Bajaj v General Assurance
2008 NYSlipOp 84460(U)(2d Dept. 2008)

“Motion by the plaintiff for leave to appeal to this court from an order of the Appellate Term, Second and Eleventh Judicial Districts, dated October 22, 2007, which reversed a judgment of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County, entered February 9, 2006.

Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and the papers filed in opposition thereto, it is

ORDERED that the motion is denied.”

Comment: Baja was the case that held that a Plaintiff cannot make its prima facie case based upon a notice to admit. This was the companion to Empire State Psychological Servs., P.C. v Travelers Ins. Co. (App. Term 2d Dept. 2007), which held that interrogatories admitting receipt and the bills being overdue was insufficient to make a prima facie case. The above cases were ruled on as they were because the Appellate Term, Second Department, has consistently opined that the billing claim forms need to be entered into evidence.

This is in contrast to the Appellate Term, First Department, which has routinely held that a prima facie case is set forth through a literal interpretation of Mary Immaculate Hospital as observed in Fair Price Med. Supply, Inc. v St. Paul Travelers Ins. Co., 16 Misc.3d 8 (App. Term 1st Dept. 2007), to wit:

“[d]efendant insurer admitted that it received the no-fault claims at issue and made partial payment on the claims. Inasmuch as defendant’s verified answers to the interrogatories constituted admissions of a party, which are admissible as evidence, defendant may not now be heard to argue that plaintiff failed to submit proof that the claims had been mailed and received, and that they were overdue (see Mary Immaculate Hosp. v Allstate Ins. Co., 5 AD3d 742 [2004]). To the extent that Empire State Psychological Servs., P.C. v Travelers Ins. Co. (13 Misc 3d 131[A], 2006 NY Slip Op 51869[U] [2006]) supports a contrary conclusion, we decline to follow it.”

Had Baja made its way to the Appellate Division, Second Department, then it is likely that the world of Dan Medical would have gone the way of vicarious liability in leasehold cases following the Graves Amendment.

Appellate Division, Fourth Department opines on the issue of non-cooperation October 11, 2008

Progressive Ins. Co. v Strough
2008 NY Slip Op 07463 (4th Dept. 2008)

We further conclude that the court properly denied that part of plaintiff’s cross motion for [*2]summary judgment declaring that plaintiff has no duty to indemnify defendant for claims arising from the motor vehicle accident in question, including claims for no-fault benefits. Plaintiff failed to support its motion with evidence provided by an individual with personal knowledge of the facts (see Chiarini v County of Ulster, 9 AD3d 769, 769-770), and the documents provided by plaintiff in support of the cross motion do not establish that defendant failed to cooperate with plaintiff, as alleged in the complaint.

Comment: Does the no-fault endorsement provide a non-cooperation defense? I remember a case entitled Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Timms, 293 AD2d (2d Dept. 2002) , which says otherwise. There is another case from the Fourth Department a few years ago, which opined on the non-cooperation defense as it relates to no-fault benefits. See, Simmons v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. 16 A.D.3d 1117 (4th Dept. 2005).

Causation – Be aware of seeking a trial de novo after a master arbitrator affirms an award October 11, 2008

State Farm v. Stack
2008 NY Slip Op 07651 (2d Dept. 2008)

“A no-fault arbitration tribunal twice concluded that the defendant, James Stack, was entitled to benefits arising from an automobile accident. Subsequently, the plaintiff, State Farm Automobile Insurance Company (hereinafter State Farm), commenced a de novo plenary action seeking a determination that medical expenses for Stack’s hospitalization were for a condition unrelated to the accident and that Stack failed to demonstrate his entitlement to lost earnings.”

“An insurer seeking to deny no-fault benefits on the basis that a claimant’s condition is not causally related to an accident “has the burden to come forward with proof in admissible form to establish the . . . evidentiary foundation for its belief’ that the patient’s treated condition was unrelated to his or her automobile accident” (Mount Sinai Hosp. v Triboro Coach, 263 AD2d 11, 19-20). The testimony of State Farm’s expert witness, an anesthesiologist and pain management specialist, that his opinion was based solely upon a hospital discharge summary and insurance claim form, rendered his opinion speculative and of little probative value (see Gordon v Tibulcio, 50 AD3d 460).”

“In contrast, the testimony of Stack’s expert witness, a neurologist who based his opinion upon his examination of Stack and his review of Stack’s relevant medical records, including, inter alia, CT scans and magnetic resonance imaging, and determined that Stack’s symptoms first appeared within two weeks of the accident and progressively worsened, was sufficient to establish that Stack’s condition was causally related to the accident (see Scudera v Mahbubur, 299 AD2d 535, 536).”

Comment: Another case where the Appellate Courts are loathe to sustain an insurance carrier’s proof that a service is not causally related to a motor vehicle accident.

Avoid the invectives October 11, 2008

Great Wall Acupuncture, P.C. v General Assur. Co.
2008 NY Slip Op 28350 (App. Term 2d Dept. 2008)

This case has been commented on numerous times before. It is one of many Mallela discovery motions that are granted as long as there is some shred of evidence that there is an improper incorporation issue. This follows the recent Appellate Division case of One Beacon Ins. Group, LLC v. Midland Medical Care, P.C., 2008 N.Y. Slip Op. 06813 (2d Dept. 2008), which held as follows:

“However, in opposition to the motion, the plaintiffs submitted sufficient evidentiary proof to raise an issue of fact as to whether Proscan was actually controlled by a management company owned by unlicensed individuals in violation of the Business Corporation Law”Accordingly, the appellants’ motion for summary judgment was properly denied with respect to all three causes of action, which allege fraudulent incorporation.”

“The Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the plaintiffs’ cross motion which was for disclosure of certain financial documents. Contrary to the appellants’ contention, the plaintiffs were not required to make a showing of “good cause” for such disclosure”

I like this case for the following quotation: “Although plaintiff contends that the court erred in denying the cross motion for an order sanctioning defendant and defendant’s counsel, in our opinion, the court providently exercised its discretion. We remind plaintiff’s counsel that “[f]rivolous conduct shall include the making of a frivolous motion for costs and sanctions” (Rules of the Chief Administrator [22 NYCRR] § 130-1.1). We further caution plaintiff’s counsel to refrain from including invective and ad hominem attacks in his papers.”

Fee schedule defense – competent evidence? October 11, 2008

OS Tigris Acupuncture, P.C. v Liberty Mut. Insurance Co.
2008 NY Slip Op 51996(U)(App. Term 1st Dept. 2008)

“Nor did defendant produce competent evidence in support of its defense of nonconformity with the applicable fee schedule (see Continental Med. P.C. v Travelers Indem. Co., 11 Misc 3d 145[A], 2006 NY Slip Op 50841[U] [2006])”

Comment: I am going to assume that the movant did not provide a copy of the applicable portions of the fee schedule and annex the Department of Insurance Letter allowing the carrier to pay the chiropractor or physician fee schedule for acupuncture or a geographical rate it deemed proper.