An unsigned OSC on appeal – procedure. August 23, 2018
Gluck v Hirsch, 2018 NY Slip Op 05828 (2d Dept. 2018)
“After oral argument, the court declined to sign the proposed order to show cause, with a handwritten notation that the Hirsches failed to demonstrate a meritorious defense to the action and that the Hirsches failed to submit proof of misconduct by the plaintiff’s attorney.
By decision and order on motion dated December 22, 2015, this Court granted the Hirsches leave to appeal from the Supreme Court’s order declining to sign the proposed order to show cause and stayed the foreclosure sale of the subject premises pending the hearing and determination of the appeal (see Gluck v Hirsch, 2015 NY Slip Op 94403[U]).
“The court in a proper case may grant an order to show cause, to be served in lieu of a notice of motion, at a time and in a manner specified therein” (CPLR 2214[d]). Whether the circumstances constitute a “proper case” for the use of an order to show cause instead of a notice of motion is a matter within the discretion of the court to which the proposed order is presented (see [*2]Siegel, NY Prac § 248 [5th ed, 2011]). Here, under the particular circumstances of this case, this was a proper case for the use of an order to show cause, and the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in declining to sign the proposed order to show cause (see Matter of Georghakis v Matarazzo, 123 AD3d 711, 711).”
I post this because generally, the remedy for an unsigned OSC is to bring the application to the Appellate Division (CPLR 5704[a]) or Appellate Term (CPLR 5704[b]). Here, because the Court ruled on the merits of the OSC without any responsive papers, the declined OSC became an order on motion not on notice, requiring leave.
Policy Exhaustion goes to Madison Avenue/Someone from the Insurance Defense side should be putting in Amicu August 23, 2018
Ameriprise Insurance Company v Kensington Radiology Group, P.C, 2018 NYSlipOp 80613(U)(1st Dept. 2018)
Respondent having moved for leave to appeal to this Court from the decision and order of the Appellate Term entered in the office of the Clerk of the Supreme Court, New York County, on or about December 22, 2017, Now, upon reading and filing the papers with respect to the motion, and due deliberation having been had thereon,It is ordered that the motion is granted. Respondent-appellant shall file two copies of the pre-argument statement and of this order with the Clerk of the Appellate Term with proof of service, pursuant to Section 600.17 of the Rules of this Court.
Ameriprise Ins. Co. v Kensington Radiology Group, P.C., 58 Misc. 3d 144(A)(App. Term 1st Dept. 2017)
Petitioner appeals from an order and judgment of the Civil Court of the City of New York, New York County (Erika M. Edwards, J.), entered on or about November 30, 2016, which denied its petition to vacate an arbitration award in favor of respondent, awarding it unpaid no-fault benefits in the principal sum of $3,548.01, and confirmed the arbitration award.
Order and judgment (Erika M. Edwards, J.), entered November 30, 2016, reversed, without costs, and matter remanded to Civil Court for a framed issue hearing regarding whether the $50,000 policy limit of the subject insurance policy was exhausted before petitioner became obligated to pay respondent’s claim.
When an insurer “has paid the full monetary limits set forth in the policy, its duties under the contract of insurance cease” (Countrywide Ins. Co. v Sawh, 272 AD2d 245, 708 N.Y.S.2d 862 ). A defense that the coverage limits of the policy have been exhausted may be asserted by an insurer despite its failure to issue a denial of the claim within the 30—day period (New York & Presbyt. Hosp. v Allstate Ins. Co., 12 AD3d 579, 580, 786 N.Y.S.2d 68 ), and an arbitrator’s award directing payment in excess of the $50,000 limit of a no-fault insurance policy exceeds the arbitrator’s power and constitutes grounds for vacatur [*2] of the award (see Matter of Brijmohan v State Farm Ins. Co., 92 NY2d 821, 822-823, 699 N.E.2d 414, 677 N.Y.S.2d 55 ; Countrywide Ins. Co. v Sawh, 272 AD2d at 245; 11 NYCRR 65-1.1).
Here, petitioner-insurer’s submissions in support of its petition to vacate the arbitration award – including an attorney’s affirmation, the policy declaration page showing the $50,000 limit and a payment ledger listing in chronological order the dates the claims by various providers were received and paid – raised triable issues as to whether the $50,000 policy limit had been exhausted by payments of no fault benefits to respondent and other providers before petitioner became obligated to pay the claims at issue here (see Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v Northeast Anesthesia & Pain Mgt., 51 Misc 3d 149[A], 41 N.Y.S.3d 448, 2016 NY Slip Op 50828[U] [App Term, 1st Dept 2016]; Allstate Ins. Co. v DeMoura, 30 Misc 3d 145[A], 926 N.Y.S.2d 342, 2011 NY Slip Op 50430[U] [App Term, 1st Dept 2011]). [**2] Therefore, we remand the matter to Civil Court for a framed issue hearing on that issue.
If you represent no-fault carriers and do not want the Second Department priority of payment rule to be the law of the State, file an Amicus with the First Department. Your help is absolutely required. Without your help, the wind may very well determine the outcome of this issue. Is that what you want?
Sensible Choice Contr., LLC v Rodger, 2018 NY Slip Op 05790 (2d Dept. 2018)
The trend – and it is logical – is that the defects (unless jurisdictional) will be excused absent prejudice. Here is yet another example (again) of CPLR 2001 at play.
“The defendants’ contention that the plaintiff’s failure to annex the pleadings to its motion papers was a fatal defect is without merit. CPLR 3212(b) requires, inter alia, that a moving party support its motion for summary judgment by attaching a copy of the pleadings. However, CPLR 2001 permits a court, at any stage of an action, to disregard a party’s mistake, omission, defect, or irregularity if a substantial right of a party is not prejudiced (see Wade v Knight Transp., Inc., 151 AD3d 1107, 1109). Here, the pleadings were not only electronically filed and available to the Supreme Court and the parties, but the answer was submitted by the defendants in opposition to the motion, and the summons and complaint were submitted in reply by the plaintiff. The defendants did not assert that they were prejudiced by the omission. Under such circumstances, the court properly disregarded the plaintiff’s omission (see Brightman v Prison Health Serv., Inc., 108 AD3d 739, 742; Studio A Showroom, LLC v Yoon, 99 AD3d 632; Welch v Hauck, 18 AD3d 1096, 1098).”
EUO/EBT/ Now I know how much Mr. Moshe makes! July 26, 2018
Moshe v Country-Wide Ins. Co.. 2018 NY Slip Op 28220 (Dis. Ct. Nassau Co. 2018)
(1) “Plaintiffs bring this plenary action to recover the sum of $10,906.14, said sum being the balance of monies claimed due as loss of earning for Moshe’s appearance at a November 10, 2015 examination under oath (EUO or deposition) taken in the context of first-party no-fault insurance claim(s) submitted by Excel Surgery Center, LLC (Excel) of which Moshe is owner.”
(2) “In support thereof, and as previously requested by Country-Wide’s counsel (Complaint at ¶ 22), Excel’s counsel provided a redacted copy of Moshe’s 2014 joint federal tax return which showed $320,000.00 in “Wages, salaries tips, etc.” and an additional $2,604,942.00 in “Rental real estate, royalties, partnerships, S corporations, trusts, etc.” (Complaint at ¶ 24; defendant’s Exhibit D [tax return]”
(3) “The within action was subsequently brought by plaintiffs seeking recovery of the difference between Moshe’s demand ($12,186.14) and Country-Wide’s payment ($1,280.00). The issue now before the court is whether plaintiff Moshe should be compelled to appear for a “second” deposition, this time addressing how he calculates the $10,906.14, as the unpaid balance still due him for his loss of earnings incurred by his appearance at first deposition.
() Plaintiffs oppose defendant’s current notice to again depose plaintiff Moshe contending that the first deposition should have included the “loss of earnings” issue. In effect, plaintiffs would have this court find that defendant’s failure to address the loss of earnings issue in the context of the first-party no-fault claim constitutes a waiver of defendant’s right to now depose him in the context of this action.
(5) “Nevertheless, the within plenary action remains an adjunct of the prior claim for first-party no-fault benefits. There is no dispute that Moshe is entitled to be paid for the financial impact of appearing at the first deposition. To now permit a second deposition to be held over a dispute regarding the amount of that impact has the practical effect of reducing by roughly half the recovery intended to be protected by 22 NYCRR § 65-3.5[e]. This is so regardless of which party ultimately prevails in fixing the amount of Moshe’s loss of earnings for his appearance at the first deposition.”
(6) “Under the circumstances, the consequences of a second deposition seem inherently unreasonable given the availability of a middle course designed to protect defendant’s right to discovery in the context of this plenary action while recognizing that the action has as its core a claim of financial harm caused by deposing plaintiff.”
Look, this decision is wrong. When you bring a plenary action, you are subjected to a deposition. Even the First Department gave the “cf” treatment to Ralph Medical v. Mercury in Acupuncture Approach.. What is more concerning this: Why would you bring a plenary case that would expose Mr. Moshe’s tax returns? My eyes are rolling at this one.
Second Department once again now recognizes a gap in treatment as a basis to non-suit Plaintiffs July 25, 2018
Chiu Yuan Hu v Frenzel, 2018 NY Slip Op 05445 (1st Dept. 2018)
“In opposition to the defendant’s prima facie showing, the plaintiff raised triable issues of fact as to whether she sustained serious injuries to the cervical and thoracolumbar regions of her spine (see Perl v Meher, 18 NY3d 208, 215-218). Further, contrary to the determination of the Supreme Court, we find that the plaintiff adequately explained the gap in her treatment by submitting an affirmed medical report of her treating physician (see Pommells v Perez, 4 NY3d 566, 577; Jean-Baptiste v Tobias, 88 AD3d 962; Park v He Jung Lee, 84 AD3d 904, 905).”
It got harder as a Plaintiff to make a living on soft tissue cases today in the Second Department. I was waiting for the Second Department to follow the First Department. It has somewhat happened. Gap in treatment is back.